

MAN MORTAL.

THERE has just been issued from the press, in America, by a Mr. F. W. Grant, a work entitled *Life and Immortality: the Scripture doctrine briefly considered in relation to the current errors of Annihilationists*. It is a book of 160 pages, written with ability. It is the strongest thing yet published in the way of attack on the truth as advocated by the Christadelphians. It is clear, subtle, and temperate, with just a sufficient *animus* to give spice to the reading. It is not directed specifically against the Christadelphians, though largely dealing with them. As the title indicates, it concerns itself with "annihilationists" in general—that is, those who believe that death in its primary sense—"the cessation of conscious being"—is the wages of sin. Among these, it recognises grades, all of them more or less respectable, except the Christadelphians, whom Mr. Grant speaks of as "the lowest depths"—"a system in which no element of real Christianity remains behind." As, however, irrespective of grades, the argument against the respectable annihilationists, is an argument against the Christadelphians, we propose to deal with the argument on its merits—to weigh it in the balances, and to show how wanting it is, despite a prevailing acumen and candour, which, we doubt not, will go a great way in the convictions of such as are not practically acquainted with the subject discussed.

The line of argument is mostly original, and even when already-trodden ground is touched, it is a way of calling for fresh attention. We promise a thorough following of Mr. Grant—not in the ordinary

sense of the phrase, but in a sense that need not be less satisfactory to that gentleman if we can show, as we undertake to do, that his arguments are based on a misapprehension, not only of Scripture teaching, but of the doctrines of those against whom he writes with such excusable indignation; and that any effect produced by his endeavour, in harmony with his intention, is an effect against the truth and in favour of the refined heathenism of the day in which we live.

THE MEANING OF "ANNIHILATION."—A PLAIN MAN'S ARGUMENT.

As an appropriate introduction to our review, place may be given to the following remarks in reference to another writer, whose attack appeared simultaneously with Mr. Grant's.

A "PLAIN MAN" is introduced, and is supposed to be told by a Christadelphian "that death means annihilation in the sense of being blotted out of existence." To this the "plain man" is made to say, "How can this be? I have never heard of anything being blotted out of existence." From this it appears that the Plain Man is not so plain as he is called. It is just plain men that do believe in things being blotted out of existence. Ask John Clodman where the cows are that were butchered last year, and he will tell you that the cows are nowhere. It requires Mr. Complex Man, with the metaphysical subtlety of Scotch divinity, to put another face on the matter. He claps Mr. Plain Man on the back, and says, "John, man, your cows have not been blotted out of existence. They are only changed in the form in which they exist. They form strength and substance in the bodies of the men who have eaten them;" to which John Plain Man would very likely rejoin "The bodies of men are not cows." Mr. Plain Man is made to illustrate his unplain thoughts. "I sow my grain," says John, "and it moulders in the ground for a time, but it re-appears above ground, first the blade, then the ear; after that the full corn in the ear. Although, then, the grain is said to die, there must have been a living principle within it, or how could it spring up and bear much fruit?" To which we say, "but suppose, John, the grain did not re-appear above ground, first the blade, &c.;" what should you say then? Should not you conclude that it had been blotted out of existence? "Ah, but you see," says John, "it does re-appear." "Well, what about your father's old horse that you buried thirty years ago, when you were a boy; do you expect it will re-appear?" John shakes his head. "Do you conclude, then, it has been blotted out of existence?" John, tutored by Mr. Complex Man from the college, hesitates a little: so we have to press him. "Come, John, what about the old horse? Is it in existence?" John looks at his tutor, and ventures to say "Well, of course, the horse is dead." "Is it in existence? is my question." John receiving a wink from his metaphysical comrade, says, "The stuff as went to make the horse is in existence." "That is Jesuitical, John; my question is, Is the horse in existence?" "Well no, not exactly." "Is it at all in existence?" "Not the horse." "That is my question, John; then

the horse is out of existence. Now, how did it go out of existence? You know it died. Death blotted it out of existence. So you see you have heard of something being blotted out of existence. Now come, John, if a horse can be blotted out of existence while its substance and life continue in being, what makes it difficult for you to believe that death blots a man out of existence, notwithstanding that his substance and life continue?" John would probably say, as this article makes him say, that "man has a living principle within him, which in popular language is called soul and spirit."

THE IMMORTAL-SOUL THEORY.

John has to abandon the tale about never having heard of anything being blotted out of existence, and take refuge in the immortal-soul theory. This, therefore, must stand or fall on its own merits. Its merits, so far as John is made to argue the matter, can very briefly be put to the test. John says, "I have a soul or spirit." If this is to prove that man has an "immortal soul—a deathless spirit," what could be John's supposed answer when told that the beasts have a "soul or spirit?" John of the ordinary clod-hopping type, would indignantly deny that this was a fact, so John's attention would have to be called to this, "The moving creatures (great whales, every winged fowl, &c.) that hath soul."—(Gen. i. 20, 21.) "The soul of every living thing."—(Job xii. 10.) "The spirit of the beast."—(Eccles. iii. 21.) Upon this the argument would be: if the possession of "soul or spirit" makes man immortal, the beasts are immortal, for they possess "soul or spirit." What would John say to this? He could say nothing that would logically relieve him of the difficulty. He might try to jerk out of the dilemma. He might say that he did not care whether beasts had soul or not: he knew they weren't immortal like man: which would expose him to this rejoinder: If beasts can have soul and not be immortal, how can you regard man's having a soul as proving him immortal? He might be expected as one of his class to terminate the argument by saying what others of a more educated class have said under similar circumstances, "Well, you may say what you like: I believe man is immortal; and if he isn't, I would rather believe he is than receive your horrid doctrine: to which there is no answer but pity.

The writer seeks to maintain his argument as against the Christadelphians, by saying the words translated soul and spirit have "several significations." This fact is granted: nay, it is made use of by the Christadelphians to disprove the Platonic theory; for if they have "several significations," they obviously do not necessarily convey the popular idea. We admit "several significations," but here is the question: Among these "several significations," is *natural*

immortality one? This is the very marrow of the controversy. The writer has not attempted to prove this, and, therefore, on this point, there is nothing to reply to. If he had made the attempt, it must have been a complete failure, for "learned bishops" who have turned their attention to the matter, admit that the immortality of the soul is not taught in the Bible, but assumed, says one (Tillotson); not recognised, says another (Whately): Where the bishops have failed, is it to be expected that Canadian "evangelicals" can succeed?

Failing in this proof, the writer attacks "perish" and "annihilation." He puts the "plain man" forward again, and says when he reads of a wreck and a *hundred souls perishing* at sea, the "plain man" never suspects it means they were "blotted out of existence." He understands that the bodies are in the sea or washed upon some desolate shore, and the souls returned to God who gave them. So says the writer; but let us look into it a moment. As to the bodies, surely he will not deny that they are "blotted out of existence." If sharks eat them, they turn into shark, or if they are cast on "a desolate shore," and decompose, the vultures get them, or the atmosphere absorbs the fluids, as they are slowly disengaged, and after a time, the mouldering solids are washed away by the sea or scattered to the winds as dust. In any case, it will not be denied that the statement, "a hundred souls perished," involves the consequence that a hundred bodies are "blotted out of existence." We now look at "the souls:" "they return," says the writer, "to God who gave them." So far, good; but let us understand. What are "the souls?" Are they the persons or the lives that God gave as the means of the persons? Platonism says they are the persons. Where is the proof? There is none forthcoming. We take the cattle and dogs drowned at the same time: and ask what becomes of their lives? Did not God give the life of the beasts? Yes: (Psalm civ. 29, 30; Job xii. 7-10). Does it not "return to God who gave it?" Who will deny it? What returns: the beast or the life that is not the beast but the property of God, by which the beast existed? What returns: the man or the life which is not the man, but the lent power of God by which the man was enabled to be? Who can falter? The man DIES. "His breath (spirit) goeth forth: HE returneth to his earth: in that very day his thoughts perish."—(Psalm clxvi. 4). That returns which came at first. What came at first: a man or the life to enable a man to be? A man did not come: therefore a man does not go. Life came, and life returns. When life comes, man is: when life goes, man is not. So that John Plain Man's idea properly worked out goes against the hostile writer.

Then he makes a strong butt at "annihilation." "Be it understood," he says, "the word is not found in our English Bible." Very

true; and the immortal-soulist writer ought also to have it understood that the word is not found in the arguments of Christadelphians. It is a word put upon them by their opponents, which they decline to adopt because of the perverted meaning it has conventionally acquired. On this point we refer to *Everlasting Punishment not Eternal Torments*—(Reply to Dr. Argus.) pp. 30-33.

The term "life" next receives a little attention, the "plain man" being still the mouthpiece of the argument. The "plain man" we are told, recognises life as "sometimes meaning simply existence," (as where it is said "the moving creature that hath life") and at other times, *well-being, favour, &c.* (as where it is written "thou wilt show me the path of life.") And it is added the "plain man" is surprised to find that this distinction is not observed by the Christadelphians. We suspect the "plain man" is speaking upon very limited information. If the "plain man" were acquainted with the people against whom he is made to speak, he would find the distinction between primary and secondary meanings carefully recognised; but he would also find that no secondary meanings that upset the primary are received. The primary is always made to govern, as all rules of sense allow and usage sanctions. The artificial meanings invented by theology, and unsupported by the Bible, are rejected. When they read "Thou wilt show me the path of life," while recognising *favour, well-being, blessing, &c.*, as involved in the statement, they refuse to detach these qualities from the first idea of existence, in obedience to a theory that wishes to provide for the existence of a class who are to be "burnt up," and "leaving neither root nor branch."—(Mal. iv. 1.) They preserve the primary while recognising the secondary.

The article concludes with a wholesome exhortation to "orthodox believers" not to take the fundamental doctrines of the Bible so much for granted, but to qualify themselves by study to be able to "give to every one that asketh of them a reason of the hope that is within them." No course will be more certain than this to open their eyes to see that "the fundamental doctrines of the Bible" are rejected by the system they have been taught to regard as the sum of all truth.

"ERRORS OF ANNIHILATIONISTS."—MR. GRANT'S BOOK.

Mr. Grant divides his book as follows:—Part I.: "Man as he is," Part II.: "Death and the Intermediate State." Part III.: "The final issues." These are subdivided into sixteen smaller sections, in which most phases of the matter are brought under review. We cannot do better than follow Mr. Grant section by section, and point out the leading flaws in the argument.

CHAPTER I.—"IS THE BODY ALL?"

THIS is the first question to which Mr. Grant addresses himself, as to which, it has to be observed that the issue raised is fictitious, if by "body" is to be understood an inanimate body. We never knew anyone contend that the body as mere substance in form, was "all." If "living body" is meant, we have a different question to consider. Mr. Grant fails to define the point. If he mean inanimate body, he is in error in attributing to the Christadelphians the proposition that "the body is the whole man." If he mean the living body, he is inconsistent in asserting that to Christadelphians, "dust thou art" expresses what he is *in his whole being*. It would have been satisfactory if he had clearly taken one ground or other.

But as we cannot imagine that he seriously supposes a lifeless body to be a man *in his whole being*, in the estimation of Christadelphians, we will proceed on the only admissible supposition, that the "body" of Mr. Grant's sentences means "living body." With this reading, we admit the charge of holding that the (living) body is the whole man, and are wondering what objection Mr. Grant himself can have to this view; for even with his immortal soul theory, he cannot avoid regarding the living body as being "the whole man," since the living body contains that which his theory teaches him to regard as the principal part of man.

The living body is surely "the whole man." A dead body is a man having commenced to cease to be a man: losing first life, then moisture, and finally organization in that process of disintegration by which he returns to the dust whence he came.

Mr. Grant is surprised at Dr. Thomas "gravely adducing Rom. viii. 6"—*το φρονηματα σαρκος* the thinking of the flesh, in proof that the flesh is the thinking substance: and at his citing the further apostolic

expression "the fleshy tablet of the heart," in confirmation of the view. As both expressions appear to mean precisely what Dr. Thomas quoted them to teach; and as they are both, on the face of them at least, incompatible with the Platonic idea that an immaterial soul, and not the flesh, performs the thinking; and as moreover Mr. Grant gives no reason for demurring, we must dismiss the matter with a counter expression of surprise that a man of Mr. Grant's subtlety should be surprised at so reasonable an application of words.

Mr. Grant admits that "there are passages which seem to make the body all," such as, "dust thou art," but contends "there are many on the other side that equally seem to make the body *nothing*;" in illustration of which he quotes:—

- "The life which I now live in the flesh."—(Gal. ii. 20.)
- "If I live in the flesh."—(Phil. i. 22.)
- "Whilst we are at home in the body."—(2 Cor. v. 6.)
- "Willing rather to be absent from the body."—(verse 8.)
- "Whether in the body or out of the body, I cannot tell."—(2 Cor. xii. 2.)
- "As being yourselves also in the body."—(Heb. xiii. 8.)
- "In my flesh shall I see God."—(Job xix.)
- "Knowing that I must put off this my tabernacle."—(2 Peter i. 14.)

He declares these to exemplify "a use of words which contradicts at the outset the whole materialistic philosophy." He says the language used in these passages "never could have arisen on the materialist supposition."

This can only be maintained on the supposition that the language affirms man to be a spiritual entity, in a body from which he can be detached without detriment to his faculties. That is to say, when Paul says "the life that I now live in the flesh," we must understand that he means distinctly to intimate that the "I" is an invisible detachable immortal self, dwelling in the flesh. And so with the other passages: for if this be not the construction Mr. Grant puts upon the passages, how can he construe them to contradict the obnoxious "philosophy?" But this indisputably is the construction he puts upon them. And the question is: Is it a right construction? If it is, it will suit every similar expression employed by the same writers, and dovetail with all their allusions to the individuality of man; for if there is anything in the argument at all, the force lies here: *the writers of these phrases had such a distinct view of the immateriality and separability of man before their minds, that it moulded the phrases by which they expressed their relation to the external conditions of life and to destiny beyond.*

Let us see, then, whether this theory of their language is maintainable. We put it to the test by asking whether it will suit every case. We insist upon its suiting every case, if it is true: for surely Mr.

Grant would not contend that the immaterial view moulded apostolic language in some instances and not in others. If a latent recognition in the apostolic mind, of the immortal soul theory, be the explanation of such phrases as "the life that I now live in the flesh," that same latent recognition would be active enough to prevent the apostolic pen writing phrases inconsistent with that theory in any other instance. Can there be reasonable demur to this? We trow not. If, then, we find the apostles employing phrases inconsistent with this theory, we can but conclude that Mr. Grant has not hit upon the right method of construing the passages above quoted; and it will remain to submit another which will harmonise all phrases.

Now we do find the apostles using phrases inconsistent with Mr. Grant's explanation of those above. Paul says, "I know that in me (that is in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing."—(Rom. vii.) Here "me" is synonymised with "my flesh." It is as if Paul said "me" and "my flesh" are the same thing. But if Paul had had the latent recognition of immortal-soulism which Mr. Grant's argument requires, he could not have said this; for that recognition would have taught him carefully to distinguish between "me" and "my flesh," and have said, "I know that in my flesh dwelleth no good thing, but my flesh is not me, and therefore I take comfort." Be it observed also that Paul in this verse is discoursing on moral quality. When he says "no good thing," he is speaking of sin, as the context will show. He attributes sin to the flesh. "Sin that dwelleth in me: for I know that in me (that is in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing." Now, a latent recognition of immortal-soulism would have prevented Paul from writing thus, for that theory recognises sin as the quality of the immaterial soul, and regards flesh as a passive instrument in the hands of the soul.

Again Paul, in allusion to sufferings endured, says, "We despaired even of life. We had the sentence of death in ourselves, that we should not trust in ourselves, but in God that raiseth the dead."—(2 Cor. i. 8.) Here Paul speaks plurally. Let us take it in the singular, and we shall find the same idea as in Rom. vii. 18: "Sentence of death in myself." What is the "self" in the case? Mr. Grant says the self is the immaterial tenant of the body. Then the question is, in what sense, in harmony with Mr. Grant's theology, was the immortal soul of Paul subject to "sentence of death?" seeing that according to that theology, it could not die physically, and was delivered from death spiritually? And why should Paul trust in the resurrection of dead bodies as a solace for death in his soul? If to this, it is answered that Paul, doubtless, had reference to his body, then be it observed that Paul calls his body "myself," and looks to the resurrection for hope, which

he would not have done if a recognition of immortal-soulism in the other passages, caused him to discriminate between his "I" and the "flesh;" for, in this case, the same recognition would have led him to discriminate between himself and his body, and to look to death as the time of its salvation.

We append further illustrations of the same thing, to all of which the foregoing remarks apply.

- "After my decease."—(2 Pet. i. 15.)
 "We (this corruptible) shall be changed."—(1 Cor. xv. 51.)
 "We have borne the image of the earthy."—(1 Cor. xv. 47.)
 "That the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh."—
 (2 Cor. iv. 11.)
 "We preach not ourselves. . . . We have this treasure (the knowledge of the glory of God) in earthen vessels."—(2 Cor. iv. 7.)
 "Separated me from my mother's womb."
 "I was unknown by face."—(Gal. i. 22.)
 "Your bodies are members of Christ."—(1 Cor. vi. 15.)
 "We are members of his body, flesh, and bones."—(Eph. v. 20.)
 "For the work of Christ, HE was nigh unto death, not regarding his life."
 —(Phil. ii. 30.)
 "Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ."—(Col. iii. 3.)
 "THEY that are asleep."—(1 Thess. iv. 13.)
 "THEY that are fallen asleep."—(1 Cor. xv. 18.)
 "Stephen . . . HE fell asleep."—(Acts vii. 60.)
 "If by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead."—
 (Phil. iii. 10.)
 "I shall go down to the grave mourning."—(Gen. xxxvii. 35.)
 "I am formed out of the clay."—(Job xxxiii. 6.)
 "Wilt thou bring me into dust again?"—(Job x. 9.)
 "I would not live away."—(Job vii. 16.)
 "I shall sleep in the dust."—(Job vii. 2.)
 "OUR rest together is in the dust."—(Job xvi. 17.)
 "He that raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise up us also by him."—
 (2 Cor. iv. 14.)

We had sorted out other instances, but content ourselves with the foregoing, which we set against Mr. Grant's eight in the sense of showing the impossibility of his construction of the eight. Our view admits of the eight being reconciled with the twenty-two, whereas Mr. Grant's reading of the eight will not fit the twenty-two. For what is that reading? That the inspired writers had such a distinct impression of the immaterial nature of man as to give it precise verbal expression in the eight passages quoted. If this is the explanation of the phraseology in those eight passages, would it not follow that in all cases the same discernment would have expressed itself always with the same precision, and avoided language which confounds the individuality with the body, as in the foregoing twenty-two cases?

We submit that a single exception would be sufficient to upset Mr.

Grant's inference, and leave the way open for the second question, which in the presence of so many exceptions, we now proceed to consider, viz., whether there is not a principle upon which the language of the eight passages can be understood in perfect harmony with the doctrine of human mortality? Mr. Grant says "such language never could have arisen on the materialist supposition." But this is a mere assertion which he does not attempt to sustain. We grant that on the true materialist supposition (which denies future existence), such language could never have arisen; but in view of the fact that "there shall be a resurrection of the just and of the unjust," is it unnatural that men related to that resurrection should meanwhile be considered and spoken of as in a condition of sojourn? It is most natural that a man whose destiny is to be raised and glorified and introduced to immortality at the second coming of Christ, should speak of his present life as "the life he now lives in the flesh." He does not thereby give expression to the philosophy of existence as Mr. Grant understands it. He merely gives practical definition to his present existence in contrast with the life that is to come. When he says "in this (body) we groan, being burdened, not that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon (with our house—body—from heaven) that MORTALITY might be swallowed up of life," it is a wonderful treatment of language to understand him to mean he is anxious for the (supposed) immortal to quit the mortal, and mount to "realms above." When, therefore, in the following out of his idea, he says in the immediate connection that while at home in the body, he is absent from the Lord, it is doing violence to the subject to understand him to mean that he must die to be with the Lord. Paul expressly excludes such a construction of his words when he teaches in 1 Thess. iv. 16-17, that it is only when the Lord himself shall descend from heaven, the dead raised and the living changed, that we "shall be with the Lord." "At home in the body" is synonymous with "in this we groan, being burdened," and as the cure desired by Paul for the burdensome body is "being clothed upon with the house (body) from heaven, that mortality might be swallowed up of life," it follows that "presence with the Lord" is descriptive of the same consummation. Paul teaches that there is no presence with the Lord till the Lord comes; in speaking of "the coming of our Lord Jesus AND our gathering together unto him;" and in saying "He that raiseth up the Lord Jesus shall raise up us by Jesus, and SHALL PRESENT US WITH YOU."—(2 Cor. iv. 14.) Paul's expressions, interpreted by Paul's teaching, are intelligible enough. Interpreted as Mr. Grant suggests, they work confusion. Remember them that suffer adversity "as being yourselves also in the body," is explained by 1 Cor. xii. 13: "By one spirit are we all

baptised into *one body*. . . . The members should have the same care one for another, or whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it."

"*Whether in the body or out of the body I cannot tell.*"—(2 Cor. xii. 3.) The Greek words are *eite en somati ouk oida, eite ekτος του somatos ouk oida*, which, literally rendered, would read: "whether in a body or without the body I know not." Paul's doubt is as to whether the things he saw were real or visionary. The context shows this. If it was in a body, he saw them; they were actual; because to see things actually a man must be bodily present. If without the body, the things were seen as in a dream, in which a man without bodily presence appears to see places and persons, and hear voices that have no actual existence except in his brain. The visions and revelations seen by Paul fourteen years before the date of his writing were so vivid, while, at the same time, his life immediately after was so entirely resumed in the same channel, that he could not tell whether he had been carried away to see actual sights or had merely seen them in vision. This is intelligible. But Mr. Grant quotes the phrase to sanction the popular notion of disembodiment. How could Paul be in doubt as to whether he was dead or alive "fourteen years ago?"

"*In my flesh shall I see God.*" Why should Job say this if he expected to see God on leaving the flesh in death? The antithesis, of which the words form a part, gives them great force, "*Though worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God.*" This expression of faith implies that in Job's estimation, the destruction of the body by the worms would for a time interfere with his seeing God. Doubtless, Mr. Grant intends the emphasis to rest on the personal pronoun, I, with the suggestion that "I" means one thing (that is, the immortal soul) and "my flesh" another, and that Job meant to say that he—the immortal Job—would, through material flesh, have visions of God. A strange thing for Job to say on the supposition that he looked to see God much sooner and far better as a disembodied Job in heaven. It has again to be said that Job is not using the language of the schools. He is not defining a philosophy but giving expression to a practical faith in practical language, that though the disease and corruption that then had fast hold on him should destroy him he should see God in the latter day, when the Redeemer should stand on the earth, and liberate His death-bound friends from the pit of corruption. If any obstinate insistence is made on a metaphysical construction of Job's words, it is sufficient to quote Job's other words, "*I shall sleep in the dust.*"—(vii. 21.) If the "I" in the one verse means immortal soul, why not in the other? And would it comport with Mr. Grant's views, that the immortal soul should "sleep in the dust?" We trow not. The conclusion is evident.

"*Knowing that I must put off this my tabernacle.*"—(2 Peter i. 14.)

This is explained in the next verse as "my decease." The words are a figurative description of death, and appropriate enough in whatever form it may be encountered. All that constitutes our individuality dwells in the body of our humiliation; but the destiny of the state is to have "this corruptible" "clothed upon" with a subduing energy that will change it from flesh-and-blood nature into spirit nature.—(Phil. iii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 53, 54.) Therefore it is to him but a "tabernacle," or place of temporary stay. He "waits for the adoption, to wit the redemption of the body."—(Rom. viii. 23.) In death, he puts it off, and "falls asleep." To some there will be no interval between the tabernacle state and the glory to be revealed. They put not off the tabernacle, but pass, without a break, into that state of incorruptibility, in which the "tabernacle" is swallowed up of life. This was not Peter's case. To him it had been revealed "by what DEATH he should glorify God."—(Jno. xxi. 18-19.) Hence his anxiety to arrange so that "after his decease," believers might "have these things always in remembrance."

Mr. Grant contends that the eight passages quoted by him go to show that there is a man "in the body;" not the *soul* or the *spirit*, but THE MAN. His words are: "That which lives in the body *is the man*," and this man he affirms to be capable of conscious separation from the body, and of being "a conscious intelligent witness" of whatever may be presented for its consideration. That the eight passages do not warrant his conclusion, we have sought to show.

WHAT IS MAN?

It is but necessary now to remember how opposed to the first principles of the subject Mr. Grant's proposition is. One of these first principles lies bare in the very word "man." What is the meaning of this term? Notoriously it means red earth, or clay, and points to the origin and constitution of the creature so named. Hence what an anomaly is involved in Mr. Grant's proposition—that man, which means *made of earth*, is not made of earth at all, but is the mere inhabitant of a house made of earth. Other obstacles are to be found in the express declarations of Scripture: "The Lord God made MAN *of the dust of the ground.*" If man be "that which lives in the body,"—an invisible tenant, capable of conscious separation from the body—how are we to understand the statement that HE was made of dust? Mr. Grant's position is that "HE" is not dust at all, but spiritual—the spiritual inhabitant of a mud hut as it were. Consequently, Mr. Grant is in opposition to the testimony. Again "The first MAN is of the *earth, EARTHY.*"—(1 Cor. xv. 46.) "If God gather unto Himself His spirit and His breath"

MAN should turn AGAIN into dust."—(Job xxxiv. 14.) How can man turn again into dust if he be not dust at all, but the invisible tenant of a dust house? How can it be said he is "of the earth, earthy," if he be not of the earth, earthy, but of heaven, heavenly, inhabiting an earthy house?

It is unavailing to quote Paul's phrase, "the earthly house of this tabernacle:" for surely Mr. Grant will never contend that Paul in those words is giving a literal definition of the human constitution. Is he not speaking the language of figure? It cannot be denied; for a body, which Mr. Grant must admit Paul is talking about, is not a house literally. If he is speaking the language of figure, the reasonable treatment of his words will be to find the import of the figure in the literal subject-matter of his discourse. This literal subject-matter is very obvious. It is defined thus in the immediate context: "For we who live are always delivered to death for Jesus' sake, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh knowing that He who raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise us up also by Jesus and shall present us with you."—(2 Cor. iv. 11-14.) This shows that the matter before Paul's mind is the glory to be revealed to every saint at the resurrection; as John also has it, "It doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that WHEN HE SHALL APPEAR, we shall be like him."—(1 John iii. 2.) Again Paul: "When Christ who is our life SHALL APPEAR, then shall we also appear with him in glory."—(Col. iii. 3.) This being the hope to which Paul for a moment gives a figurative dress, in speaking of our present body as a tabernacle, or place of temporary and grossing stay, and of the body to be given by Christ at his coming as a house brought from heaven, how unskillful to construe his figure literally, and extract from it a declaration subversive of his hope!

But Mr. Grant comes boldly to the question: "What about the texts which on their side, the Annihilationists lay stress upon? such as 'Dust thou art?'" His answer to this is in reality a destruction of his position. He says, "It is just as plain that in these texts, man is identified with his body as in the former ones with his spirit or soul. It would be wrong to argue exclusively from either class of passages: as wrong to say man is all soul upon the authority of one as to say that he was all body upon the authority of the other. Neither body, nor soul, nor spirit, is the man exclusively, but spirit and soul and body (1 Thess. v. 23) make up the man: in such sort that he may be and is identified with either according to the line of thought which is in the mind of the speaker."

The analysis of these sentences will yield fatal results to Mr. Grant's theory. He admits, as he is bound to, that in the Scriptures "man is identified with his body." It would represent his view of

the matter to say that the body is the third part of man. Now, as to this third, what is the effect of death upon it? Is it not to destroy it? Unquestionably. So that as to this third, Mr. Grant is bound to admit that man is not immortal. Now if the separation of the different parts of man is fatal to that one which we see—"the body"—what proof has Mr. Grant to offer that it is not equally fatal to the remaining invisible two? (granting for the sake of argument that these are to be considered as separable entities.) The substance of the body continues, but ceases to belong to the man: it is appropriated by other organisms or chemical affinities. What evidence is there that the vital energy or mental power does not equally cease for the time to appertain to the man who was? They existed before he was born, like the substance that made his body; but they were not his. May they not when he dies, revert to original and eternal conditions equally with the substance of his body? Nature is distinctly against Mr. Grant here; Where is Scripture on his side? Where are the phrases "immortal soul," "immortal spirit," by which the theory is in our day carefully preserved from misunderstanding? They are not. Mr. Grant attempts to make good their absence by citing the inevitable fictions of mortal speech, which, treated as Mr. Grant does in this instance, would prove not only the immortality, but the eternity of all mankind; e.g., "Thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations. Before the mountains were brought forth or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou—God."—(Psalm xc. 1.) "Given us in Christ Jesus before the world began."—(2 Tim. i. 9.) If the us of the last verse could stand related to a something done before they existed, surely they can be spoken of as related to something while momentarily dead, without involving the conclusion that they must be at the time actually in existence.

Mr. Grant truly says, "Spirit, soul, and body make up the man;" but if this is correct, upon what hypothesis can we consider man as still existent when that which "makes him up" is taken down? Again the question recurs: why are we to assume the surviving identity of "soul" and "spirit" when the identity of "body" is self-evidently destroyed by the analysis? "He (man) may be," continues Mr. Grant, "identified with either (body, soul, or spirit) according to the line of thought which is in the mind of the speaker." Excellent; but see how it turns. If "the line of thought" assumes that man is mortal, and that in death he is non-existent for the time, except as related to the divine purpose, would it not be illogical to extract from any form of verbal "identification," a conclusion requiring us to consider man immortal and existent in death? If the "line of thought" has the Platonic theory of natural immortality as its basis, doubtless the allusions

would be affirmatory of Platonism. Is it not obvious that the basis of "the line of thought" is the thing to be tested? Annihilationists, as Mr. Grant calls them, speak of a man being "lean of soul," hasty in *spirit*, stout in *body*, or of a dead *body*, the life (or soul) departed; or the spirit returned to God: without recognising Mr. Grant's theory of these things. They identify man "with either (body, soul, or spirit) according to the line of thought" which is in their minds. If this is so with them, the rule applies to the Scriptures.

Hence it seems insufficient to quote verbal allusions and "identifications" such as those set forth in the sentences under review, as proof that Mr. Grant's theory, to which he can make them conform, is the theory upon which they are based: for "Annihilationists" (as he calls them) can also conform them to their conceptions of truth. The argument must go deeper, and deal with the principles of human existence as revealed in the Scriptures of truth. Let Mr. Grant quote a single divine declaration that man is immortal, and the controversy will collapse in his favour; but in the absence of such declaration, and the presence of many declarations of a contrary tenour, Annihilationists (as he calls them) must needs continue the strife, which is no strife of words, as Mr. Grant himself is witness.

We notice for a moment Mr. Grant's definition of the process or application of "identification," to show that his definition, though favourable to his theory, is false to fact (in the logical sense of course). He says that man's "identification with the body which man sees and touches," is "in general the language of sense, while *faith identifies him with the unseen spirit.*" We demur to both propositions. To make manifest the reason of our demur, it is necessary to recall attention to the nature of "faith," and we care only for the scriptural sense of the term. This is given as follows: "Faith is the substance of things HOPED FOR." Faith is, therefore, the belief of promise; which is illustrated in the following connection of words: "He (Abraham) staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief, but was strong in faith."—(Rom. iv. 20.) Now this kind of faith—"being fully persuaded that what God promises He is also able to perform" (v. 21)—has as much to do with body as with mind. God has promised to raise the dead (and surely this is *body*); is it not the anticipation of *faith* that looks forward to the resurrection of bodies from the grave? In faith, we look to see "Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets in the kingdom of God" (Luke xiii. 28), and this when God shall have raised them—in the time spoken of as "the time of the dead," when it is said God will "give reward unto His servants the prophets, and to the saints, and to them that fear His name, both small and great."—(Rev. xi. 18.) Now in this anticipation,

faith identifies them with their bodies. How else could they be identified? *Faith* believes in the resurrection of Jesus, and identifies him with *his body*.

Rejecting the suggestion that the identification of a man with his body is necessarily the language of sense, we equally repudiate the proposition that "faith identifies him with the unseen spirit." The "unseen spirit" is visibly manifested to and recognised by sense. Does it require "faith" to note that a man is angry? The man that is hasty of (unseen) spirit is known and read of all, even the most faithless. The perception of the fact is *entirely a matter of sense*. How has Mr. Grant learnt the peculiarities of what he terms "our poor Annihilationists?" Is it not by the *reading* of books or hearing of speech? And what is this? The exercise of "sense," without which he would have been unable to identify the poor Annihilationists with their "unseen spirit," if he had nursed his "faith" by the chimney corner from the first unconscious moment of his babyhood till now. (By the bye, he ought not to have had any unconscious moments of existence if his theory is right). They can afford, then, to endure him when he says our poor Annihilationists see and confess what sense recognises, and are blind to the other." They correct him by saying, "By the recognitions of sense, applied to the truth, they are enabled to obtain access to the glorious things hoped for' by faith: it is one of their beliefs that '*faith* COMETH BY (the sense of) HEARING.'" And if they were playfully inclined, they might return Mr. Grant's compliment by saying that "the poor Immaterialists are so perverted in their mental operations by their theory, that they are but blind to the self-evident lessons of sense: while as to faith (which HOPES FOR things promised), they have lost it in the contemplation of the creations of their own imagination."

Mr. Grant concludes his chapter with a few remarks on the narrative of the Lord's burial. He calls attention to the phraseology: "there they lay *Jesus*: they took *him* down and wrapped *him* in the linen and laid *him* in a sepulchre." Upon which he asks, "Is this as conclusive that the Lord was all body as similar words about Stephen would seem to be that *he* was?" We have disposed of this question in pointing out that Mr. Grant is wrong in representing that the "Annihilationists" teach that Stephen was "*all* body." "Soul and spirit" were requisite to complete Stephen as a living person. When Stephen died, there was a dead body which was called Stephen *with reference to what had been*. The life and spirit of Stephen had been re-absorbed in their original source, and their restoration is necessary to the reconstitution of the dead Stephen whose being is meanwhile in abeyance.

But we look at the question as applied to Christ. Mr. Grant asks, "Was there nothing of Christ but what was laid in the grave?"

Answer: "Yes." "What?" Answer: "God, who was in Christ."—(2 Cor. v. 19.) This is Paul's statement, who also says God was manifested in him.—(1 Tim. iii. 16.) Jesus gives the same account of himself in saying, "The Father dwelleth in me." "The words that I speak, I speak not of myself." "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." This much then was left of Christ while he lay in the grave: God, who in the fulness of the Spirit, had tabernacled in Jesus in the days of his flesh. "Christ died:" but the Father, who cannot die, remained, and raised Christ from the dead on the third day.

Against this, Mr. Grant quotes the words of Christ, "I have power to lay down my life and I have power to take it again," asking how could a dead body have the power to take its life back? The answer to this is, that the dead body did not resume its own life, nor did a disembodied "man Christ Jesus," do it. The power that actually restored the life of the crucified one, was the Father whose instrument he was. This is abundantly proved by the following Scriptures of which we quote one specimen: "This Jesus hath God raised up whereof we all are witnesses."—(Acts ii. 24-32; iii. 15; iv. 10; v. 30; x. 40; xiii. 30; Rom. viii. 11; 1 Cor. vi. 14; xv. 15; 2 Cor. iv. 14; Gal. i. 1; Ephes. i. 19-20; 2 Tim. ii. 8; Heb. xiii. 20.) The Father who quitted the Lord Jesus and left him to die on the cross, quickened his dead body on the third day, and resumed the habitation interrupted by Calvary. When in the light of these facts and the context, we look at the words of Christ quoted by Mr. Grant, we read them differently from him. The context, "No man taketh it (my life) from me; but I lay it down of myself," shews that the question was the relation of his death to the malice of his enemies, and to his own will. It was to be a voluntary thing, not a thing forced upon him. If his will had been not to die, men and angels would have combined in vain to destroy him. His death was voluntary. Still it was none the less a matter of fact that men killed him. Thus Peter says, "Him . . . ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain" (Acts ii. 23); and, again, "Ye have killed the Prince of Life."—(Acts iii. 15.) It was his own act in so far as he coincided in it and could have prevented it, as he said, "Could I not pray to my Father and He would send me twelve legions of angels."—(Matt. xxvi. 53.) Yet it was none the less a murder on the part of those who put him to death.—(Acts vii. 52.) "Power to lay it down and power to take it up again" is not a strict rendering of the original. The word translated "power" is *ἐξουσία*, which carries with it not so much the idea of physical power as power in the sense of authority. It is the word translated "authority" in the following: "I am a man set under authority."—(Luke vii. 8.) "He

spake as one having authority."—(Matt. vii. 29.) "By what authority doest thou these things?"—(Luke xx. 2.) "Here he hath authority from the chief priests."—(Acts ix. 14.) The proper word for "power" in the other sense is *dunamis* as in the following: "Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit."—(Luke iv. 14.) "The power of the Lord was present to heal."—(Luke v. 17.) He having said "I have power (authority) to lay it down, and I have power (authority) to take (or receive) (*labein*) it again," Jesus immediately adds, "This commandment I have received of my Father" (John x. 18), which throws back upon *ἐξουσία* (power or authority) the light or sense of instruction; order, or commission. It is as much as if Jesus had said that laying down his life was a matter of divine pre-arrangement which he had authority from the Father to execute; and not a matter of compulsion from men, though they would be accessory to it. Peter combines the two features in saying on the day of Pentecost: "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, YE HAVE TAKEN" (Acts ii. 23); or, as we read it in those unfigurative words of the Lord, "Behold we go up to Jerusalem and all things which are written by the prophets concerning the Son of Man shall be accomplished. For he shall be delivered unto the Gentiles, and shall be mocked and spitefully entreated, and spitted on, and they shall scourge him and put him to death, and the third day he shall rise again."—(Luke xviii. 31-33.) The power or authority to take or receive his laid-down life again is in allusion to the resurrection, which was God's work.

Mr. Grant contends that an invisible Christ in Jesus—(corresponding to the invisible man which he contends for in a human being,)—laid down his life, and took it up again. Has he realised the full significance of this? If an invisible Christ laid down HIS LIFE, what was his state in relation to life after having done so? One could understand the consistency, at least, of Mr. Grant's theory, if it was a case of laying-down "the body;" but laying-down "the life" and yet having it before taking it up again, is confusion. The point aimed at by Mr. Grant is to establish the existence of a disembodied Christ, so as to deprive those he writes against of those Scriptures which speak of the dead persons as the persons themselves. He wishes to set against those Scriptures the passages which speak of *Jesus* being buried, from which he aims to be able to turn in triumph, and say, "Yet Jesus was elsewhere." The argument in his own words is this: "Now if the Lord lay in the grave, and yet the higher part did not lie there, so (plainly) might David, or Stephen, or Moses, lie in the grave and yet have another and a higher part of them which did not lie there." But the truth bars the way to this. The higher part of Jesus was God. The Spirit descended, and as it were clothed itself

with flesh, in the begetting of Jesus of Mary, and afterwards received a higher effusion from the same Father-source at his baptism. "At his death, the "higher part" (which was the teaching and miracle-working part) forsook him, and left Jesus the man, to die.

What parallel is there to this in the children of Adam who are altogether "of the earth, earthy?" None. Mr. Grant feels that he has no hold on this point against the Christadelphians. He speaks of "the fearful *self-consistency* of Thomasism," in parrying the thrust of any argument from this doctrine. The nature of "Thomasism" he somewhat misapprehends on this point; but it is useful to notice that he admits that arguments which tell against other "Annihilationists," are powerless against the Christadelphian portion.

CHAPTER II.

"MAN TRIUNE."

MR. GRANT'S chapter on "Man Triune" requires not many words to dispose of it from a Christadelphian point of view. Its object is to prove that "the physical constitution of man as defined by the holy Scriptures," comprehends three separate elements, "spirit, soul, and body." These he says are "three constituent parts," each of which is necessary to "the whole man." This, says Mr. Grant, "is denied on the part of those who hold——" what? "That the body is the whole man." We must object on the part of all Christadelphians to be confounded with these, if there are such. We are of those who recognise the possibility of 1, a body without life or mind; that is, a corpse; 2, a body with life but lacking mind, as in the case of the lowest type of idiot; neither of which would appeal to our appreciations. We are of those who find pleasure only in the combination of "body, soul, and spirit," as constituting "the whole man." In this sense, we stand as stoutly as Mr. Grant, by 1 Thess. v. 23: "I pray God that your whole *spirit, soul, and body* be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." We recognise no "whole man," and in the strict sense, no man at all, away from this essential combination.

Wherein then do we differ from Mr. Grant's "triune" theory of man? The difference will be found in the definition of the elements as separate elements which in combination constitute the "trinity in unity." Mr. Grant contends for a "spirit" that remains a thinking spirit when the "whole man" no longer exists to possess it; and a soul that remains an individual vital thing when there is no whole man for it to vitalise; why he does not also contend for the continued existence of a body when the partnership between "spirit, soul, and body" is dissolved, is presumably due to the ocular evidence in a contrary direction, presented in the mouldering corruption of the grave. But for this ocular evidence, there would be as much reason for believing in the separate existence of the body in death as in the separate existence of the other two. But the ocular evidence is an insuperable obstacle to any theory of the continued existence of the body, at least with the majority of people; there is a sect of Jews reported to believe that the body is conveyed

subterraneously to a place of rendezvous where it is preserved against the day of resurrection.

Mr. Grant, however, believes in the "annihilation" of the body—one "constituent element" of the "whole man;" but he insists upon the immortality of the other two "constituent elements."

So far as this chapter goes, he does no more than insist. He adduces no evidence. He merely cites 1 Thess. v. 23 (quoted above), which is no evidence at all, since it merely defines the aspects of human nature while it is a living thing, without telling us anything of the mortality of the body or the immortality of the soul believed in by Mr. Grant. Ought it not to occur to Mr. Grant as strange that the soul, if immortal, should sink to a low ebb when nutrition is cut off, or the atmosphere robbed of oxygen? Surely he is not above discussing food and air, since both are the work of God; and surely he cannot justly consider it "carnal" for us to take notice of the relations which God has established between these things and ourselves. Not only physical life or soul, but mental faculty fails, and fades, and disappears (not from outward manifestation merely, but from *inner consciousness*) before injury, starvation, or age. "Spirit" and "soul" are stopped in their operation by conditions which, if Mr. Grant's theory were true, could not affect them.

For "the remarks of Ellis and Read upon the text," the Christadelphians are nowise responsible. Uncertain and contradictory reasoning is natural on the part of men knowing only a part of the truth as these men do. Mr. Grant's strictures on their arguments do not touch the Christadelphian position in the slightest degree. We, therefore, pass them by, regretting merely that Mr. Grant should appear to get an advantage which is due not to the strength of Mr. Grant's position in itself, but to the incompetence of the diluted "annihilationism" which he combats in conjunction with his assaults on the Christadelphian position.

And with this remark we might leave the "MAN TRIUNE" chapter, were it not for his passing allusion to a view advanced by Dr. Thomas. Dr. Thomas has written, "the flesh thinks," as implied in the apostolic phrase, "the mind of the flesh," and as made patent to the consciousness of every man when the brain is wearied. But Mr. Grant does not believe the flesh thinks; and he avails himself of what evidence he thinks the "spirit, soul, and body" passage affords in favour of his disbelief.

He calls attention to the fact that Paul expresses a desire for the sanctification of all three—"spirit, soul and body." "Now," says he, "if the flesh thinks, let the body be sanctified and all is done." This is cogent if the body as here expressed is taken as the whole living, thinking man; but it is evident that it is considered apart

from the life and spirit at work in it, just as the life and spirit are considered apart from the body; not that they can be taken apart, but they present themselves separately to the cognition, as the shape, colour, and substance of a hat, which, though identical with and inseparable from the hat itself, can be thought and spoken of as entities separable from the hat. And does not this illustration in truth suggest the meaning of Paul's words? How could a man more fervently express the entirety and the integrity of a thing than by specifying all the aspects in which it presents itself to the cognition? But would it not be a perverse treatment of his words to extort from them a theory that these separate aspects could exist separately? This is what Mr. Grant is guilty of in treating as a scientific analysis of human nature the fervent hyperbolism of an apostolic benediction.

Mr. Grant's concluding sentence, that "spirit, soul, and body, are the man," is according to truth; but when we put the question "separately or in combination?" we discern the extent to which the proposition is intended (unknowingly) to bear against the truth.

Mr. Grant points to the "ample confirmation" which his view receives in his treatment, in separate chapters, on "spirit," "soul," and "body." In these, then, we must needs follow him, in the confidence of dispelling his argument, and developing what will be the opposite of "ample confirmation" of his unscriptural views. Meanwhile, at the risk of repetition, we cannot refrain from pointing out that his theory of man's capability of subsistence in three *separated* elements is discountenanced by our experience that one of the three which is open to actual observation. The body, when separated, loses its organisation, and, in time, ceases to exist. If the body loses its entity as the result of separation, why are we to assume the continuous entity of the impalpable results developed in its vital operations, viz., life and mind? What we may call the essence of those results—the power or energy of God, which is the basis of all development—existed before ever we had a being. Why must we assume that that power, energy, or essence, when withdrawn from our poor earthy selves, on the occurrence of death, and restored to God who gave it, preserves an entity which was not its attribute before it was given? The presumption derivable from analogy is against it, especially since our experience of life points to a complete dependence of life and mind upon the conditions and operations of the bodily structures. This means neither more nor less than a belief in the actuality of death, which is the revealed dispensation of God to man through Adam.

Mr. Grant's position involves a denial of death; the Christadelphian's position is a profession of belief in it. The relation of these two positions to Scripture will be clear in the estimation of such as accept the Scripture revelation that "by man came DEATH (1 Cor. xv. 21), and that "in death there is no remembrance."—(Psalm vi. 5.) Again, we ask, Where are the phrases "immortality of the soul," and "deathless spirit?" by which Mr. Grant's theory is expressed in human theology, and the existence of which in the Bible would have barred the way to this controversy. With this, we shall follow Mr. Grant in his further chapters.

CHAPTER III.

"SPIRIT."

THE object of this chapter of Mr. Grant's book, as declared in its last paragraph, is to "establish the doctrine of the distinct existence of the spirit as a separate entity in man"—(or four pages earlier), "a real intelligent entity in the compound nature of man—of all men, as such; 'the spirit of man which is in him.'" That Mr. Grant fails in his object is what we shall conclusively show.

He begins lexicographically. He quotes the words in Greek and Hebrew, which are, in the English version of the Scriptures, translated "spirit," viz.: רִיחַ and πνευμα. Of these, he rightly says they are derived from words signifying to breathe, and that they, therefore, primarily signify "breath or wind, or what is a kindred thought, air in motion." When, however, he adds they give us the word "spirit," by reason of the typical *invisibility of their power*, he oversteps the boundaries of philological criticism. He substitutes opinion for facts, dogmatism for demonstration. He begs the question at its threshold. We demur to his philology. A substantive derived from a verb draws its meaning from the act expressed by the verb. *Ruach* is *ruach*, because it is the thing *ruached*, so to speak, and not because the act of *ruaching* is invisible. *Pneuma* is *pneuma* because it is the thing *pneo*-ed, and not because of some subordinate aspect. So spirit (itself a foreign word of identical origin) is spirit, because it is the thing *spiro*-ed, and not because of some assumed quality of the act.

The strict English in all cases is "breath," so called because the subject of the act of breathing. Mr. Grant recognises in all these words "a type of viewless activity," in harmony with which he extracts from them, at the start, a countenance to his theory of "spirit." But, as we have said, this is a mere recondite opinion having no deeper foundation than the ingenuity of those who have given birth to the speculation. It is more in accordance with the laws that govern the formation of language, to understand that the word "spirit" originates in the fact that the power which gives life was, in the first instance, spirited, *breathed forth* from the Eternal Source of Life and Light. The word does not define the

nature of the effluence, principle, or energy breathed or spirited forth, of which we have to learn from the experience afforded in its manifestations in the recorded dealings of God with man. It merely identifies it with God as the source. No doubt it comes by association with subsequent manifestation, to stand, in its New Testament use, as the synonym of the divine nature, whether morally and physically manifested, as "God is Spirit;" but this by association merely, and not by philological derivation.

Mr. Grant bestows considerable attention on this phase of the matter before discussing its relation to man. He characterises the Christadelphian view of God as "gross folly," "disowned by Scripture in all its parts." He thinks it may not seem to need reply, but declares, nevertheless, that he shall answer it, because God alone knows in what unlooked-for places the answer may be needed. Mr. Grant has the right kind of zeal and a high order of ability, but fails to succeed in his purpose.

How does he answer the evidence adduced in Lecture v. (*Twelve Lectures*)—part of which he quotes—to prove the unity and universality of the Creator as one Spirit, filling heaven and earth, but having personal focus, so to speak, in Unapproachable Light? He asserts that "in Scripture, the Spirit of God is a person, divine, and intelligent in the things of God," in proof of which he quotes:

"What man knoweth the things of a man except the spirit of man which is in him; even so the things of God KNOWETH no man but the Spirit of God."—(1 Cor. ii. 11.) Mr. Grant thinks that the last words of the text affirm the personal separateness of the Spirit of God from God as a knowing agent. We submit that the actual phraseology and the context alike exclude such a construction of the words. There is a parallel: 1, "Man and the spirit of man," and 2, "God and the Spirit of God." Now, does Mr. Grant mean to contend that the spirit of man is one person, knowing the things of man another person? Surely not. Yet this is what his view would require if he is right in maintaining that the spirit of God is one person, knowing the things of God another person. But, secondly, the context settles the meaning in a sense hostile to Mr. Grant's argument. Paul had said, "God hath revealed them to us by HIS SPIRIT, which (the things revealed) none of the princes of this world knew." The matter before Paul's mind was not the relation of the Spirit to God, but the relation of the apostolic (inspired) knowledge of divine things to the knowledge accessible to "the princes of this world" as natural men. There were two kinds of knowledge in question: natural-man knowledge and inspired knowledge. His contention was that natural men could only know the things of natural men; that the things of God were not within their reach except by the Spirit by which God

had revealed them. The Spirit with them was God with them; for the Spirit is as much one with God as the light emanant from the sun is one with the sun; and thus, although he "dwells in heaven," he fills heaven and earth. Yet the Spirit with them could be described as an enlightening agent, separately from the Father dwelling in heaven, because though one with him, it presented in relation to men the aspect of something that is second to him. Only thus could the divine mystery be expressed in human language. By making the Spirit a person, the Father is displaced from His position as a revealer by the Spirit.

"The Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God" (v. 10). This describes the apostolic experience of the Spirit. It was with them. It was the overshadowing of "the power of the Highest" and "the Holy Spirit" which are one and the same thing (Luke i. 35). It was not separate from the Father. It was "the Spirit of the Father," as Jesus had foretold (Matt. x. 20), yet to their sensations, as we may say, it was, separately from themselves an Enlightener, a Searcher, a Penetrator, a Comforter, a Witness, and, therefore, described in language that reads as if these functions were personally separate from the Father. To call the Spirit of the Father a person is to put forward an unscriptural form of speech without simplifying a matter sufficiently beyond us on its own mighty merits, and to confound what is revealed concerning the personal unity of God.

Mr. Grant scouts the idea of the spirit of God being the universal basis of life in this form and common to every living thing. He seems to think the idea is founded solely on the statement of Job xxvii. 3, "The Spirit of God is in my nostrils," and this verse he dismisses very cavalierly. We shall see that the truth assailed stands on no such narrow foundation; but let us first look at the attempt of Mr. Grant to get rid of this verse.

It looks as much like a manoeuvre as possible. He speaks of its quotation for the purpose in view as "worthy of men who, when they please, can quote Greek and Hebrew abundantly, but who choose to ignore in this case the fact that one of the commonest renderings of *ruach* is breath." The animus of this sentence intimates Mr. Grant's sense of the difficulty presented by the passage to his argument. But passing that by, let us look at the difficulty itself. Does it help Mr. Grant much that the phrase "spirit of God," should be changed to "breath of God"? Will Mr. Grant tell us what is the breath of God? He says the expression refers to Gen. ii. 7, "breath of life." Suppose we pass over the dogmatism of this assertion, and treat it as a true one, how much the better is Mr. Grant's position? "Oh," says Mr. Grant, "the word for 'breath of life,'

in Gen. ii. 7, is a word which is never applied to the Spirit of God at all." (Mr. Grant's idea is to fence off the idea of men having the Spirit of God in a physical sense.) Well, suppose for the sake of argument merely, that the word in Gen. ii. 7 is a word "never applied to the Spirit of God at all," how does this get rid of the application of the words in Job xxvii. 3, which are the Hebrew words for the spirit of God, רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים *weerooach Eloah*? If

ruach Eloah "refers to" נְשִׁמַת חַיִּים *nishmath chayim*, as Mr. Grant says it does, must not *nishmath chayim* be capable of standing apart from etymology; but when we look at the etymology of the phrases, Mr. Grant's competence to discuss a question involving the significance of original words appears in a doubtful light. *Ruach*, as he has himself admitted, signifies to breathe: now the meaning of *nasham*, from which *nishmath* is derived, is identical: to breathe. Hence, by derivation, the substantives *ruach* and *nishmath*, as meaning a something breathed, are interchangeable; and no wonder, therefore, that the *ruach* of Job xxvii. 3, should "refer to" the *nishmath* of Gen. ii. 7.—Mr. Grant being witness.

But Mr. Grant will truly say there is something to consider besides *ruach* and *nishmath*—viz., *Eloah* and *chayim*. Well, the consideration of these will strengthen the case against him. *Ruach Eloah* refers to *nishmath chayim*—Mr. Grant being witness: therefore the one must be equal to the other, in the second as well as in the first words. As to *Eloah*, Mr. Grant will admit this is none other than God, and that therefore, "Spirit of God" is the correct English equivalent of *ruach Eloah*. As to *chayim* (lives), this is not God directly; but it leads to Him, if we ask where is the source of all the lives that exist. David says, "With Thee (*O Eloah*) is the fountain of life."—(Psalm xxxvi. 9). Paul says, "He giveth unto all life and breath and all things."—(Acts xvii. 25.) Job says "In His hand is the soul of every living breath, and the breath of all mankind."—(Job xii. 10.) The Spirit of God, or breath of God, is therefore the spirit of lives or the breath of lives. Hence, doctrinally, the two phrases, *ruach Eloah* and *nishmath chayim*, are identical. Consequently, Mr. Grant does not get rid of Job xxvii. 3, by asserting that it "refers to Gen. ii. 7."

But Mr. Grant is mistaken if he suppose that this verse in Job is the only support to the doctrine that the Spirit of God is the means of universal life. The statements quoted four or five sentences back, indirectly (and not very indirectly) show the same things. In addition to them, we have to consider such passages as these: "Whither shall I go from THY Spirit? Whither shall I flee from THY presence?"—(Psalm cxxxix. 7). What conclusion can we come to from this, but

that the universal presence of God, who personally dwells in heaven (Psalm cxxiii. 1; Eccles. v. 2; Matt. vi. 9; 1 Kings viii. 30), is the universal Spirit, invisible power or energy breathed or radiated from the Father, and therefore called spirit, or that which is breathed? Again, "The Spirit of God (*ruach All*) hath made me: the breath of the Almighty (*nishmath Shaddie*) hath given me life."—(Job xxxiii. 4). Again, "Thou sendest forth THY SPIRIT (*ruach*): they (the living creatures) are created."—(Psalm civ. 30). Hence, "I in Him (by the Spirit) we live and move and have our being."—(Acts xvii. 28). Hence also, "If He gather unto Himself His SPIRIT (*ruach*), and His breath (*nishmath*), ALL FLESH shall perish together, and man shall turn again unto dust."—(Job xxxiv. 14).

Mr. Grant finds a disproof of these teachings in Paul's description of Christians, as those "who have received the Spirit which is of God." This is no disproof at all. There are various uses of the phrase, because there are various works of the Spirit. Let not one work be excluded by another. Let every one have its own place. The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters (Gen. i. 2); made man (Job. xxxiii. 4); renewed the face of the earth (Psalm civ. 30), and garnished the heavens."—(Job. xxvi. 13). By its powers all things have been made and are upheld; and if it were withdrawn (see verse quoted above), all life would disappear.

But God afterwards communicated with the earth He had made, and this communication was "by His Spirit," as saith Nehemiah, "Thou testifiest . . . by THY SPIRIT in Thy prophets" (Neh. ix. 30); and Peter: "Holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit."—(2 Peter i. 21). Thus the Spirit was a teacher, more particularly in the apostolic era, when it was bestowed on all who believed the word, enabling them to work miracles, speak with tongues, understand mysteries, according as the Spirit willed. This teaching of the Spirit came to be in contrast with the teaching of the natural mind, and was called by the name of the Spirit, on the principle of metonymy. Thus Jesus saith: "The words that I speak unto you, they are SPIRIT, and they are life."—(John vi. 63.) Again, John the apostle: "The Spirit is THE TRUTH."—(1 John v. 6.) In this sense those who received the truth received the spirit. Because also the truth inculcated a certain spirit, or state of mind after the image of Christ, styled the new man—those who fully received the spirit of truth were those "who had received the Spirit, which is of God;" and it was a collateral truth, no less true in our day, that "if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his."

These things the "poor annihilationist" can write and rejoice in equally with Mr. Grant, who is either imperfectly informed or scarcely

candid, when he says that the men he opposes acknowledge "that the only Spirit of God they know is one subject to men's wills." They truly believe that there is but "one Spirit," as Paul says; but they recognise the fact also stated by Paul, that there are "diversities of operation" to that "same Spirit"—(1 Cor. xii. 6): one to be seen in the maintenance of the order of things established in what is called "nature;" and another, in the proclamation of God's favour by inspired men, to all who are obedient by Christ Jesus; not to speak of the gifts distributed in the apostles' days to "every man severally as he willed."

Mr. Grant adduces a "second application" of the word "spirit" in support of his theory of the personality of the abstract human spirit. The second application is to "angelic beings, whether holy or unclean, upon which his argument is thus worded: "There are spirits whose existence as separate personalities cannot be denied. And if this be so, there is no reason, at least beforehand, why man's spirit should not be also an individuality, a real and living entity, though in him united with a body which is of the dust."

As Mr. Grant does not, in this place, define or insist upon his views of "unclean angels," but reserves the consideration of them for another occasion, we have only to consider his argument as affected by those who are holy, the angels of Almighty power to whom David alludes in Psalm ciii: "Bless the Lord, ye His angels that excel in strength, that do His commandments, hearkening unto the voice of His word." We admit that these angels are *spirits*, as saith Paul, quoting from Psalms: "He maketh His angels spirits." And, as saith Paul again: "Are they (the angels) not all ministering *spirits*, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?"—(Heb. i. 14.) But how is Mr. Grant's argument assisted by this admission? Not at all. For what are the angels? Are they "viewless activities?" Are they immaterial, impalpable, invisible entities, such as Mr. Grant tries to prove the human spirit to be? We must seek our answer to these questions from the Word, which is the only source of information on the subject; and this information must not be set aside by any unprovable assumption as to its meaning.

The information is plain, and the answer very direct in its negative force. The angels are not "viewless," for some men have "entertained angels unawares." How? By supposing them to be men. How could they suppose them to be men unless they *saw* them? But to the testimony for a settlement of all doubts. Cornelius told Peter that he had "*seen* an angel in his house."—(Acts xi. 13.) Zecharias, the father of John the Baptist, "*saw*" an angel of the Lord standing on the right side of the altar.—(Luke i. 12.) Mary *saw* the angel Gabriel.—(Luke i. 29.) Gabriel was *seen* of Daniel.—(Dan.

ix. 21.) Abraham lifted up his eyes and *saw* three angels.—(Gen. xviii. 1-2.) And many such cases might be cited. These are enough as to their visibility.

As to their nature, the evidence is equally definite. They are corporeal. Jacob struggled with one who had to weaken Jacob's thigh before he could release him from Jacob's friendly importunity.—(Gen. xxxii. 24-30; Hosea xii. 4.) Two who had destroyed Sodom spent a night in the house of Lot, who made them a feast and "*THEY DID EAT.*"—(Gen. xix. 1-3.) Abraham *washed the feet* of three.—(Gen. xviii. 4.) And other cases might be cited.

In all these cases, they were mistaken for men, which shews their form to be human; or rather (as it ought to be truly expressed) that the human form is angelic, as saith David and Paul.—(Psalm viii. 5; Heb. ii. 7.) "Man is made a little lower than the angels;" lower to nature, but in their image as to form (Gen. i. 26); and is destined, in the purpose of God, to become *equal unto them* (Luke xx. 36): dying no more, and neither marrying nor giving in marriage. This equality is to be attained *at the resurrection*, as is evident at once from the words: "They that shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world and the resurrection from the dead, shall be equal unto the angels;" and this is brought about by *a change of bodily nature*, as we read: "He (Jesus) shall *change our vile body*, that it may be fashioned LIKE UNTO HIS OWN GLORIOUS BODY."—(Phil. iii. 21.) And again: "This mortal must put on immortality . . . for as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly."—(1 Cor. xv. 53, 49.) When this takes place, the subjects of the change will have attained to the divine nature, which is styled "spirit," for the reason formerly mentioned. Thus it is said of the body of such: "It is sown a natural body; it is raised a *spiritual body.*" The physical change implied in this declaration, Paul says, is to be effected by the Spirit, thus: "He shall *quicken your mortal bodies* BY HIS SPIRIT which (as could be said in the days of the Spirit's bestowal) dwelleth in you."—(Rom. viii. 11.) Now, when a mortal body is quickened by the Spirit, it becomes assimilated in nature to the quickening power, and is spirit, as in the case of Jesus, who is styled "the Lord the Spirit," and as declared by himself: "That which is born of the Spirit is *Spirit.*"—(John iii. 6.) So that not only the angels but the saints made like them and equal to them at the resurrection, will be "spirits" in the generic sense.

But what does Mr. Grant's argument gain from all this? It gains a great loss, as a Hibernian would say. We have only to paraphrase it in harmony with the foregoing to see this at a glance—thus: "There are visible, glorious, incorruptible, corporeal beings styled angels, who are also generically described as "spirits," whose

existence as separate personalities cannot be denied. And if this be so, there is no reason, at least beforehand, why man's 'spirit,' which is invisible, inglorious, decaying and incorporeal, should not also be an individuality," &c. The logic of this is behind that which would contend that because God as a Spirit is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent, man, as a spirit, is endowed with similar attributes. And it ought to be remembered that whatever it might be held to prove with regard to man, would, by the same process of logic apply to the brutes; for there is "the spirit of a beast" as well as the spirit of man.—(Eccles. iii, 21.) If the mere term "spirit" is to prove separable and immortal personality for man, because the angels, bodily, glorious, and immortal, are termed "spirits:" (extraordinary logic!) a like result is secured for the hippopotamus. But Mr. Grant would scout the idea of a hippopotamus' spirit being a separate immortal entity. In this Mr. Grant would do rightly; but he ought to tell us why he refuses to the hippopotamus' "spirit" that which he wishes conceded for a human "spirit," upon the mere strength of the word "spirit" itself. If he were to do so fully and completely, he would answer his own argument, and be compelled to seek other support for the Pagan idea of human immortality.

Turning from the angels, who serve his purpose so little (for surely the frail, feeble, corruptible, weak, decaying, sinful nature of man would argue against his having anything in common with the powerful, incorruptible, strong, glorious and undying angels of God), Mr. Grant "invites particular attention" to the application of the word spirit to man. "Here," he says, "a cloud of dust is endeavoured to be raised by the assertion of the wonderful variety of meanings given to the word." Mr. Grant, after a little fence, admits a variety of secondary applications, and rightly observes, "the greater the variety, the more needful to look for the key to these different applications, the possession of which will enable us to find harmony in these various uses of the word, instead of discord." Unfortunately, Mr. Grant does not follow the excellent advice indicated in this sentence. He does not proceed to "look for the key," but, in the very next sentence, picks up and brandishes the Pagan piece of metal whose pretensions are the very thing in dispute. "The fact is," he says, "the only key to this hidden harmony is in any application of the word . . . to a real intelligent entity in the compound nature of man."

This statement on examination will be found absolutely untrue. The intelligent entity application is no key at all. It may be got into the keyhole and even turn a little right and left, but it won't turn the bolt. The standards do not fit the intricacies of the lock. The intelligent-entity application works confusion instead of harmony. The sub-

stitution of "intelligent entity" for *spirit* in the following passages will show this:—Joshua v. 1: "Neither was there intelligent entity in them (the kings of the Amorites) any more, because of the children of Israel." Judges viii, 3: "their intelligent entity was abated toward him." Judges xv, 19: "When he (Samson) had drunk, his intelligent entity came again to him." 1 Sam. xxx, 12: "When he had eaten, his intelligent entity came again to him." 1 Kings x, 4, 5: "When the Queen of Sheba had seen all Solomon's wisdom, . . . there was no more intelligent entity in her." Psalm lxxvi, 12: "He shall cut off the intelligent entity of princes." Eccles. iii, 21: "Who knoweth the intelligent entity of the beast." Isaiah xxix, 10: "The Lord hath poured on you the intelligent entity of deep sleep" (verse 24): "They that erred in intelligent entity shall come to understanding." Isaiah xxxi, 3: "The Egyptians are men and not God, and their horses flesh and not intelligent entity." Isaiah lxi, 3: "The garment of praise for the intelligent entity of heaviness."

If the "intelligent entity" theory were the key to the diversity of "spirit" application, there could not occur the palpable anomalies of sense which, from Mr. Grant's point of view, are to be found in the foregoing verses. Hyperbole is the exaggeration of truth, not the negation of it; but here are verses, some of which affirm that there was no immortal soul where Mr. Grant's theory denies the possibility of its absence, such as the Queen of Sheba in a state of admiration; while others affirm the presence of immortal soul where Mr. Grant's theory denies the possibility of its ever being present, viz., "the intelligent entity of the beast." Mr. Grant's intelligent-entity application is not the key, or it would fit the lock all round. Despite the uncouth wording, the sense would be perfect in all cases if it were the clue to the "hidden harmony."

The key is to be found in the radical sense of the word translated spirit, which is *power or energy breathed forth* from the Eternal Source, as explained last month. This power breathed forth by Him is breathed in by us, and becomes the basis of all vital and mental faculty, and therefore, appropriately draws its name from the act of breathing, as *pointing to origin and not to nature*. This is the key which Mr. Grant advises the search for, but which he rejects: it fits all round. It will suit every application and unlocks every meaning. It discovers the "hidden harmony." Man and beast sensation and faculty (mental and physical) are all developments from "the fountain of life" (Psalm xxxvi, 9), from which has come forth, in bountiful supply, the power, energy, spirit or breath of God, of which every living thing partakes by breathing, explaining to us how there can be a spirit of a beast as well as of a man; and how the excess of admiration may diminish our supply of spirit for the time being, or grief may impart the quality of heaviness to what we have.

Mr. Grant appeals to "proofs" in support of his intelligent-entity theory? but his proofs vanish when approached. "It is," says he, "quoting Scripture to speak of the spirit of a man which is in him"—(1 Cor. ii. 11,) true; but is it not "quoting Scripture" to speak of "the spirit of the beast which goeth downward to the earth"?—(Eccles. iii. 21.) And if "the spirit of man" must be held to mean the intelligent entity of man, why not "the intelligent entity of the beast," seeing there is but the word "spirit" to go by in both cases. Logic requires similar premises to yield an identical conclusion.

But Mr. Grant thinks more of the phrase, "the spirits of just men."—(Heb. xii. 23.) He lays stress upon the plural form of this phrase, as proving that "it is not one common spirit they all have," but that "each has his own," and each "is a separate entity" in itself. This is puerile. It is demolished at once by the obvious principle that no process of deduction can overthrow a direct affirmation of Scripture, such as we have on this subject, that they have all ONE RUACH (Eccles. iii. 18), or spirit, and *that spirit, the Spirit of God* which, said Job, "is in my nostrils" (Job xxxvii. 3); in harmony with Paul, who said He giveth unto all life and breath, and all things.—(Acts xvii. 25.) Whose life? Whose breath? Whose spirit do all receive and possess? God's. "If God were to gather to Himself HIS Spirit and HIS breath, all flesh should perish together, and man should turn again unto dust."—(Job xxxiv. 14.) Hence, in contradiction to Mr. Grant, the Scriptures prove that it is "one common spirit they all have;" and this is accordant with what one from experience conceives to be reasonable. It is obvious to any observant mind that we do all live by a common life-power, our participation of which depends upon the condition of the life apparatus we have received.

"But, what, then, about 'the spirits'?" Plainly enough, the portion of spirit which sustains us in being is *ours* while we live, and is inevitably conceived of as individual to ourselves and separate from all other, but this only while we exist—either as a fact or a purpose—as in the case of the dead in Christ, who are to live again. A number of such is a plurality, and, therefore, to be spoken of in the plural number, without ignoring the primary fact that the pluralities are a common spirit sub-divided, so to speak. Just as there is primarily but one life—the self-existing life of the Eternal Father—and yet we talk of "the lives" of the creatures He has brought into being by His power; so though primarily there is but "one Spirit," there are "spirits" to contemplate when we see that common spirit distributed according to the will of the First Cause, and formed into the spirits of men. As reasonable would it be for Mr. Grant to say that because we have separate fleshes, therefore, "it is not one common flesh that we all have."

But Mr. Grant reads that God "*formeth* the spirit of man *within him*" (Zech. xiii. 3), and this, to him, is "a complete upsetting" of the theory of his opponents. It reads rather like a complete setting-up of the obnoxious "theory," instead of a complete "upsetting." For, is this not the very theory itself, that God formeth the spirit of man within HIM? Is this not a recognition of the earth-born as THE MAN *within whom* is developed, by the wonderful apparatus with which God for the purpose has endowed him, the spirit which animates his earthly frame, and in conjunction with which it constitutes the wonderful creature that was made lord of the sublunary creation? If Zechariah xiii. 1; had read: "that formeth the spirit of man in heaven or outside of him," it would have been easy to understand Mr. Grant's promptitude in regarding it as a "complete upsetting," but, reading as it does, one can only conclude that Mr. Grant has not thought of the statement in all its bearings. Is "the spirit of man" in death any longer "the spirit of man" when there is no man to possess it? Does it not, then, return to God *who gave it*, and become once more strictly what it was before, "the Spirit of God?" Undoubtedly; for "if God gather unto Himself *His Spirit and His breath*, all flesh shall *perish together*, and man shall turn again unto dust."

Mr. Grant likes not that passage (Eccles. iii. 21) wherein there is mention made of "the spirit of the beast." Obviously, this phrase, if it can be sustained, is "a complete upsetting" to his intelligent-entity theory. So he seeks to undermine it. He cares not to declare it false, but he goes the length of saying it is "not necessarily true." He reminds the reader that it is the language of a man who had "given his heart to *search out by wisdom* (unaided wisdom, he evidently suggests), concerning all things that are done under heaven;" and concerning whom, he comes to the conclusion that he was "no Spirit-taught man," but one who, in his researches, "got into conjecture, and often wrong conjecture, too." He points out that the objectionable declaration is only what Solomon "said in his heart" at a certain time, and insinuates that at a subsequent part of his writings, he withdrew it as the shortsighted induction of fallible observation.

There are several weighty objections to Mr. Grant's attitude on this matter. That he should find it necessary to disparage Solomon's wisdom, will be of itself a damaging fact to all who are acquainted with Solomon's position in the Scriptures. Solomon's wisdom was not of the unaided sort that Mr. Grant would have his readers believe. In answer to his prayer for wisdom, we find God saying, "I have done according to thy words: I have given thee a wise and an understanding heart."—(1 Kings iii. 12). Then the inspired recorder of Israel's history testifies that "God gave Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much, and largeness of heart, even as the sand

which is on the sea shore. And Solomon's wisdom excelled the wisdom of all the children of the east country, and all the wisdom of Egypt. For he was wiser than all men: than Ethan the Ezrahite, and Heman, and Chalcol, and Darda, the sons of Mahol: and his fame was in all nations round about. And he spake 3,000 proverbs."—(1 Kings iv. 29-32). In proof of the truth of this record, we find the Queen of Sheba hearing of the power of Solomon, and coming to Jerusalem to prove him with hard questions."—(2 Chron. ix. 1). Her verdict is this: "It was a true report which I heard in mine own land, of thine acts and thy wisdom. Howbeit, I believed not their words until I came, and mine eyes had seen it; and behold, one-half of the greatness of thy wisdom was not told me. Happy are thy men, and happy are these thy servants which stand continually before thee and hear thy wisdom."—(Verses 5-7). Next, we have to think of the storehouse of wisdom contained in the Proverbs of Solomon; and of the fact of their being frequently quoted by inspired apostles, and once particularly as the voice of God.—(Heb. xii. 5).

Is it inconsistent with these facts, that Solomon should seek by experience of all the occupations and pleasures of men, to know "what was that good for the sons of men which they should do under Heaven all the days of their life?"—(Eccles. ii. 3). Rather otherwise; for gifted as he was with wisdom to discern, experience was needful for its full development; and in the possession of it lay the guarantee that he would come out of all the experiments of life with the right verdict: "I saw that wisdom excelleth folly as far as light excelleth darkness."—(Eccles. ii. 13).

By the stress he lays on *human* wisdom and *human* searching, as applied to Solomon, Mr. Grant distinctly ignores the fact that God endowed him with a discernment extra to "human wisdom and human searching;" and thus destroys the value of all his conclusions on this point. That the theory he is defending should compel him to do this is, perhaps, the strongest condemnation of it that could be recorded.

Mr. Grant's treatment of the book, and the passage itself, is scarcely so ingenuous as the general tone of his writing would lead the reader to expect. He says of the objectionable declaration in Eccles. iii. 18-19, that "it is only what 'he said' at a certain time in his heart." True, the passage begins "I said in mine heart concerning the estate of the sons of men:" this is the language of Hebraistic idiom, and to comment on it as suggesting that it was not the writer's deliberate mind at the time of writing is unfair treatment. How would it answer in the verse immediately preceding it? "*I said in mine heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked.*" Did Solomon afterwards change his mind? On the contrary, the very last statement in the book is, "God shall bring every work unto judgment."

Again, it is scarcely to be expected that Mr. Grant would have claimed that in one part of Ecclesiastes, Solomon "comes out into the light," while in the other he is in doubt, darkness and wrong conjecture. Yet this is practically what he does in asking the reader to "Listen to Solomon's own exposition of this (as to the attainment of wisdom by human searching), *as he comes out into the light!*" "As thou knowest not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child, even so, thou knowest not the works of God who maketh all." That is, Mr. Grant suggests that Solomon now discovers that he knows nothing as to the result of his searching. Yet, inconsistently enough, believing that in chapter xii. 7, Solomon favours Mr. Grant's theory, Mr. Grant yields to the temptation of assuming that Solomon really does know: for he adds, "But he has something to say now about his former thoughts." (This is a gloss; an unfair colouring: Solomon is not speaking of "former thoughts" at all. The suggestion by Mr. Grant in this introductory sentence that he is doing so, is Mr. Grant's invention—ingenious certainly, and calculated to strengthen his argument in the minds of the ignorant, but highly reprehensible in a critical controversy), "for," continues Mr. Grant, "he says, finally and conclusively that man's spirit does *not* go downward to the earth: then shall the *dust* return to the earth as it was, and the *spirit* shall return to God who gave it."

On this, we have simply to say that the words quoted have nothing to do with the fanciful issue with which Mr. Grant subtilely places them in juxtaposition. The problem before Solomon's mind, in chapter iii. 21, even admitting, for the sake of argument only, that this verse had any allusion to the problem—was not whether the spirit of man went upward or downward. The "upward" he distinctly and positively associates with "the spirit of man" *as a fact*: and the "downward" with the "spirit of the beast" *as a fact*. The question is "who knoweth the spirit of man that takes the one direction, or the spirit of the beast that takes the other?" The answer is that philosophy is alike ignorant of both. The spirit of man is a fact, and its upward tendency, as compared with the mere bestial creation, is a fact; but who understands it? None. We can only see and accept the fact, without understanding it, as we do many other facts. So the spirit of the beast is a fact, and its tendency downward to the earth is a fact; but who understands it? No one, any more than we understand the instinct of the bee. We accept the fact merely. But Mr. Grant obscures the problem propounded by Solomon, and tries to keep out of sight Solomon's distinct recognition of the fact that *there is a spirit in the beast*. He makes it appear in the concluding remark now under review, as if Solomon had formerly surmised that the spirit of man (at death) went downward to the earth; but that now, "he

says, finally and conclusively, that man's spirit does not go downwards to the earth." Then shall the *dust* (italicizing dust, as if the conclusion Solomon wished now to convey was that the dust only, and not the spirit, was the subject of death, and that the spirit, as an intelligent entity, went to God).

The treatment of this passage is the cleverest in the orthodox interest we have yet heard of, but clever in a sense not complimentary to Mr. Grant. It savours much of sleight-of-hand. Solomon, in chap. xii., makes no connection with what he had said before on the question of the human constitution. He merely inculcates the early pursuit of wisdom, in view of evil days to come, and of death; as to which he says, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it." What does Mr. Grant's view gain from this passage, when isolated from the fictitious surroundings in which he has set it? Absolutely nothing. The return of the dust to mother earth, and the spirit to where it came from; surely looks very much like the death contended for by "the poor annihilationist;" for, if the spirit that returns be that which came, obviously it is no person or "intelligent-entity," but the means of the person formed from the dust.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SOUL.

IN Mr. Grant's remarks on this head, there is little calling for answer. From the orthodox point of view, this must be a matter of wonder, for here the greatest demonstration is required, and will be expected. The absence of it is significant of the impotence of the whole argument in favour of human immortality; for if there is a word in which the essence of theory is concentrated, and which, of its own force, is supposed to express the theory without reserve or circumlocution, it is the word "soul." "Spirit" is liable to variation in its significance, even in the orthodox use; but "soul" is the one word which is supposed to define directly and with unequivocal precision the immortal essence of man. Surprising must Mr. Grant's treatment of this word be to those who expected him to demonstrate the common theory. He positively admits that beasts have souls though unscripturally (as we have seen) denying they have "spirits." In admitting that beasts have souls, he but yields to the pressure of truth. This is right, but what is the consequence? Though he does not intend to do it, on this point, he distinctly surrenders the orthodox case; for if beasts can have souls, and not be immortal, it follows it is not proving man immortal to prove he has a *soul*.

Mr. Grant admits the derivation of נֶפֶשׁ *nephesh*, and ψύχη, *psuche*—the Hebrew and Greek words translated soul—to be from "words signifying to breathe." He claims the fact in favour of his theory on the ground that *viewless activity* is the idea intended to be signified in such a derivation; but we have already combated and disposed of this assumption in our reply to the argument in connection with spirit. It is the *origin* and not the nature of both spirit and soul that is intimated by the terms employed to define them. The etymology proves this, as we have shewn. The "viewless activity" construction is an invention—ingenious, but gratuitous and self-destructive; for as applied to the beasts, of whom the word is used, it would teach that which Mr. Grant does not admit: the existence of an invisible, disembodiable, "viewless activity" in the animals.

Mr. Grant notices Dr. Thomas's assertion that "the Scriptures

define a living soul to be . . . a living, natural, or animal body," and asks how such a proposition would suit the case of Gen. i. 30, where mention is made of "everything wherein there was a living soul." "Are we to understand this," he asks, "as everything wherein there was a *living body*?" In this Mr. Grant is a little perverse; for he ignores Dr. Thomas's definition of the principle which explains the case, viz.: "By metonymy, or figure of speech, whereby the container is put for the thing contained, and *vice versa*, *nephesh*, breathing frame, is put for *neshemet ruach chayim*; which, when in motion, the frame respirees." This definition he truly quotes, but does not allow its place in the matter of which he makes a point. Yet, afterwards, he practically adopts the principle for his own purposes, in another place (p. 42), saying: "The soul is put for the whole man." The question he asks sounds clever, but is equally profound with that he might ask in the case of a man said to "drink a cup" or "take a glass." Here, the container is put for the thing contained; but Mr. Grant might ask, "Are we to understand that the man drank a piece of earthen ware, or took into his interior a solid piece of transparency produced by a glass manufacturer?"

Mr. Grant cannot deny the assertion which he ridicules—that the Scriptures define a living soul to be a natural body. He does not attempt to disprove it, but resorts to shallow logomachy to bring it into contempt. Paul quotes the declaration of Moses (that man became "a living soul") to prove the existence of the natural body—(1 Cor. xv. 45.) Even without this use of the testimony of Moses, the words of Moses themselves prove Dr. Thomas's assertion; for the man that became a living soul, was the man *made from the dust of the ground*, or a natural body. The same point is established by the application of the phrase living soul to the beasts.—(Gen. i. 21, 24; ii. 19.)

But Mr. Grant contends that "living soul" is a "*something* that is alive within the breathing frame." What would his argument gain supposing it were conceded? (which it may be, in the same way as it may be admitted that the *red heat* in the fire is a *something alive* within the coal that gives structure to a fire in the grate.) It is the "beast of the earth," as Mr. Grant allows: that is spoken of in the phrase "*wherein* is the breath of life." Is this "*something alive* within the breathing frame" of the animals—an immortal soul? If so, it is a new idea to orthodox religion, at all events, that beasts have never-dying souls to save, an idea which the general evidence of his book would show that Mr. Grant himself repudiates. If not, then what is gained for immortal-soulism by proving that there is a "*something* (which is not immortal) alive within the breathing frame" of man? Absolutely nothing, and worse, for it proves man to be in this matter of immortality, on a par with, and, therefore,

as the Scriptures declare, to have "no pre-eminence above a beast."—(Eccles. iii. 19.)

But, says Mr. Grant, "It is not said that the beast has a spirit." This is not true. It is said the beasts have a spirit (Ecc. iii. 22). This we proved in our last chapter and the one previous, to which we must refer our reader. "But," continues Mr. Grant, "*it is said that it has a soul!*" Let orthodox believers mark this. A champion of their faith declares what they DENY. They say beasts have no souls. Mr. Grant admits they have. What is the escape from this nonplussing issue? Mr. Grant is right according to the Scriptures, as all scholars will admit. Therefore it follows that Bible "souls" are different things from the "souls" of common theological talk: that is, that the theological "soul" is a myth. Awkwardly enough for his theory of the matter, Mr. Grant holds that the soul which the beasts have in common with man, "is so distinct in its life from that of the body that they that 'kill the body' cannot 'kill the soul.'" In proof of this he quotes Matt. x. 28; which seems like proving that when a cow is killed, a cow-soul is left, which the butcher cannot touch; which, as we have already said, is altogether a new idea to theology. Such admissions on the part of a defender of popular theology, form the strongest evidence that something is wrong. As Mr. Grant reserves Matt. x. 28, "for examination elsewhere," we defer comments thereon till it comes up in its proper place.

Then, says Mr. Grant, "God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and He did not into the brute;" which he contends is indicative of "a higher condition in man than in the brute." A "higher condition" will be admitted by everyone to characterise man (in his developed state) while *man is man*, but the question is as to his immortality. Will he live for ever? What light is thrown on this by the fact that God breathing into his nostrils the breath of life? None. We have light the other way—that man will not—does not live for ever—is condemned to death for disobedience—has to part with the breath of life which God gave him, and return to the dust from which he was taken.—(Gen. iii. 19.)

But the beasts have the breath of life.—(Gen. vii. 15-21.) Who breathed it into them? Not God, says Mr. Grant. Strange! Mr. Grant relies upon the mere absence of the declaration. This is no evidence. But the declaration is not absent from the Bible, though absent from Genesis. It is supplied in substance in Ps. civ. 25-30. But what turns upon it? Nothing. It is the possession of a thing, and not the mode of obtaining it, that makes rich. What matters it whether it is by post-office order, or bank draft, or cheque, or cash, that a man obtains a thousand pounds? It is the getting of the money that is the important point. The beasts have the breath of life; it

matters little how they got it, and it indicates the weakness of the cause Mr. Grant has in hand that he should attempt to glean an argument from this source; but the attempt fails him, for "God giveth unto ALL life and breath and all things."—(Acts xvii. 25.) "In His hand is the soul of EVERY LIVING THING, and the breath of all mankind."—(Job xii. 10.)

Mr. Grant admits the fact that man is "called a living soul" in common with all the animate creation. In seeking to evade the force of the fact, as against human immortality, he makes a suggestion which is certainly very ingenious, but which contains a principle more destructive to popular theology than anything yet noticed. Plainly stated, the suggestion is this: that man is called a living soul not because he is of the same order of existence as animal souls in common, but to distinguish him from the angels, to whom he *morally* stands related. The angels, he says, are *spirits*, never *souls*. His inferiority to them is that he is a *soul*. The link of connection between him and the brutes is that he has a soul. The conclusion flowing from this extraordinary and most gratuitous suggestion is that the soul is *not* the divine, but the brutish part of man! Observe this, ye orthodox believers who hail Mr. Grant as a deliverer from the invincible attacks of "the poor annihilationists." Talk no more of the soul as "a spark of the *divine* essence," and as the "native of celestial spheres." The soul is the *brute* essence: the soul is of the earth, earthy. The "salvation of *souls*" is a mistake! The "immortality of the *soul*" is a delusion—Mr. Grant, your deliverer, being judge. The redeemed are to be made "equal unto the angels."—(Luke xx. 36.) "The angels are *spirits* never *souls*." So says Mr. Grant. Therefore, the redeemed, when saved, being equal to the angels, are *not* souls but spirits, having parted with that which constituted their *inferiority*. So that all the world is, and has been for ages, wrong on this subject of the soul, Mr. Grant being witness. Well may Mr. Grant's orthodox readers begin to pray that common prayer about being saved from friends; for he is likely to commit them to a theory not a whit more orthodox than the terrible heresy of "the poor annihilationists."

Mr. Grant's suggestion is the mere wriggle of an ingenuity hard pressed by the argument he is opposing. The Creator Himself speaks of His "soul" (Lev. xxvi. 11; Judges x. 16), and surely Mr. Grant will not suggest there is any brutish affinity in the divine nature. When the philosophy of the words "soul" and "spirit" is recognised, the terms are delivered from the mist and embarrassments of scholastic theories, and in all their variations, become the intelligible synonyms of power derived from the Creator from whom all energy is breathed forth. The nature or dura-

tion of these powers is not expressed by the designations they receive. Of these we have to be informed separately, either by experience or revelation; and as to man, the information is that he is a perishing mortal, with all his power, like the flowers that wither and decay. His "soul within him" that mourns, is not an immortal soul, but "a vapour that appeareth for a very little while and then vanisheth away" (Jas. iv. 14), real enough to the mortal man while he possesses it, but nothing to him when he loses it in death, except wherein he may have acquired in Christ a title to its restoration in glory at the resurrection.

Whatever force there may be in Mr. Grant's denial of "one example" of the word $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ being used for the "life to come," is dissipated by a reference to John xii. 25, where the man losing his life ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) in this world for Christ's sake, is said to save it. When? When the Son of Man comes.—(Matt. xvi. 25-27.) If he is to save his $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ *then*, it is surely *now* a $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ or "life to come." We quote the following, in addition to this "one example," as illustrative of the fact denied by Mr. Grant: James i. 21; v. 20; 1 Peter i. 9; ii. 11; Heb. xiii. 17; vi. 19; Acts xv. 24; ii. 27; Mark viii. 36-37; Matt. xi. 29; x. 28; xvi. 26. It is worthy of remark in passing, that Dr. Angus, who has attempted the same task as Mr. Grant, denies that the human $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is the same as the brute $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$. He says the notion is "degrading." Mr. Grant, on the contrary, freely admits that both man and animals have the same soul (or $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$). Their divergence on this point illustrates the entanglements inseparable from the attempt to harmonise the Scriptures with the Platonic dogma of natural immortality.

Mr. Grant admits the diversity of the meanings of the word "soul," and its applicability to "birds, beasts, fishes and creeping things." But the key to those applications, he asserts, is to be found in the fact that the soul is "a distinct entity, a living component part of the 'fearfully and wonderfully made creature' man." This is Mr. Grant's view, and requires no other remark to dispose of it, except perhaps that a distinct-entity meaning to a word is a curious reason why it should be employed where no distinct entity exists. It is a curious "key" that will not fit the locks to which it is said to belong. The "admitted use of the same word (soul) in different meanings" is allowed by the poor annihilationists; but what they deny is that any of those uses are Platonic in their character. They deny that the "soul" (of man) is ever immortal soul. Mr. Grant does not attack this point. Indeed, in this chapter, he twice or three times carefully exempts the question of immortality from the consequences of his argument. "Remember," he says, "I do not touch the question of immortality here. I do not base it upon these texts about the soul. Otherwise, they would prove for the beast what they

prove for the man." Exactly; and here is where the whole of Mr. Grant's argument on "soul" falls to the ground; for, if his argument for a separable living soul—a distinct entity—in man, is good, it establishes the same for the animals, of which the same language is used. But Mr. Grant does not admit such a separable existence in the animals: *ergo*, the philosophy fails to prove it for man.

CHAPTER V.

FUNCTIONS AND RELATIONSHIP OF SOUL AND SPIRIT.

HEREIN, Mr. Grant seeks to introduce a "new and beautiful harmony" in the teaching and phraseology of Scripture as to the constitution of man. "New" it certainly is, for which orthodox believers will hardly thank him; "beautiful" it cannot be, for a thing to be beautiful must exist, which Mr. Grant's "harmony" does not, except in his own imagination, as we shall see.

The newness of it lies in this, that he teaches the existence of "two separate entities in the compound nature of man"—the soul and the spirit. The spirit is "the higher part," the seat of the intelligence and judgment; the soul, the lower, giving affection, desire, appetite, &c., and forming the connecting link between the spirit and the body." "Two separate entities" must be two *separable* entities. Hence we have the idea of a double existence in death, or two surviving personalities when the body has mouldered to dust; unless (as is probable) Mr. Grant means us to understand that the soul dies with the body, and that the spirit alone is immortal. In either case, we have a new theory—either that the soul is not immortal, or that man has two spiritual elements, reminding us of the insane German philosopher's notion of the three souls—the rational soul, the animal soul, and the vegetable soul, which he supposed to enter into the composition of man, and to die in the order of their enumeration, a theory which he reduced to too practical a test for the laws of his country.

Mr. Grant's theory liberates two entities at death instead of one. Whether they remain in combination or part asunder, he does not tell. If they remain in combination, the soul must be in an anomalous and rather useless condition, without objects of "desire, affection, and appetite" on which to operate. If they part asunder, the question of "which is which?" would come up rather strongly. If the spirit only survives—the soul dying with the body, to which it was the spirit's link—then the soul is not immortal, and Mr. Grant is heterodox.

Mr. Grant emphasizes on the fact (as he alleges) all "moral qualities, the senses, the emotional and intellectual faculties," are in

the Bible ascribed to the "soul" and "spirit." The brain, says he, is not so much as once mentioned from Genesis to Revelations. Striking fact, says Mr. Grant. As how, Mr. Grant? One would imagine Mr. Grant was about to deny all connection between the brain and the senses, &c. If the flourish about the non-mention of the brain in the Bible means anything, it means this. Yet Mr. Grant adds, "I do not say this as doubting the result of men's researches in this respect, but as fully allowing it, &c." Mr. Grant allows that the brain is the demonstrable seat of the mental faculties, yet he declares that by silence, "the wisdom of God meets the insane folly of would-be-philosophers!" This is simply incomprehensible. If Mr. Grant had denied the truth of brainology, one could have understood him putting forward the Bible's silence as a proof of its "insane folly." But, "as fully allowing it," and yet exulting in the Bible's silence, as against it, while pointing to the Bible's attribution of the feelings and faculties to the heart, belly, bowels, kidney, womb, &c., strongly suggests his desire, anyhow and at all hazards, to have a fling at the "poor annihilationists." How he would have gloated if he could have found "immortal soul" in the Bible.

But Mr. Grant is wrong in saying that "all the faculties of man are attributed to the unseen soul or spirit." Seeing is attributed to the eye (Job vii. 8; xxix. 11; Psalms xliv. 9; Prov. xx. 12; Matt. vi. 22; 1 Cor. xii. 16; Rev. i. 7); hearing to the ear (Job xii. 11; xlii. 5; Psalm xciv. 9; Isaiah lxiv. 4; Rev. ii. 7); taste to the mouth (Job. xii. 11; xxxiv. 3); the function of smell to the nose (Psalm cxv. 6; Cant. vii. 8; 1 Cor. xii. 17); pain to the flesh (Job xiv. 22; 1 Cor. xvii. 28; Eccles. xii. 12), and understanding to the whole mechanism of man as made of the dust (1 Chron. xii. 32; Job xxii. 8; Prov. xxx. 2). "Spirit" and "soul" are used as synonymous for the whole person, or for the mind separately considered, without any effort to define a technical theory such as Mr. Grant associates with them. Mr. Grant's first position is, therefore, untenable. All the faculties of man are *not* attributed to the (unseen) soul or spirit. The statement to the contrary is a false assertion.

Still less is his assertion true that the intelligence and judgment are ascribed to the spirit, and the affections, desires, appetites, etc., to the soul, "with the utmost exactness and the most unvarying harmony." The fact is the two words, "spirit" and "soul," are, as regards their association with mental attributes, used interchangeably in the most indiscriminate manner. A single case illustrates this: "My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my Spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour."—(Luke i. 46, 47.) But the fact can be shewn from the very passage which Mr. Grant has quoted. For instance: out of nine quoted to show that the Spirit is the "seat of mind or understanding," as

contrasted with the soul as the seat of hate, love, lust, appetite, &c., six have to do with *emotion*, such as anger, fear, &c.

Gen. xli. 8: "Pharaoh's spirit was troubled."
Judges viii. 3: "Then their spirit was abated."
Psalm cvi. 3: "They provoked his spirit."
Prov. xiv. 29: "He that is hasty of spirit."
Mark viii. 12: "He sighed deeply in his spirit."
Acts xvii. 6: "His spirit was stirred within him."

It reads like sarcasm when Mr. Grant, commenting upon these citations, remarks: "Here it requires but little examination to see that the spirit is presented in Scripture as the seat of the mind or understanding." Only such as give them "little examination" indeed could come to such a conclusion. A not very close examination shews them to teach that the spirit, in addition to understanding, has to do with *trouble, anger, provocation, hastiness, sorrow and excitement*, and, therefore, is not the "higher" "entity" of Mr. Grant's theory, having to do only with the exercise of reason.

So with his citations to illustrate "the soul" as the seat of the affections, lusts, &c., they show as a whole that the "soul" of the Bible has as much to do with higher actions of the mind as the "spirit." Thus: Psalm xlii. 1, "So panteth my soul after Thee;" Psalm lxiii. 1, "O God, my soul thirsteth after Thee;" Psalms lxxxiv. 2, "My soul longeth for the courts of the Lord." In all these, which are his three first quotations, it is David's *soul* that aspires after divine things, and therefore that apprehends knowledge. But this point is more obvious in some passages, which of course he has not quoted. Thus, Proverbs xix. 2, "That the soul be without knowledge is not good;" Psalm cxxxix. 14, "That my soul KNOWETH right well;" Proverbs ii. 10, "When knowledge is pleasant to thy SOUL;" Proverbs xxiv. 14, "So shall the knowledge of wisdom be to THY soul."

Mr. Grant's theory, therefore, that the spirit is the *thinker*, and the soul is the *feeler*, is purely imaginary, equally with his assertion that "in all this, the difference between the 'soul' and the 'spirit' is preserved in the most marked way." The theory and the assertion are absolutely without foundation. They could only have been hazarded by one partially acquainted with the matter. They doubtless represent a desperate adventure on the part of a tolerably clear mind to reconcile popular metaphysics and the doctrine of natural immortality with the Bible. The endeavour is a complete failure. The resultant theory, instead of developing a "new and beautiful harmony," is a new illustration of the confusion which must ever attend all attempts to harmonise the Bible with popular views of the human constitution.

The putting forward of such a theory on such grounds evinces a

misapprehension of the character of Bible teaching. On no subject is the language of Holy Writ of the precise and technical character which Mr. Grant seeks to attach to the words "soul" and "spirit." Its terms deal broadly with facts rather than the meaning, nature, or means of the facts. It concerns itself not with *how* blood vitalises, but contents itself with the fact that the blood is the life. It takes no pains to observe the secret laws which regulate the action of the winds, the growth of vegetation, the motion of the heavenly bodies, or the processes of physiology in man and beast. It speaks of all these in language founded on their practical aspect and uses, rather than on their abstract relations. So with man. It gives us not a theory of his constitution when it speaks of "soul" and "spirit." It but recognises the fact of soul and spirit as actual experiences of human beings while they are alive, and not as defining the nature of life in the abstract, or the way in which mental impression is formed. Sufficient that it speaks of him as alive and possessing the faculties of his nature, without scientifically defining their mode and duration. In this is exhibited wisdom both as regards the objects aimed at and the accommodation to the capacities of those for whom it is given. It is not "how things are that is important, because this is in God's hands, who made all. It is the practical object (as affecting ourselves) for which things exist that is the matter of concern; and these are best discoursed of in language suitable to the surface aspect in which all things are necessarily presented to finite intellect. The Bible written in this language comes to the capacity of all, with the recognition of the fact of our life and the certainty of our death (which philosophy denies), and the obligation of obedience to the Creator, and the hope of goodness which He has promised to all who believe and obey. These important matters are not cumbered with metaphysical theories, as Mr. Grant would make out: but are exhibited with an unsophisticated plainness which only requires due attention and familiarity, and a childlike disposition, adequately to perceive.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FALL.

Mr. GRANT'S exigetical efforts on this head are darkened and embarrassed by the spirit and soul theory; and there is so much of dogmatism, and so little of argument is employed, that there is little to answer. Yet, in this short chapter, there is much to startle ordinary believers, who suppose Mr. Grant is fighting their battle. "In the fallen state," he says, "the spirit has yielded its supremacy to the soul;" that "Adam, in his disobedience, was led by the affections of the soul, and with the soul the spirit fell;" and that "the natural man is sensual or soul-led." Ordinary believers have the idea that if the soul is supreme, all must be right with "the spirit," which they regard as the same thing. According to their way of thinking, it would have been well for Adam if he had been "led by the affections of the soul." In their conceptions of a sensual man, he is the opposite of "soul-led." The fact is, Mr. Grant broaches a new theory, and, as before said, is utterly heterodox, as much so as the objects of his continual pity—"the poor annihilatöists." He makes the soul the sinner, and the spirit a sort of helpless partner. The sacrifice of Christ was the offering of his soul—not of his spirit. The soul is more connected with the body than the spirit. For that reason, those that are "led of the soul" are called fleshly minded, because the soul has more to do with the flesh than the spirit. "But," observes he, doubtless seeing many inconvenient difficulties in the way of this explanation, "into the mysteries of this it is not my province now to enter." Mystery indeed! a darkening of counsel by words without knowledge.

Writing of "the fall," as affecting the question of human mortality, it strikes one as peculiar that Mr. Grant says nothing of "death" which came by it, and the coming of which by it is its great feature: as saith Paul: "By one man, sin entered into the world, the death BY SIN, and so death hath passed upon all men." Was this *death* or moral degradation? If moral degradation, how are we to understand Paul putting resurrection as the opposite, antithesis, or cure of it thus: "By man came death, by man also the resurrection of the dead?"—(1 Cor. xv. 19). Is resurrection of the dead the opposite of moral

degradation? If so, how can the morally-degraded be the subject of resurrection, which they are to be, at the resurrection of the unjust? If not moral degradation but real death was the consequence of Adam's transgression, how can Adam's children, who inherited the penalty, be immortal? If Mr. Grant had discussed these questions, as involved in consequence of "the fall," he would, one way or other, have contributed something to the consideration of the subject. Instead of that, he indulges in a kind of metaphysical disquisition which, while giving his side of the question the credit of grappling with "the fall," leaves the pith of the matter untouched, and throws a cloud over the subject in general. The effect is, doubtless, to successfully dodge, as the vulgar phrase is, a dangerous point of Mr. Grant's theory.

"The fall," divested of the artificial surroundings of human philosophy, is a matter requiring no aid from recondite hair-splittings such as those put forward by Mr. Grant. It is beautiful in its intelligible simplicity. Adam, by the belief of enticing falsehood, was induced to disobey a command of the Almighty, with which the penalty of death was linked. The penalty followed the transgression, and Adam was sentenced to death. His descendants inherit his nature, and hence universal man is mortal. The doctrine of native immortality which Mr. Grant defends, looks like a perpetuation of the original lie by which Adam and Eve were seduced from obedience.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

DEATH.

MR. GRANT'S theory of death is founded on his theory of the human constitution; and as we have shown this to be without foundation, we have virtually demolished his present chapter. Nevertheless, desiring to leave him not an inch of standing ground, we follow him in it.

He admits the body dies, dissolves, and ceases to be; but maintains that revelation is needed to tell us whether "the spirit and soul" are equally extinct. On this it is to be observed that the natural evidence of the cessation of what Mr. Grant calls the "spirit and soul," is just as distinct as the evidence of the body's dissolution (in the case of others, and not ourselves, of course, and it is of such that Mr. Grant speaks). The evidence of the body's dissolution consists in the disappearance of all the signs by which we recognise the body's existence. We know of the existence of the body by sight and touch: we see it and feel it. In death, it vanishes from sight and crumbles into impalpability, and we say the body has ceased to be. Now, we have just the same evidence of cessation in the case of "the spirit and soul," so called. Every sign by which we recognise their existence in life disappears on the occurrence of death: cognition, volition, facial expression, susceptibility to external impression in hearing, sight, touch, and every other sign by which the existence of consciousness and intelligence is indicated, cease. If Mr. Grant, therefore, would but apply the argument by which he arrives at the conclusion that the body ceases to exist, he would not stand in special need of revelation to tell whether, in spite of all symptoms to the contrary, the "spirit and soul" cease to exist.

However, he appeals to a conclusive authority, by whose decision "the poor annihilationist" gladly abides. And, first, let it be admitted that "spirit" in the primary scriptural sense of the term is indestructible. It has existed from eternity as God has, for it is He in expansion, so to speak. God has given us of His Spirit (Job xxvii. 3; Acts xvii. 25), and it is ours so long as we have it; but we are mortal, and, consequently, only have it so long. We die; the

dust returns to the earth as it was, and the "spirit returns to God who gave it." That which was given is that which returns—not an intelligent entity (for our intelligence does not begin to exist until we are about three years of age), but the energy which forms the basis of our life. In relation to man, this energy is abstract. Without it he could not exist; yet it is no more he before, during, nor after his existence than the fleeting atoms of his substance. It is the basis of it. It is of God and God's. When withdrawn, it returns to God who gave it. There is just the same relation between it and his being as there is between the organic impress which laid the foundation of his body and that body (if, indeed, this be not the very same thing). The body exists by the materials supplied for its upbuilding, and these, for the time being, constitute the body. Yet the materials could not first become "body" but for the invisible organic power which at first imparted the capability to assimilate substance to its own formation. On the other hand, without the materials, the organic impress could never produce a body. It requires the concurrence of the two to develop the result. So in the evolution of a man in the image of God, the "dust of the ground" and "the breath of life" are required in combination. The result was "a living soul." But death destroys this combination, and puts affairs where they were before combination took place. "The dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it." Where is the man? He has returned to his earth.—(Psalm cxlvi. 4.) Where are his thoughts? "In that very day his thoughts perish." (Same verse.) What is necessary to bring him again from this lost state? "Of all that the Father hath given me, I shall lose nothing, but RAISE HIM UP at the last day.—(John vi. 39.) When this occurs, many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake.—(Daniel xii. 2.) What if there is no resurrection of the dead? "Then they that are fallen asleep in Christ are perished."—(1 Cor. xv. 18.) No wonder that Paul should strive if by any means he might attain unto the resurrection from among the dead (Phil. iii. 10); for, as he said to the Corinthians, "If after the manner of men, I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me if the dead rise not?" We thus understand how it is that it is at the arrival of "the time of the dead" that God gives rewards to His servants, the prophets, and to the saints, and to them that fear His name, small and great (Rev. xi. 18); and we comprehend the promise of Christ when he said, "Thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just."

But Mr. Grant will have it that death does not extinguish the man. He goes first to the seed to prove his case. "You put the seed into the ground," he says, "and in Scripture language, it is not quickened unless it die" (1 Cor. xv. 36); whereupon, he asks, "Does

the living germ you sow become extinct in order to bring forth the harvest?" The answer is distinctly "Yes," which is proved by asking, Where is the living germ when the harvest is brought forth? Can Mr. Grant find it? The case is plainly put by Christ: "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." On this, Mr. Grant asks: "Does the grain of wheat become extinct in order to bring forth fruit?" Undoubtedly it does. If it does not there is no fruit. If it keeps its life within itself—if its own vitality be shielded from the invasion of the vegetating process, there is no sprouting. The sacrifice of the individual grain is indispensable to the multiplication of grains. It gives up its own life to the new formation that takes place. Herein lies the analogy to Christ's death; but Mr. Grant destroys the analogy by insisting that the individual grain does not die. If it does not die, it lives; and if it lives it can be found. Will Mr. Grant undertake to produce the living grain from which any stalk of corn has been grown? Mr. Grant will never again have to say "They—the poor annihilationists—have never (at least that I can find) attempted to illustrate by the grain of wheat their doctrine that death is the cessation of existence." It is a distinct and striking illustration of it, and it is here and now put forward.

Mr. Grant invokes "the clear full light of the New Testament" for satisfaction that death is not death. He finds evidence of this in statements which we have already disposed of in the second chapter of our reply. Peter's metaphor of "putting off this tabernacle" he claims in his favour, in spite of the obvious anomalies which his quasi-literal construction of it involves. If Peter is a tenant detachable from his body because he has spoken of it as a tabernacle, we are naturally presented with the idea that he was somewhere before he went into his tabernacle, and in that case, transmigration of souls seems not so absurd after all. May we not also insist on a parallel to the fact that a "tenant" does not stay in his house all the time, but comes and goes at convenience, in which case we should conclude Peter to have been in the habit of going in and out of the body, and that, therefore, his body was many times dead during his lifetime, and the subject of as many resurrections. A tenant carrying his house about with him is rather an absurd phase of the metaphor, if it is to be treated in the literal style of Mr. Grant's requirements. Mr. Grant would doubtless repudiate such an extreme application, and insist upon those phases only which accord with the literal fact that Peter meant to enunciate which would be very legitimate, but very destructive to the object for which he cites Peter's metaphor. The metaphor governed by the facts of the case will yield an idea in harmony with Peter's hope, which hope was that he should share in

the glory to be revealed at the second appearing of the Chief Shepherd—(1 Peter iv. 13; v. 1-4.) In relation to this hope the Peter of "the glory to be revealed" was now in the tabernacle (for temporariness is the idea expressed by tabernacle), and could, therefore, from the glory point of view, speak with perfect appropriateness of death as a putting-off of this tabernacle. Granted that Peter had had no hope of living again, such a form of speech could have had no meaning; but the certainty of living again, after an unconscious interval of death, just makes all the difference in the phraseology concerning the occurrence of death. As an appointed heir of an eternal state, he could well speak of "this corruptible" as a tabernacle, without necessitating the conclusion that he expected to be alive when he was dead. As well might the doctrine of pre-existence be deduced from the language of the man who, in setting forth his family history, spoke of events happening "before HE entered this mortal state." These remarks apply with equal force to Paul's description of the present nature as "the earthly house of this tabernacle;" and his allusion to the "we" who are *in* it. Paul's language is the language of figure—very effective when the literal referred to is recognised, but rendered childish and ridiculous when read with the literal precision with which Mr. Grant seeks to invest it. To be in this tabernacle is to be in this state, in the sense of subsisting in it, and not in the sense of being an entity in it, and separable from it. This "we" is descriptive of the persons who so subsist, and who, because the state is a corruptible and frail and mortal state, "do groan, being burdened." If this be not so; if, on the contrary, Mr. Grant's view of it is the right one; that the "we" are so many immortal souls "in" bodies, who because of so being "in" bodies "groan being burdened," obviously the remedy would be for the souls to get out of the bodies; and Paul's desire would be to die, so as to obtain this release out of the body. But he expressly excludes this solution of his sorrows. He says, "Not for that we would be unclothed," as much as to fence off the conclusion apparently flowing from his words that death was the relief to be desired. "Not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that MORTALITY might be swallowed up for life." In this he distinctly manifests the nature of the hope before his mind, and the remedy which the groaning state admitted of. Death would end the groans, but bring no blessings. Therefore he desires not that, but that change which would obliterate the mortal and confer everlasting joy in the bestowal of an incorruptible and immortal nature. But if Mr. Grant were right, death would not only end the groans but secure the blessing, and there would be no room left for Paul to desire a bodily rehabilitation. Manifestly Paul and Mr. Grant are not in the same groove.

Mr. Grant lays stress on the expression "unclothed," and properly

enough contends that it is only intelligible if something else that is not the clothing be understood. The question is, what is this something else? Mr. Grant spoils the figure by giving it a literal sense, and making out that "something else" to be a literal inhabitant of the body, who is "clothed with" the body. The fact is, it is the person without reference to what may metaphysically constitute the person, the individual intelligence, resulting from vital mechanism of our nature as a whole, and the experience of external conditions necessary to lay the foundation of identity and responsibility. The exigencies of mortal speech require us to speak of this person as an entity separate from all that composes him, and when figure is added, as in this case, the effect is greatly heightened, and a theory like Mr. Grant's receives apparent countenance. The personal pronoun has to be used in a way that would seem to imply that the person was neither his body, his soul, nor his spirit. We say *my* hand, *my* head, *my* body, *my* faculties, *my* intellect, *my* mind, *my* breath, *my* soul, *my* life, *my* spirit, and leave the way open for the hypererotic to ask, "But who are *you* that possess all these things?" This peculiarity, this inevitable fiction of speech, is not confined to man, but extends to even inanimate objects. We say the doors of the house, the walls of the house, the floors of the house, the roof of the house, all the while seeming to imply that the house is a something separate from doors, wall, floor and roof alike. What should we think of a man who should seriously argue from this idiomatic fiction that there was an abstract house which was the owner of these separate parts? The owner of the parts is the whole, yet in speaking of the parts, you are obliged to speak as if the whole were separable from the parts. So it is exactly in the case of man, and Mr. Grant's argument on Paul's necessary compliance with an inevitable fiction of speech, is as conclusive on the subject of an abstract man as that of his supposed friend and brother, who might split hairs over the bricks and mortar. "Unclothed" is a figurative description of death. "Clothed upon" is a figurative description of the change from mortality to immortality. What these are literally is not to be gleaned from figures, but the plain teaching of revelation and experience, which are conclusive in an opposite direction to Mr. Grant's reasoning.

The same is to be said of the phrase "my departure" (*την εμην εξοδον*) which Peter applies to his death. It is a figurative description, having its foundation in the fact that in death a man goes away (*εξ* out of: *οδου*, the way), even to his long home (Eccles. xii. 5, departing out of the land of the living in yielding up his life and being gathered to the dead. But Mr. Grant (with somewhat superficial penetration, it must be said) emphasizes the pronoun, "MY departure." "The man departs;" true, but not in the partitive

sense. He departs altogether. His life departs, and his body disappears from among men: he dies. The emphasis on the "my" has only to be a little more emphatic to destroy Mr. Grant's sense of it. But he "departs from the body," says Mr. Grant. This is Mr. Grant's gloss. Peter's expression bears it no countenance.

But, rejoins Mr. Grant, Paul uses the expression, "absent from the body." True, but Paul, as the context decisively shows, is not speaking of death, and therefore his words cannot be made to throw light on the subject. He is distinctly speaking of his desire to be delivered from "the earthly house of this tabernacle," in which he groaned, and to be invested with the glorious nature with which the Lord, at his coming, will clothe all whom he approves. Death is related to this change only in so far as it annihilates the conscious interval between the one state and the other, in the case of such as Paul, who have fallen asleep, and to whom, for this reason, to die was gain. But death is not that element in the case of which Paul is desirous, and therefore his expressions cannot be applied to it without perversion. "Absent from the body" distinctly means, in the light of the context, "delivered from this corruptible, and present with the Lord," conformed to his glorious image in his presence at his coming, which is the doctrine of all the apostolic writings. "WHEN HE APPEARS we shall be like him."—(1 John iii. 2.) "When Christ, who is our Life, shall appear, THEN shall we appear with him in glory."—(Col. iii. 2.) "He shall change our vile body that it may be fashioned like to his glorious body."—(Phil. iii. 20.)

Mr. Grant meets this by saying, "To make absent from the body apply just to the time when the body will have its fulness of bliss, is simply to make incomprehensible what is very simple." The fallacy of this apparently clever rejoinder lies in attaching the same value to the body in two totally different states, and will be seen if Mr. Grant's remark is paraphrased in harmony with the facts. "To make 'absent from the animal body' apply just to the time when the animal body has ceased to exist in the same having been changed into the nature of the Lord, is simply to make incomprehensible, &c., &c." Mr. Grant himself would not acknowledge the sentence thus deprived of its piquancy; yet this is the form which embodies the facts. The piquancy of the remark, as Mr. Grant has it, is derived from a fallacy which will be the more realised as Paul's line of thought in 2 Cor. v. is apprehended.

"In the body or out of the body" has been already considered in remarks which need not be repeated.

"Fear not them which kill the body but are not able to kill the soul." Mr. Grant quotes this as conclusive that "when man dies, his soul is not touched by it;" which is true enough when the meaning

of "soul," as used by Jesus, is understood. Is this meaning "immortal soul?" How can it be, when he speaks of the possibility of a righteous man losing it for his sake, saying, "He that loseth his $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (the word translated soul and life) for my sake shall find it?" How can a man, in the sense of orthodox language, lose his *soul* for Christ's sake? Impossible. Hence the "soul" of Christ's word is not the soul of clerical theology which Mr. Grant defends. What is it? The question is answered in the alternative translation which our translators have given to $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ —*life*. A man may lose this for Christ's sake; but because man cannot destroy it, it may be given again. Hence the point in Christ's warning. We are not to fear those who can only demolish the body, but cannot interfere with the abstract power of life, which is in the hands of God. We are to fear Him who has the power in His hand (for "in His hand is the soul of every living thing of the breath of all mankind," (Job. xii. 10), and who will use this power in the giving or withholding of life at His pleasure in the day of account as intimated in the words immediately following those quoted by Mr. Grant: "Fear Him who can *destroy BOTH body and soul* in Gehenna," the judgment place of the age to come. The explanation which Mr. Grant rejects is therefore preserved in its integrity, that "there is a life in relation to those who are Christ's which cannot be touched by mortal man, however they may treat the body and the poor mortal life belonging to it."

"If soul be life merely," says Mr. Grant, "those who kill the body kill it." True, but "soul" as Jesus uses it, is not "life merely" in the sense of a present physiological phenomenon. It is comprehensive of the power from which it springs (styled "the fountain of life;" Ps. xxxvi. 9), and of the purpose to bestow it again. It is these two latter elements which constitute its indestructibility in relation to the preserved of God. Divine appointment matters everything as to the language in which a thing is spoken of. Jesus said of the sickness of Lazarus, "This sickness is *not unto death*."—(John xi. 4.) Physiologically it *was* unto death, for Lazarus died; but in its ultimate effects (and this is everything) it was *not* unto death, for Lazarus was alive and well on the fifth day after his decease. So in the case of the ruler's daughter: "The maid is not dead," addressed to the mourners. She was not dead in the sense of their mourning, though actually for the moment she *was* dead. Because he was to wake her, he said she was not dead, but asleep. So in the matter of life for the righteous; it is indestructible at human hands, though for the moment, capable of being taken from them and "lost" for the time being in relation to them. God purposes they shall have it everlastingly, and therefore, in divine language, men cannot kill it.

If the case were otherwise, that is, if it were as Mr. Grant contends, there would be no need for Christ's exhortation to fearlessness, for the killing of the body in that case, instead of being a thing to be dreaded, would be a thing to be welcomed, as the means by which the righteous man would be ushered into glory. It is because the killing of the body does in a measure, humanly speaking, imperil the existence of the righteous, that it was necessary to remind them that it was not in the power of man to inflict permanent fatal injury.

CHAPTER II.

CONSCIOUSNESS AFTER DEATH.

MR. GRANT objects to "the sleep of the soul." He admits the sleep of the body, but denies the soul becomes unconscious in the death state. With this argument, as directed against an imperfect theory, the Christadelphians have nothing to do. They are not "soul sleepers." "Soul sleepers" are those who believe in the existence of "the soul" as an entity after death; but who contend that between death and resurrection, it sinks into a state of somnolence, like certain animals that lie dormant all the winter. The Christadelphians, on the contrary, believe that in death a man is DEAD, and that if man is not put together again at the resurrection, he will never come again, or enjoy or suffer any kind of existence whatever. It is nothing to the purpose as against their belief to say that spirit cannot be annihilated. Matter cannot be annihilated: will you therefore say that the lime left after the bones are dissolved are the man's bones? Not only so, but we have to think of all the lime and other chemical ingredients that a man uses up in his body during his lifetime; these are not destroyed, but merely changed in their combinations; will it be said that the atoms and substance we part with to-day continue to be elements of our being when they are dissipated into surrounding immensity? As reasonable is it to say that when death destroys our being, the spirit disengaged from the bodily organisation continues to be ourselves. It returns to God who gave it, and is no more us or ours than before it was given.

Mr. Grant's opposition to the idea that the dead are unconscious, is based on an argument that would exclude the possibility of a man becoming unconscious at any time. Herein is a sufficient condemnation of it: we know that unconsciousness is a common occurrence. In sleep we are partly unconscious. If our sleep is healthy and as profound as it ought to be, unconsciousness is nearly complete. In the case of injury to the brain it is absolutely so. A man in such circumstances will be for weeks and months in a state of total insensibility. There is no mistake about it. It is not merely that there is a suspension of outer manifestation, but an absence of all mental action on the part of the subject, as shown by the fact that

when he awakes from his coma, he confesses the interval to have been a blank, and declares the infliction of his injury to seem but just a moment ago. How can this be explained in accordance with the theory of the "soul's" inherent and indestructible consciousness? There is only one mode of attempting to explain it, and that is that the brain is the instrument of the soul's operation, and that when the instrument is injured, the soul cannot work. Surely this is fatal to the consciousness in death for which Mr. Grant contends; for if a partial and temporary injury of the brain interferes with the soul's capability to evolve itself, how reasonable the presumption that a total destruction of it in death necessitates a complete suspension of its powers (assuming, for the sake of argument merely, that the "soul's" separate entity is a fact).

Mr. Grant's admission that the term sleep as expressive of death, is always in the Bible *applied to the body*, is of itself significant of the truth of the doctrine he is opposing, for it is a distinct recognition of the body as the man. What need would there be to speak of the body's relation at all, if death were but the person's escape from a fettering alliance with it? But the body (living, of course), being the person, the death of the body comes very naturally to be spoken of as the sleep of the person, particularly because there is to be an awaking by resurrection. While death continues, the saints "sleep in the dust of the earth."—(Dan. xii. 2.) When resurrection ensues, it is in obedience to a call which summons the sleepers as those that "dwell in dust."—(Isaiah xxvi. 19.) Mr. Grant evades the manifest force of this phraseology by speaking of it as an "identifying with the body." This is mere logomachy. Why should the dead be identified with their bodies if their bodies aren't they? The phrase "identified with their bodies," leaves the door open for Mr. Grant's implication that the persons expressed in the pronoun "they" are something separate from their bodies. But it is a mere phrase and a gratuitous one, which subtly begs the question while allowing Mr. Grant to appear as if in the groove of logic.

But Mr. Grant says there is "abundance of inspired testimony" in favour of the consciousness of the dead. He alleges this in the face of the explicit declaration that "THE DEAD KNOW NOT ANYTHING," (Ecc. ix. 5), as if the Bible could contradict itself. But we look in vain for the "abundance" of inspired testimony, or for any at all! He quotes the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, We have elsewhere (*Vindication*: answer to the "Rev." C. Clemance, page 327), dealt with this matter, and need not here repeat the remarks then made. Mr. Grant speaks dubiously as to the character of the narrative. He does not say it is not a parable. He calls it "the familiar story," of which

he says "call it a parable if you will," implying that he cares not to concede its parabolic character, and is yet afraid of the inconvenience of asserting its literality. This is scarcely frank. Mr. Grant ought to take clear ground that the reader might see where he is. He thanks God for making (by this parable) consciousness after death "so plain." Yet, he says, "figurative, no doubt, the language is—Abraham's bosom is not literal, any more than the gulph over which souls (?) could not pass. Nor do we contend for souls absent from the body having eyes or tongues or fingers. These are extraordinary concessions for a man who objects to a parabolic construction of the incidents of the narrative. He admits the drapery is fictitious, but insists on the literality of acts performed. Abraham's bosom is spoken of, but he admits there is no Abraham's bosom. A gulph is spoken of; but he says "I do not say there is a real gulph." Eyes, tongues, and fingers have a place in the scene; but he says, "I admit that souls have no eyes, tongues or fingers." Now, if he feel at liberty to admit the non-actuality of these things spoken of as apparently real, why is he so sure about the reality of the other parts that apparently favour his theory of the death-state? If there be no real Abraham's bosom, why is he so certain that there was a real Lazarus taken there? If there be no real gulph, why insist upon real souls that could not pass? If there be no real eyes, tongues, and fingers, why are we to admit in obedience to him, that there is real fire and a real torment, and a real person to be conscious? The reason which Mr. Grant might give for disbelieving in real eyes, fingers, gulph, &c., would, probably, be a reason for disbelieving in the reality of dead men alive. He might say, "I cannot insist upon real fingers, because I know there are no such things as fingers in the disembodied soul-state. I cannot insist on a real Abraham's bosom, because I know that the disembodied soul of Abraham has no bosom. I cannot insist on a real impassable gulph; because I know that souls could traverse the deepest gulph that could be made;" which would be sound and good reasons from his point of view. But why not argue the other parts of the parable in the same way? Why not admit their literal unreality, if it be shown they are inconsistent with what is demonstrably true? Mr. Grant cannot consistently object to this mode of procedure. The adoption of it settles the question against him. In death there is no remembrance of God.—(Psalm vi. 5.) When a man dies, in that very day his thoughts perish.—(Psalm cxlvi. 3, 4.) The grave is a land of forgetfulness.—(Psalm lxxxviii. 12.) In the grave there is no knowledge nor wisdom.—(Eccles. ix. 10.) The love and memory and hatred of the dead are perished.—(Eccles. ix. 5, 6.) The dead praise not the Lord.—(Psalm lxxv. 17.) They that go down into the death-state cannot hope in the truth of God, but the living

only praise Him.—(Isaiah xxxviii. 18.) These declarations join with our own experience, and show that a literal reading of the narrative of the rich man and Lazarus is excluded.

What other reading is admissible? The parabolic, in which sometimes impossible things are represented as occurring. Dead bodies are pictured as rising out of their graves and speaking to the King of Babylon at his burial.—(Isaiah xiv. 9-11.) Trees are described as speaking to him also.—(verse 8.) More than once the trees are spoken of as holding conference and deciding upon rational measures.—(Jud. ix. 8-15; 2 Kings xiv. 9.)

In the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, dead men are represented as the subjects of reward and punishment—that the scornful class to whom it is addressed, and to whom it is testified that Christ always spoke in parables (Mark iv. 34), might have foreshadowed to them the doom awaiting them in the time of retribution, which we are taught is—when the Son of Man comes in his glory (Matt. xvi. 27), and raises the dead out of their graves.—(John v. 29; Luke xiv. 14.)

Mr. Grant calls this a "wild manœuvre" on the part of "the poor annihilationists" to "escape from the plain speaking of the parable." The character of the explanation will appear in a different light to such as judge the matter even in the light of Mr. Grant's own admissions.

Mr. Grant next finds support in Luke's statement, that the disciples, when the Lord appeared to them after the resurrection, "supposed they had seen a *spirit*." He understands this to mean that they imagined it was Christ in a disembodied state. He says "it was no question with the disciples as to its being Jesus. . . . but as to its being Jesus in the body, or as a spirit only." This is contrary to the narrative. He says that the two journeying to Emmaus, and Peter having seen him, and reported the facts to the disciples, "they did not doubt *who* it was." But the testimony is that they "believed *not*" the words of the witnesses (Mark xvi. 11-13; Luke xxiv. 11), and that even after Christ appeared to them, they "believed *not* for joy." They saw Jesus stand before them, they did not at the moment believe their senses. What was their alternative theory? That it was not *Jesus*, but — a spirit. What is that? Under similar unnatural circumstances, viz., the appearance of Jesus walking on the sea, we are told in Mark vi. 49, that "they supposed it had been a *spirit*." Here the word is *φαντασμα* a *phantom*, an unreality, a spectral illusion, a fancy of the brain. Now in some ancient MSS. of Luke, the word is the same—not *πνευμα* but *φαντασμα*, and this suggests a sense the very opposite to what Mr. Grant contends for—viz., that the doubt was whether the appearance

before them was the mere creation of their imagination or a reality. Christ's words to them show that he recognised this as the problem. "It is *I myself*," that is, not a mere appearance. "Handle me and see: a spirit (*phantom*) hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have." Mr. Grant understands this as if Jesus had said, "*My spirit* hath not flesh and bones," as if Christ intended to admit to his disciples the possibility of his really appearing to them in the capacity of a disembodied spirit. This is inconsistent with the entire character of the incident; and inconsistent with Mr. Grant's theory: for how could Jesus, then, have laid stress on the appearance before them being *he himself*? Would not his "*spirit*" on Mr. Grant's theory have been "he himself?" Unquestionably. But the issue before the minds of the company was—Christ or *not Christ*. Was it a reality or a spectral illusion? Mr. Grant's exegesis of the matter might well be stigmatised as of that class of "wild manœuvre" with which he credits his friends, "the poor annihilationists;" but the force of reason is so strongly against him, that the case may be safely left without hard words.

He next makes something of Luke's observation in Acts xxiii. 8, that "the Sadducees say there is no resurrection, neither angel nor *spirit*; but the Pharisees confess both." As the opinion of the Pharisees weighs nothing one way or the other in a disputed question, the argument of Mr. Grant upon it may be passed over. Christ's relation to the Pharisees was one of continual condemnation and repudiation, which makes their agreement with a doctrine a dangerous kind of support. We prefer to let Mr. Grant have the full advantage of it. His inference that Luke endorses their opinion, is too unsubstantial to call for serious argumentation.

But Mr. Grant is thankful for the light of the Pharisaic opinion, so dark is the general situation when left to the plain teaching of God's word. He thinks it makes plain and simple for him such passages as "To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise;" "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit;" "The spirit shall return to God who gave it;" "The spirits of just men made perfect." There is room for another opinion as to whether these passages (though apparently on Mr. Grant's side) are made plain by Mr. Grant's theory.

With regard to the first, the testimony is that Christ's "soul" was in hell between his death and resurrection.—(Acts ii. 31.) Now, if this soul be the same as the "soul" of Mr. Grant's belief, how does he explain the suggestion that Christ's "spirit" was in *Paradise* during the interval? Did Christ's soul go to one place and his spirit to another? Again, is not *Paradise* the "garden of the Lord"—the inheritance of the saints—the land of promise, beautified like Eden?—(Ezek. xxxvi. 35; Is. li. 3; lx. 13, 15; lxi. 4.) If so, how could the

spirit of the thief go to a place which had no existence at the time? Christ's answer to the thief is much more "plain and simple" when understood in the light of the question put: "Lord, remember me when thou comest unto THY KINGDOM." The reply that in that day the thief would be with him, is intelligible. It may be objected that the word is "to-day," or "this day," and not "that day;" but this objection is without force when the expression is understood to apply to the day introduced to notice in the thief's question: "THIS DAY, viz., ~~at~~ when thou comest into thy kingdom," which is, at the appearing of Christ.—(2 Tim. iv. 1; Matt. xxv. 31.) Literally, the word is "to-day;" but in the connection of the phrase, the idea of the Greek idiom is best represented in English by "that day."

Then, as to Stephen's dying words, are they "quite plain and simple," if we suppose that Stephen's spirit is Stephen himself about to mount to glory, as Mr. Grant's theory contends? It is much other-wise, for it represents Stephen making the subject of petition that which, according to the theory, was in no danger; and ignoring the body and soul, which were in danger according to Mr. Grant's view of the situation. Stephen, the Spirit, as he views it, could not be touched, but would, of his own volition, mount, as an "intelligent entity," to the presence of the Saviour. If the case was so, why did not Stephen pray rather for his imperilled body and soul? and why did he speak as if his spirit was something separate from him? And how are we to read the statement that "having said this, HE fell asleep?" His words are much more "plain and simple," if we suppose that Stephen understood that he was about to die, and that if God did not, so to speak, treasure his spirit or life for him, his death would be final as the beasts that perish. On this supposition, his prayer is a natural petition for existence in peril.

And as to the spirit returning to God who gave it, it is rather wonderful that Mr. Grant should contend that the Pharisaic theory makes this plain; for is it not obvious that the spirit given by God is not an "intelligent entity" but the abstract means of individual intelligence? This returns, but not an intelligent entity, which never came. Surely Mr. Grant will not contend that he was an intelligent entity before he entered the body.

The "spirits of just men made perfect" will appear, by a consideration of the whole context, to mean the consciences of just men perfected in righteousness by forgiveness through the blood of Christ—men who once lived under the law which made nothing perfect.—(Heb. vii. 19.) Instead of being made "plain and simple," this is a passage put in an utter cloud by Mr. Grant's "light;" for he makes it mean spirits perfected by resurrection, as if spirit in his theory could be perfected by body!

Paul's desire to "depart and be with Christ" receives considerable attention from Mr. Grant in this chapter. His remarks, however, are mainly directed against the explanation advanced by the Adventist annihilationists. They, therefore, call for little attention on the part of the Christadelphians, who are not responsible for the explanation. The Christadelphians believe with Mr. Grant that the problem before Paul's mind when he declared himself "in a strait betwixt two," was, whether it would be best to choose life or death. Nevertheless, they contend, on the strength of Paul's own teaching (1 Thess. iv. 13, to the end; 2 Cor. iv. 14), and the general teaching of the word (Old and New), that his desire was for the returning of Christ, and being with him. Death was but a means of his instantly reaching the consummation, by abolishing for him the interval; for "the dead know not anything" (Ecc. ix. 5), and the death state passes to them like a lightning flash, as the pre-life state, in its countless ages, has done; so that an occupancy of the grave for thousands of years would pass to them as a night's rest, and shorter. Death was doubly "gain" to Paul, in terminating a career of privation and suffering, and suddenly introducing him to the day of the Lord's glory not yet arrived. This understanding of Paul's words would not be affected by their acceptance of the common version, "depart and be with Christ:" for to die and be with Christ are instantly sequential incidents to the consciousness of the man who dies. But the translation "for the returning and the being with Christ," is more in accordance with the hope before Paul's mind.

Mr. Grant lays great stress on the appearance of Moses on the Mount of Transfiguration. He contends that "here we are permitted to gaze on one departed, and to realise as far as we can, how departed Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob still live unto Him who is not the God of the dead but of the living." Mr. Grant seeks to make out his view of the case by denying that the transfiguration was a vision, and at the same time denying that Moses was raised from the dead. Of course, if he maintain these positions, the transfiguration is a proof in the direction he applies it; but he is far from proving either point. He relies upon the fact that the disciples were "awake when they saw Moses and Elias with Jesus," to prove that it was no vision. But this can only be proof on the assumption that men cannot see visions when awake. Was not John "awake" in the island of Patmos, when he saw visions of "things which must be HEREAFTER?"—(Rev. iv. 1.) Was not Ezekiel awake when "in the visions of God" he was brought to the mountains of Israel and shown a temple *that is to be?*—(Ezek. xl. 1.) The wakeful state of the disciples is therefore no proof that what they saw was not a vision. Jesus expressly calls it a vision (Matt. xvii. 9): "Tell the vision to no man till the Son of man be risen

from the dead." Are we to read this in the light of what Luke says concerning Peter: "He wist not that it was true that it was done unto him, but thought he saw a vision?"—(Acts xii.) If so it settles the visional character of the transfiguration as a representation of something to be.

Nevertheless, it is to be admitted that the employment of the term "vision" is not conclusive, since it is applied to some transactions that were undoubtedly real, such as the angels at the sepulchre (Luke xxiv. 23), and the appearance of Gabriel to Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist.—(Luke i. 22.) And we have then to consider whether the position of "the poor annihilationist" is at all affected by the hypothesis that the transfiguration was an actual scene, and that Moses was really there. We shall see that even in that case, it leaves the position untouched.

If Moses were really there, say they, he must have been raised from the dead. No, no, says Mr. Grant, "Christ was the first begotten from the dead." True, the first that rose to the immortal state. But others rose before him—the widow's son, Lazarus, and others, and why not Moses? "Because," says Mr. Grant, "it is no question of simple restoration to earthly life." The meaning of this is not obvious. Mr. Grant says of Elias, who never died, that though he appeared at the transfiguration, his body "was not in the likeness yet of Christ's glorious body." If this means anything it means that Elias was there with his "earthly life." And if Elias could be there with his earthly life, why not Moses, having been the subject of a "restoration to earthly life?" Mr. Grant's own premises admit of the possibility which he denies, viz., that Moses had been the subject of resurrection, and was really present. He lays stress on the fact that he appeared in "glory"—apparently as suggesting that it was not a body of "earthly life" that he had. But so did Elias, whose body, on his own admission, was not yet glorified. And so did Jesus, who was yet of the same flesh and blood as mortal men.—(Heb. ii. 14.)

But even if we were to admit that both Elias and Moses were actually there with glorified bodies (which possibly was the case), we should fail to see anything in that fact incompatible with Christ's priority as the first fruits. The first fruits under the law were the fruits first presented before the Lord, without implying that there was no other fruit ripe in the field. Jesus was presented in the presence of the Father as the first fruits of the human race. But this did not exclude the co-existence of others, as in the case of Enoch, Elias and Moses. He was the first-born in rank; the headstone of the building the heir through whom all the family should come into possession the foundation upon which the scheme of salvation should be

established. But this did not preclude the preparation beforehand of some special stones, as in the case of Enoch, Moses, and Elias waiting to be put in their place when the foundation should be laid: brothers of the family, waiting the appearance of the heir before they could come into possession. Miraculous exemption from death must be admitted in the case of Enoch and Elijah. This could only have been in view of the removal of sin to be accomplished by Christ. Now, if death could be averted in advance, without clashing with God's plan in Christ, so the body could be glorified in advance with a similar absence of confusion.

Altogether, whichever way it be taken, there is nothing in the appearance of Moses in the Mount inconsistent with the position of "the poor Annihilationists," and certainly nothing of which Mr. Grant can logically boast on behalf of the unscriptural and Pagan doctrine he is seeking to maintain.

In a similar position (but stronger against Mr. Grant), stands the statement that "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." Mr. Grant's supreme attention is concentrated on the phrase "the living," which he takes as defining conscious existence, at the time of speaking, on the part of those referred to. Ought he not to think also of the converse? Who are "the dead" whose God God is not? Jesus recognises such a class. Mr. Grant's theory does not; for, according to the theory, all are and never can be anything else than "the living." The purpose for which Jesus makes the statement shows the meaning. It is to prove the resurrection. Jesus argues God's purpose to raise Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, from the fact of His styling Himself their God while they were dead. This is irresistibly logical on the principle that "God calleth those things which are not (but which are to be) as though they were."—(Rom. iv. 17.) A dead man whom God intends to raise is alive to Him, since the man's re-appearance in being is a mere question of the exercise of His will. In the same sense, the saints are said to have received the favour of God in Christ "before the world began."—(2 Tim. i. 9.) But Mr. Grant takes all the pith out of Christ's argument, by imagining that Christ meant to allege the then present existence of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

In view of all which, we may say that Mr. Grant, in his concluding remark in this chapter, but in a sense different to his, that the question of the consciousness of the dead may be left, "with the full conviction of its complete, manifest and divine answer."

CHAPTER III.

HADES AND PARADISE.

MR. GRANT touches upon these to give "completeness" to his "sketch of the Scripture doctrine of the soul's immortality." [Note, in passing, that this is the first place in the book where he commits himself to the popular phrase "the soul's immortality," the strange significance of which in his mouth will appear when it is remembered in the earlier part of his book (page 40 and elsewhere), he admits that in the Scriptures, "it is said that it (the beast) has a soul." From the obvious argument on this, that either the beast is immortal, or man is not, Mr. Grant saved himself, in the early part of his book, by saying—untruthfully as we saw—"it is not said that the beast has a spirit," leaving it to be inferred that it is the "spirit" of Mr. Grant's phraseology that is immortal, and not the soul; but now it comes out that after all, it is "the soul's immortality" he is labouring to establish, and that his fine-spun theory of the difference between soul and spirit was a mere contrivance to evade scriptural inconveniences that the immortal-soul theory, pure and simple, is liable to.]

How does he make *hades* and *paradise* "complete" his "sketch of the Scripture doctrine of the soul's immortality?" He does it by asserting something that he does not prove. The process does not appear, at first sight, to be so naked as this; but stripped of its settings, this is what the chapter amounts to.

He first seeks to dispose of the "annihilationist" idea that *hades* means the grave, and that *paradise* means the kingdom of God. He says the Scripture use of both words is awkward for the annihilationist theory. His only illustration of this, so far as *hades* is concerned, is one he is precluded from using. It is that of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, of which he says, "it is awkward to have read, 'in the grave he lifted up his eyes, being in torment.'" True, but this parable embodies the Pharisaic notion of *hades*, which Mr. Grant in this very place recognises as the "annihilationist" view of the parable. Therefore it cannot be used as discrediting their view of the scriptural use of it, which the grave undoubtedly is.

Then comes the assertion that the word *hades* "applies undoubtedly, in ordinary Greek, to the region of departed spirits, but got naturally thence to be applied loosely to death and the grave. It was never the distinct proper word for either." And with this indefinite reference to "ordinary Greek," the unsafest of all authorities in Divine matters, whose wisdom Paul pronounces "foolishness with God," Mr. Grant is content to leave, as proved, the scripturally-undemonstrable notion of a "region of departed spirits." True, he takes care to say "a word in Scripture may . . . differ in meaning from that simply classical;" but he does not say that this is a case in which such a difference exists. He leaves it to be inferred that there is no difference, and that the Scripture *hades* is the *hades* of Pagan mythology. He asks which of the eleven cases of its occurrence in the New Testament will the "annihilationists take up to prove their position from?" Let us look at them, and it will be found that all of them, with the exception already explained, prove their position, or are in harmony therewith. They are cited by Mr. Grant, and are as follow:—

- 1.—"Thou, Capernaum, shalt be brought down to hell.—(Matt. xi. 23.)
- 2.—"The gates of hell shall not prevail against it."—(xvi. 19.)
- 3.—"Thou, Capernaum, shalt be thrust down to hell."—(Luke x. 15.)
- 4.—"And in hell he lifted up his eyes."—(xvi. 23.)
- 5.—"Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell."—(Acts ii. 27.)
- 6.—"That his soul was not left in hell."—(31.)
- 7.—"O grave, where is thy victory?"—(1 Cor. xv. 55.)
- 8.—"And have the keys of hell and of death."—(Rev. i. 18.)
- 9.—"Was death, and hell followed."—(vi. 8.)
- 10.—"Death and hell delivered the dead."—(xx. 13.)
- 11.—"Death and hell were cast into the lake of fire."—(14.)

No. 1.—"Thou, Capernaum, shalt be brought down to the grave," reads rather more intelligibly than "brought down to the place of departed spirits."—No. 2: "The gates of the grave shall not prevail against my church," is surely more in harmony with the great doctrine of salvation by resurrection than "The gates of the region of departed spirits shall not prevail, &c." According to Mr. Grant, the region of departed spirits for saints is a state of being with Christ; if which be true, it is rather desirable than otherwise that the gates of such a happy region should prevail. Certainly on that hypothesis, there is nothing attractive in the promise that the gates shall not prevail, but if *hades* be, the grave, then the promise that the gates shall not remain closed, becomes a precious promise.—No. 3: Capernaum (see No. 1).—No. 4: (see remarks before on the "Pharisaic foundation of the parable.")—No. 5 and No. 6: As proving the resurrection, "Thou wilt not leave my soul (that is, me) in the grave,"

is certainly more pointed than "thou wilt not leave my immortal soul in the region of departed spirits;" in this form, the statement would not be a proof of resurrection of the body, but only an intimation that the immortal soul was to be transferred from *hades* to somewhere else, perhaps Mr. Grant's paradise. The "annihilationist" construction preserves all the force of the passage as a proof of God's purpose to raise the Messiah from the dead.—No. 7: "O grave, where is thy victory?" is surely more appropriate than "O region of departed spirits, where is thy victory!" Mr. Grant expects to go to the region of departed spirits, and to be with Christ; and for this victory of the region of departed spirits over his body, as introducing him to Abraham's bosom, Moses, the thief, Lazarus, and so on, he will be thankful. Why then should he imagine himself afterwards jubilant at deliverance from this region of departed spirits? How can he conceive of the comparatively mean circumstance of a return to his body, inspiring him with such satisfaction as to cause him to shout, "O region of departed spirits, where is thy victory?"—No. 8 "I have the keys of the grave and of death" is surely an appropriate saying from him who said "I am the resurrection and the life."—No. 9: "On a pale horse was death, and the grave followed him," is certainly not a more incongruous piece of imagery than death on a horse and "the region of departed spirits" following. Death killing and the grave receiving the victims, is a more appropriate collocation than death not killing, and a cloud of departed spirits chasing it.—No. 10: "Death and the grave delivered up the DEAD" is more intelligible than a region of departed spirits delivering up a swarm of ghosts who never were dead.—No. 11: "Death and the grave were cast into a lake of fire," as symbolising the extirpation of death in the destruction of the wicked, is more intelligible than a region being emptied into a lake.

In response, therefore, to Mr. Grant's triumphant challenge, "which of these passages will the writers in question take up to prove their position from?" the simple answer is—ALL, with the exception which Mr. Grant himself has recognised. We therefore record a simple denial of his assertion that "the only positive teaching of the passages is all against them."

On "Paradise," Mr. Grant is more brief and less cogent on behalf of the theory he advocates. He returns to the thief on the cross, or rather to Christ's answer to the thief's question. He argues against the reading of the answer which some "annihilationists" contend for: "Verily I say unto thee *to-day*: thou shalt be with me in paradise," and insists that "*to-day*" in the case was intended as the time of the event spoken of, and not the time of the speaking, which the construction of the sentence in the Greek doubtless shows. With this

argument Christadelphians do not quarrel, believing, with Mr. Grant, that Christ's words were "in answer to a prayer in which *the time in which the thief sought to be remembered* was expressed;" but they do not agree with Mr. Grant that the thief spoke about one time and Christ another. They contend that the time referred to by both was the same—thus: "THIS DAY: ~~as~~ *When thou comest in thy kingdom.*" This, which might be left to stand by its own reasonableness, is conclusively proved by the collateral facts of the case, one of which is unconsciously admitted by Mr. Grant in his remarks on *hades*. In fact, he supplies the confutation to his present argument. He quotes the statement that Christ's soul, during the three days he was dead, was not left in *hades*; and therefore admits, inferentially, that it was in *hades* during the interval. Now, with Mr. Grant, *hades* is one place and *paradise* another; and both are places to which, according to his theory, the disembodied souls of dead men go when they die.

Now, when Christ was dead, he was either in one place or the other. Which? Arguing on Christ's answer to the thief, Mr. Grant says he went to *paradise*: but when he quotes Peter's words about Christ's resurrection: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in *hell*" (*hades*), he asks us to believe that it was *hades* and not *paradise*! Whence this confusion? Because Mr. Grant has got hold of a false theory of the matter. His *hades* is not the Bible *hades*; and his *paradise* is not the Bible *paradise*. Let him substitute the *hades* and *paradise* of the Bible for the *hades* and *paradise* of Greek mythology, and the confusion will disappear. Christ was in the grave three days, and in the "*to-day*" of the thief's question: "when he comes in his kingdom," he will be in *paradise*.

The case is strengthened by Christ's words to Mary on the day of his resurrection: "I have *not yet* ascended to my Father," which, as Mr. Grant views things, is equivalent to saying "I have *not yet* ascended to *paradise*." Mr. Grant makes light of this, and tries to escape by drawing a misty distinction between the ascension of "the Risen One," "as such," and the "mere departure (why 'mere?') of his human spirit" (not himself, therefore). Words are very plastic in Mr. Grant's manipulations. When he is proving "spirit" an intelligent entity, "they thought they had seen a spirit," is made to mean they thought they saw JESUS as a spirit; now when Christ says HE had not on the third day ascended to where Mr. Grant makes him go on the first, "HE" in *paradise*, changes into "the mere departure of his human spirit." Mr. Grant is like a certain kind of marine insect: you see it in a place, and put down your hand to take it, but you only take sand: the creature is gone. You see it again: you are sure of it this time; but again it has darted to another place. A third time succeeds, perhaps, and you take the creature home to boil it. Mr. Grant may apply the parable if he pleases; if not, the readers will do it for him.

In a few remaining words of this chapter Mr. Grant says some true things of paradise though he misapplies them, as he is bound to do, to make them of service to immortal-soulism. He says: "paradise is an eastern word for a park or pleasure ground. The Hebrew פֶּרְדֵּי is only used in Neh. ii. 8; Ecc. ii. 5; Sol. Song iv. 13. It is there translated once 'forest,' twice 'orchard.' It is not used for the Garden of Eden in Hebrew, but the ordinary word גֶּן for garden. The Septuagint translation, however, gives here *παράδεισος* (paradise) which is uniformly the word it uses for the 'Garden of Eden,' or of God, except in the place where the usual word for garden (*κηπος*) is used." Now, Mr. Grant admits that the New Testament use of the word "paradise" is "doubtless derived" from its use in the Greek version of the Old Testament. If so, does it not follow that our conceptions of it as used in the New Testament, where its significance is not defined, must be derived from the Old Testament, where it is defined? Mr. Grant says, "it does not follow that it will have exactly the same application." True, if by "exactly" is meant the identical Garden of Eden, to which it was applied by the Greek translators of Moses; but it does follow that its generic sense is the same as refers to earth, dressed, cultivated and settled as a place of enjoyment. "The earthly paradise," says Mr. Grant, "is taken as the type of another." This is one of his unproved assertions, against which we place the much more reasonable proposition that it is taken as the designation of the *promised inheritance*, which is expressly spoken of as a "planting of the Lord that he may be glorified" (Isaiah lx. 21). This explanation of the matter puts the New Testament uses of "paradise" in harmony with all the promises and revealed purpose of God in the Old Testament. Thus Abraham is to have "the land of his pilgrimage for an inheritance" (Gen. xvii. 8; Heb. xi. 8, 9), of which we read that it is to be made like the garden (paradise) of Eden (Ezek. xxxvi. 35); the garden (*paradise*) of the Lord (Isaiah li. 3); an eternal excellency; the joy of many generations (Isaiah lx. 15); the place of His (Jehovah's) feet made glorious (verse 13) with festal beauties of the myrtle and shittah tree, in the absence of thorn and brier. Thus too David was to see his kingdom (the same country) established for ever (2 Sam. vii. 16) according to the covenant, which was all his salvation and all his desire.—(2 Sam. xxiii. 5.) The BRANCH raised up unto him, sitting on his (David's) throne, Jesus (Acts ii. 29; Luke i. 32), was to execute judgment and righteousness in the land (Jer. xxxiii. 15), reigning as the Lord of Hosts in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem, before his ancients gloriously.—(Isaiah xxiv. 23.) The twelve apostles were at this time to sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel in the day of their restoration, when Jesus should sit on the throne of his

glory—(Matt. xix. 27.) This Jesus speaks of as the kingdom of God, saying, "I will not any more eat thereof until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God;" and "I appoint unto you a kingdom as my Father hath appointed unto me, that ye may eat and drink with me at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel."—(Luke xxii. 16, 29, 30.) Abraham's "land of promise;" David's established throne and kingdom; the "kingdom of God," of the gospel, and "paradise," of occasional allusion, are thus all one and the same thing. But Mr. Grant's paradise—what is it? He does not say. He cannot be definite. He makes himself understood as pointing, with a somewhat uncertain finger, it is true, towards the blue sky; but if that be paradise, what about the land promised to Abraham, the covenanted re-establishment of the kingdom of David and the kingdom of God, which is to consist of "the kingdoms of this world?"—(Gen. xiii. 14; Amos ix. 11; Rev. xi. 15.)

Mr. Grant's only point lies in the statement of Paul in 2 Cor. xii. 4, how he was caught up into "paradise," but even this dissolves before a critical test. The idea of "up" is not expressed in the original. The word translated "caught up" is *ἤρξαθη* which comes from *αἶψα* to seize, carry away with force. The idea is that Paul was by a divine afflatus introduced to paradise, before his eyes. But in telling us this, he says he is dealing with "visions and revelations," as to the character of which, we have an illustration in the case of John in Patmos, who heard a voice from heaven, saying, "Come up hither and I will show thee THINGS WHICH MUST BE HEREAFTER." "And immediately," says John, "I was in spirit." That is, he was caught away in the sense of Paul's words, and witnessed things "in heaven" which were to transpire on earth, "things which were to be hereafter." Now, in Paul's case, he could not tell whether was bodily present in the scenes he saw or not. Mr. Grant might rejoin, if what he saw was a something that was to be, he could have no doubt on the point. True, as a matter of after-reflection, he might conclude the visions were simply visions, but this would merely be an argument, whereas he is telling us of the impression made on his senses. He gives us to understand the things were so apparently real that to the day of his writing, he could not say whether they were actual or not. He might suppose them made actually existent for the occasion of his inspection, while recognising the future relation of the whole matter to the heirs of salvation. At all events, he says he doesn't know. If his view had been Mr. Grant's view, he could have had no doubt, because a present actual paradise above the clouds would have been no difficulty to him; but to see as a reality a thing that he knew was future was just the experience calculated to produce the mental dilemma he describes.

CHAPTER IV.

OBJECTIONS FROM OLD TESTAMENT TEACHINGS.

MR. GRANT devotes a lengthy chapter to the consideration of those passages of Scripture, which are quoted against popular views by "the poor annihilationists." His treatment of these is original, ingenious and neat, but nevertheless characterised by an occasional inconsistency and an always absurdness in the nature of the implications involved, indicative of the logical impossibility of the task he undertakes.

He sets forth in order references to the fifty-six passages which are brought forward in *Twelve Lectures* (pp. 40-50), in illustration of the Bible doctrine of death and the future state. Concerning these, while pointing triumphantly to the fact that forty-seven of them belong to the Old, and only nine to the New, he calls attention to the fact that the passages favourable to the popular doctrine reviewed in *Twelve Lectures*, are nine from the New Testament and only one from the Old. The point he seeks to make is, that most of the passages quoted in proof of the mortality of human nature, are from the Old Testament, and most of those quotable in proof of the popular doctrine are from the New; upon which he asks, "Really does it not seem as if it were a question between the Old Testament and the New?" Does Mr. Grant contend that the truth could not be learnt from the Old Testament, but only from the New? It looks like it; yet he instantly adds, "it is not that (a question between Old and New)," and he afterwards admits that the Holy Spirit in its teaching in the Old Testament does not contradict the teaching in the New. To what purpose then, is the virtual boast that while the Old Testament may be on the side of "the poor annihilationist," the New Testament is on the side of Mr. Grant? "The poor annihilationists," he says, "are groping for light in the midst of the shadows of the dispensation of comparative darkness." This, at the same time is ingeniously untrue. The "poor annihilationists," who lie so heavily on Mr. Grant's spirit, go to the Old Testament for light *only on those subjects on which it treats*. It does not treat of the way by which the Gentiles may enter into life. Therefore, they "grop" not for light where none is to be found.

But it tells us of the creation of man, and of the flood, and of the reason thereof: does Mr. Grant wish them to refuse this light? It informs us of God's dealings with Israel, and the reason of their afflictions, and His future purpose with them: would He have them reject this light? And it tells them of the nature of man and the state of the dead: why are they to refuse this light? Just as they accept the light of the New Testament on the glorious way by which condemned sinners of the Gentiles may rise to "glory, honour, and immortality," so do they accept the light of the Old Testament, in its revelation of the fact that by one man's disobedience, sin entered into the world and death by sin, and that when men are dead, they ARE dead and know nothing at all.

But the Old Testament light on this subject does not agree with Mr. Grant's light, and so he calls Old Testament light in general "comparative darkness," by which he lays himself open to several damaging rejoinders. If the "annihilationists" in taking the Old Testament as a guide *in the matters of which he treats*, are "groping for light in the midst of the shadows," Christ (be it said with reverence and only as the result of Mr. Grant's argument) exhorted men to grope for light in the midst of the shadows; for he said "search the Scriptures" (of the Old Testament, of course); then also Paul commends groping in the midst of the shadows, for he said to Timothy, "the Scriptures (of the Old Testament, of course) are able to make thee wise unto salvation" (2 Tim. iii. 15); and "give attendance to reading" (the Old Testament of course)—(2 Tim. iv. 13). Then Peter advises the same process under misleading language, for he said the word of prophecy was a light shining in a dark place, whereunto believers did well to take heed.—(2 Pet. i. 19.) Then David made a mistake in calling the word *a light and a lamp*.

Mr. Grant "points Mr. Roberts's attention, and that of his companions in the doctrine he advocates, to a tale that these (Old Testament) quotations tell, the moral of which will be found in 2 Tim. i. 10, where we find that Christ 'has abolished death and brought life and incorruptibility to light by the GOSPEL.'" This is perfectly superfluous on the part of Mr. Grant. The tale he would point to is the very tale which the poor annihilationist is continually telling; and to which, be it said, it is Mr. Grant and his co-religionists who shut their ears. It is part of the so-called annihilationist case that life and incorruptibility having been brought to light in the gospel, they form no part of man's natural inheritance. It is Mr. Grant who wants pointing to this tale.

But, of course, Mr. Grant's application of this would be different. His object is to exclude the Old Testament as a witness in the matter in

dispute. The logic by which he seeks to effect this will appear in an extraordinary light when nakedly stated. "Life and incorruptibility are brought to light in the gospel; therefore don't go to the Old Testament for light on death and corruptibility!" To have any force, this argument should be turned the other way about, viz., that the Old Testament is the place to go to for light on the nature of death; but that as for the way of life and immortality, a man must have recourse to the gospel. But even this would appear weak when the fact is recognised that the gospel is not confined to the New Testament, but is to be found in the Old (Gal. iii. 8; Rom. i. 2), that the New Testament economy is but a confirmation of the promises made unto the fathers.—(Rom. xv. 8.) The fact is that death and the nature of man are revealed in the Old Testament, and God's purpose to bring life also (Psalm cxxxiii. 3; Isaiah xxv. 8; Hosea xiii. 14), but the way whereby it was to be brought within reach was reserved for illustration and proclamation in the mission of Jesus, the facts of which gave birth to the New Testament.

Then supposing there was the force in Mr. Grant's argument which Mr. Grant imagines, how easy it ought to be for him to settle this controversy. "No light in the Old Testament," says Mr. Grant; "mid-day light in the New," adds he, meaning mid-day light on immortal-soulism. If so, let him show it. Where is the New Testament affirmation that man is immortal? or that the soul is immortal? or that the spirit is immortal? It cannot be found. Where is the New Testament proposition that "the righteous at their death do immediately pass into glory"; that the dead "are not dead, but gone before?" Not to be found. Mr. Grant cannot produce a single explicit declaration of the thing he contends for. All he has to bring forward in the shape of "mid-day light" on immortal-soulism, is a variety of elliptical, tropical, figurative, parabolical, and incoherent forms of speech, which while in superficial agreement with immortal-soulism, do not affirm it, and which are all in equal agreement with the mortality of man, when their meaning is perceived. Let him no longer talk of his opponents "loving to hide in the shadows." If they go to the darkness to see what darkness is, they come to the light to learn what the light is, whereas, Mr. Grant, like a foolish child, dances among the sunbeams (with closed eyes, be it said,) and shouts "there is no darkness at all."

Mr. Grant is, after all, wonderfully obtuse. He says Heb. ix. 8 "furnishes a point about the old economy which they (the poor annihilationists) need to know." Well, what is it? "The Holy Spirit this signified—that the way unto the holiest was *not yet manifested* while the first tabernacle was yet standing." Why should "the annihilationists" have their attention called to this? It is the very

thing that proves their case. Mr. Grant contends that Abraham, Moses, Samuel, David, Isaiah, Daniel, and thousands besides them, went into the holiest (that is, the heavenly state) *as soon as they died, WHILE THE FIRST TABERNACLE WAS YET STANDING.*" The "poor annihilationists," on the contrary, accept the declaration that the way was not yet manifested while the old economy existed, and that, as Jesus said, "No man had ascended into heaven."—(John iii. 13). The passage recoils with singular force against Mr. Grant's position. He says it "simply means" that the Mosaic dispensation dealt with earthly and not heavenly promises. One can only be surprised at such an explanation. It "simply means" something specifically pertaining to heavenly promises—not that the Mosaic economy had nothing to do with those promises, but that the way to them had not been manifested during the Mosaic economy, which strikes at the root of Mr. Grant's theory, which assumes that the way at that time was not only manifested but duly traversed by the righteous dead in thousands every year.

He thinks, however, that the Old Testament saints knew very little about it. He admits that to them "death" was "a deep dark shadow," and that the thing they looked for was "resurrection and restoration to a scene of earthly blessedness," which he says "is the truth as to the Old Testament:" a strange admission for Mr. Grant, and a damaging one to the point of fatalness, when it is remembered that the ancients possessed the true hope (Heb. xi. 39); that to them the promises were made (Gal. iii. 16), and the gospel preached (Heb. iv. 2), and that we are but their children *if we walk in the STEPS OF THAT FAITH WHICH ABRAHAM HAD, while he was yet uncircumcised*" (Rom. iv. 12), being thus his seed and heirs according to the promise (Gal. iii. 29). And then to think of one thing being "the truth as to the Old Testament," and by implication another thing in the New! This is a sufficient condemnation of Mr. Grant's theory of the Bible. The Old and New Testaments are one, and the hope the same in both, as those who understand them are aware.

But they were not in *total* darkness according to Mr. Grant, as to "a portion in the heavenly place for those who believed." Enoch and Elijah were as a "little gleam of light." As how, Mr. Grant? Enoch and Elijah were taken away bodily. How could this throw even "a little gleam of light" on the problem of men getting to heaven whose bodies were buried in the grave? The cases in question are more like a cloud of smoke than a gleam of light; for they did not seem to imply that men had no chance except in being bodily translated?

Though dark in the matter of accurate knowledge, Mr. Grant relies on Phariseism to show that the majority of the people "were not

annihilationists." This is of no weight in the controversy, on account of the position of Phariseism. Had Jesus endorsed Phariseism, the case would have been different; but Jesus styled the Pharisees blind (Matt. xxiii. 17), and declared of them and their companions that they had "taken away the key of knowledge."—(Luke xi. 52.) To show, therefore, that the people were mainly Pharisees, is only to show that they were under a blind leadership, and led away by a system that lacked true knowledge.

But Mr. Grant is hard pushed for supports, and, therefore, not only Christ-repudiated Phariseism, but God-condemned necromancy is pressed into his service. This, also, he cites as evidence, that though dark, the people believed in a conscious death-state, the obvious remark on which is, that proving the Jewish people to have been largely believers in immortal-soulism, would not prove that immortal-soulism was true. At almost any time in their history they were worshippers of false gods, even when the prophets were among them; and if the argument in question were to stand, then would their belief in gods prove that false gods are true gods.

Necromancy was an imposture. Mr. Grant says it was "heathenish," but this is a term of very obscure significance in a critical controversy. By "heathenish" he does not mean "untrue;" for he says "the Scriptures recognise it as a real thing." At the same time, his meaning here is doubtful, for though he appears to mean that Scripture admits that necromancers could really bring any of the dead to their presence, as they pretended, he limits the recognition of this claim by saying, "True indeed, the departed spirit of a saint was not at the mercy of a witch to summon into presence." It would seem that he thinks witches had the power to summon sinners from hell, but not saints from heaven. Yet singularly enough, the very case he cites in illustration is the case of Samuel—a saint summoned by the witch of Endor! And this he quotes "to shew that all was not dark even here on the subject of immortality!" Well may we think of Isaiah's words (viii. 19), "When they shall say unto you, Seek unto them that have familiar spirits, and unto wizards that peep and mutter; should not a people seek unto their God? for the living to the dead? To the law and to the testimony, if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them."

Mr. Grant believes Samuel appeared, not bodily, yet really and apparently. The first question upon this is, Why did not Saul, as well as the witch, see Samuel? Saul had to ask the woman what sort of a person was coming, showing that the perception was limited to the woman as a practiser of the necromantic art, and, therefore, that the Samuel which appeared was not an apparition of the order of Mr. Grant's theory, which would have been seen by both; but a vision sub-

jective to the woman herself. Again, the person seen was an old man with a mantle, by which Saul identified him as Samuel: do the spirits of Mr. Grant's belief have the shape of the bodies they leave? and when a spirit or ghost leaves the body, does it take away a ghost of the clothes the body wears? Samuel's ghost in this case had a ghost of Samuel's clothes, which is intelligible enough in view of the nature of the apparition as the spectral impression of Samuel in the woman's brain reflected from that of Saul. On the same principle, we see friends in dreams with their clothes. The difference in this case was that the impression was borrowed or reflected from the brain of Saul, and made abnormally visible to the woman in a waking state through her peculiar constitution. But how does Mr. Grant explain the ghost of the clothes on his supposition that Samuel was really there. Furthermore, Samuel said (through the woman), "Why hast thou disquieted me to bring me up?" According to Mr. Grant's theory, Samuel came "down" from paradise. Finally, Samuel said, "To-morrow shalt thou and thy sons be with me," which must be a difficulty with Mr. Grant, who is required by his theology to believe that while Samuel is in paradise, Saul and his sons went to hell.

There is little doubt that, as Mr. Grant expresses it, "God permitted Saul to get his answer of doom;" but there is equally little doubt that it was by means of the very instrumentality he chose to his own confusion, by the usually lying divination of a necromancer, in this case tinged with truth by divine interposition.

Necromancy, witchcraft, &c., were the ancient counterparts of spiritualism—"real" in the sense in which astrology is real—real in the fact dealt with, but not in the use made of them. Stars are real, and their movements also, but their determination of individual occurrences exists only in the imagination of the astrologers. A necromancer is real, in the power peculiar to his organism; but his interpretation of what he does and can do, is as true as the wars among the gods, to which the ancients attributed storms. There is no "raising" of the dead or miraculous performance whatever. There is but the exercise of natural brain and nervous power in an unusual way. The use of this power, as if it were divine in a special sense, especially to draw aside Israel from obedience to the commandments of Jehovah, was esteemed an offence so heinous as to warrant death. That Mr. Grant should have to invoke the aid of an ancient lying vanity, is evidence of the hopeless nature of the case he has to support.

Proceeding to dispose of the "Old Testament objections" to his theory, Mr. Grant refuses to take notice of the "sober and literal" character of the death chronicles of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, &c.

They "died," "gave up the ghost," were "gathered to their fathers." Nothing about going to their reward. "The reason for this I have already given," says Mr. Grant. We fail to perceive this, unless he refer to the alleged darkness of the Old Testament. If he refer to this, the best comment upon these cases would have been to quote New Testament records of death, not that this would have helped him, but that it ought to help him if his argument of the matter be right. He says the New Testament is "mid-day light" on the subject. The "darkness" in the Old Testament in the matter of recording the death of the saints is "he died." Can Mr. Grant offset this from the New Testament by such records as we read in modern religious biographies? "He went to the presence of his God;" "he mounted to the heavenly Canaan;" "he sped to the happy land, of which he often sung," &c. He cannot do it. The New Testament records of death are as "sober and literal" as those of the Old. "He fell asleep."—(Acts vii. 60.) "He gave up the ghost."—(Acts v. 10.) "These all died" (Heb. xi. 13), and so forth.

As to "the soul that sinneth it shall die," (Ezek. xviii. 4), Mr. Grant truly enough says, "all through the Old Testament 'my soul' is equivalent often to myself;" but what then becomes of the very precise theory and rather strong declaration on the subject in an earlier chapter, wherein Mr. Grant laid it down that there was "the utmost exactness and UNVARYING harmony" in the attribution of the emotions, &c., to "the soul" as distinct from the spirit? Having gone into this rather thoroughly, we content ourselves now by calling attention to Mr. Grant's own refutation of it.

Mr. Grant then makes a bold attack on those passages in Job, Psalms, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes, which speak of the dead praising not the Lord, &c. But his attack is of the kind that must recoil terribly on himself in the estimation of all who have rightly estimated the character of the books in question. He finds it necessary to lay down as a principle that these books are "eminently MAN'S VOICE!" Aghast with surprise, the reader stops and asks "what does this mean?" In answer to which, he reads, either with relief or increased perplexity, as follows: "I do not mean that they are the less fully inspired on that account. Every word, I doubt not, is penned for us by the Holy Ghost himself." He wonders, if this be true, how the books can be considered as "man's voice?" Mr. Grant leaves no doubt on this point. He instances the speaking of Satan in Job, and says, though that speaking is written, "we do not any the more adopt his sayings as the expression of divine truth." It is Satan's voice recorded by the hand of inspiration. So that Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, are to be regarded in the light of Mr. Grant's theory as "man's voice" recorded by the hand of

inspiration: that is, a true record of what men have said! but not, therefore, a record of what is to be received! of no more value, in fact, than a newspaper report of a meeting. The report is true, but the speeches may be the outpourings of fools! It says a great deal for the force of the passages which Mr. Grant seeks to dispose of, that he should feel compelled to lay down such a principle as the basis of attack. But the principle will not stand. It is not a true one. It is a false theory that the books in question are the voice of man. This is best shewn by their New Testament quotation as the *voice of God*. We give a specimen of each.

JOB.—"The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God: *for it is written*, He taketh the wise in their own craftiness."—(1 Cor. iii. 19.) The quotation is from Job v. 13, where the actual speaker is Eliphaz, whose interpretation of God's dealings with Job was condemned. His abstract principles were right though his application of them in Job's case wrong. His words are quoted by Paul as *proof* of something pertaining to God, whence it follows that in the estimation of Paul, the words were not "the voice of man" (which on such a subject would be no authority), but the voice of God. The words of the book of Job are seven other times alluded to in the New Testament in the same improving manner.

PSALMS.—"Who by the mouth of Thy servant David hath said, Why did the heathen rage?" &c.—(Acts iv. 25). The quotation is from the second Psalm, which on Mr. Grant's theory is the "voice of man," but which is expressly quoted as "the voice of God." So Jesus says, "David *in spirit*" saith thus and so in the Psalms.—(Matt. xxii. 43.) This sort of allusion to the Psalms as the voice of God is common throughout the New Testament. Suffice it to say that it occurs 117 times besides the two cases quoted.

PROVERBS.—"Ye have forgotten the exhortation which *speaketh unto you as unto children*, My son, despise not thou the chastening of the Lord, nor faint when thou art rebuked of Him, for whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth."—(Heb. xii. 5.) The quotation is from Prov. iii. 11-12, and is thus applied by the Spirit in Paul with the authority of a divine maxim, as in short, the voice of God and not the "voice of man." The voice of man could never be described as an exhortation "speaking as unto children," if that voice were not in its inception the voice of God. The other New Testament appeals to Proverbs are in number nineteen.

ECCLESIASTES.—There is not the same direct recognition of Ecclesiastes. A remark of Paul's in 1 Tim. vi. 7 looks like a quotation of Eccles. v. 15. Nevertheless, the book stands on its own foundation as the product of a man to whom God gave "wisdom and understanding exceeding much, and largeness of heart, even as the sand which is on the sea shore."—(1 Kings iv. 29.)

The man who was thus "wiser than all men" has written concerning human life: "Man hath no pre-eminence above a beast." The "poor annihilationists," in view of the qualification of the writer, as a man divinely endowed with wisdom, take this as "the utterance of divine truth." At this Mr. Grant expresses his amazement, and says: "Surely they might as well quote the fool's saying as an inspired utterance, that 'there is no God.'" This is extraordinary. According to this, Solomon was a fool, whereas the Scriptures say he was a wise man: shall we follow Mr. Grant or the Bible? But Mr. Grant is scarcely honest in the way he puts this. The fool's saying (Psalm xiv. 1) is given as a *fool's saying*, whereas Solomon's saying is given as a wise man's saying. Mr. Grant says the one is as wise as the other. Why should he try to make this appear so? Obviously, he could not otherwise get rid of Solomon's sayings! but he cannot uphold such an argument without denying the facts testified in the Scripture.

Mr. Grant modifies his declaration as to the character of the Psalms. He says "they are much more prophetic in character than the other books, indeed fully so." If so, how can he justify his description of them as "the voice of man?" Because, rejoins he, though under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, David was left to "speak of things as from his own point of view." But surely, if so guided, he was not left to utter things that were absolutely untrue. Mr. Grant's remark is doubtless true that "David's words, prompted, in the first instance, by his own sufferings, became, by the guidance of the Holy Spirit, full of a deeper meaning than David was himself conscious of—prophetic utterances of another, more than royal, sufferer." But why so anxious to make the Psalms as human as possible? Because David has said "in death, there is no remembrance of Thee" (Psalm vi. 5), and certain other things of the same damaging sort to Mr. Grant's theory; and Mr. Grant wants to be at liberty to say, "That was merely David's opinion." At all events, the poor annihilationists can rejoice in David's company as a natural man, and that is no mean advantage, especially when they remember, in spite of all Mr. Grant's glosses, that David has said, "The Spirit of God spake by me!"—(2 Sam. xxiii. 3.)

Grappling with the sayings of Job, that had he died from the womb, he would have lain still and been quiet, as an hidden untimely birth; that he would have been as though he had not been, &c., &c., Mr. Grant remarks that Job *might have been mistaken*. He says the words quoted are "Job's words: that is all." He says this, thinking to reduce their value to a very small degree. Does it not occur to him as awkward to have the words against him of a man whom the Almighty testified that he had "spoken of Him that which was right?"

(Job xlii. 7), whom He recognises through Ezekiel as one of His best friends (xiv. 14), and who is set forward in the New Testament as a model? Even if nothing but Job's words, it is something to "the poor annihilationists" to have such a man to sustain them. Mr. Grant evidently feels this; so he tries to make it appear that Job's words, after all, "are no contradiction of (what he considers) the revealed truth as to those departed." If this be so, why did he suggest, to start with, that Job "might have been mistaken?" Mr. Grant's tactics are somewhat uncertain. Wherein he thinks Job's words against him, he says they are only Job's words, who "might have been mistaken." Yet he likes not this position, so he says Job's words are no contradiction to Mr. Grant's ideas, which he tries to show. When Job says, "There (in the grave) the weary are at rest," he understands him to mean himself, and not the wicked, who he says are far from being at rest." But it is obvious that Job meant "all weary"—righteous and wicked, without distinction. This gives point to his own wish that he had been "carried from the womb to the grave." When Job says that in such a case, he would have been as though he had not been, Mr. Grant understands him to limit the application to the present scene. He would have been as though he never had been here, but not as though he had never existed. "Enoch," says Mr. Grant, "was not, yet he lives, for God took him." Such, he argues, would have been the case of Job. But the illustration Job uses precludes this ingenious extrication. Job says "as infants who *never saw the light*" (Job. iii. 16). Surely Mr. Grant does not suppose that unborn infants that have neither lived or died have a disembodied existence? This is Job's explanation of his meaning, which bars the way against Mr. Grant's suggestion from Enoch. Enoch never died; he disappeared from among men. The statement that he "was not," is a Hebrew ellipsis; expressive of this fact Paul fills up the ellipsis in this way: "He was not *found*" (Heb. xi. 5), which debars Mr. Grant from making use of the ellipsis in its naked form, to weaken the force of Job's absolute statement that if he had died in infancy, he should have been as though he had not been. And equally is he excluded from making a parallel between Enoch and Abraham. Abraham died; Enoch did not. That God is the God of Abraham, though for the time being dead, does not prove that Abraham is alive now, but that God purposes to make him alive again by resurrection. Jesus has settled this by quoting the words in this way, to the confutation of the Sadducees.—(Luke xx. 37; Matt. xxii. 31.)

As with Job, so with Solomon, Mr. Grant having tried to show that his words are of no account, attempts the task of reconciling them with the immortality of the soul. The declaration "the

dead know not anything," receives his principal attention. Naturally he finds it difficult to deal with, but manages at last to launch the suggestion that Solomon meant the dead knew nothing in relation to the scene they had left in the land of the living, implying a reservation in favour of their knowledge as to "disembodied" matters. This is rather ingenious, and it must be said considerably surprising. Does Mr. Grant mean to say that "intelligent entities" lose their memories when they pass out of the body? that they forget everything they have known "in the body?" that they appear in heaven or hell without recollection of who they are, where they come from, and what they have been? Mr. Grant has forgotten himself surely. In his effort to unloose the throttling coil that Solomon has fastened round the neck of immortal-soulism, he throws to the wind all that makes immortal-soulism valuable; for if an immortal soul "knows not anything" of its former life, how is it to know itself or its friends when they arrive from the earth, or how is it to enjoy an existence whose principal charm may be supposed to lie in its connection with the moral issues of its mundane career? Mr. Grant has fairly overshot himself. True, he tries hard to make Solomon's words descriptive of the scene the dead have left; but the statement in question applies to the dead themselves, in a subjective sense, as shown by its association with the statement about the living. "The living know that they must die; but the dead know not ANYTHING." If this does not teach the unconsciousness of the dead, it would be impossible to devise words that would teach it. But Mr. Grant feels it does teach it; so he resorts once more (inconsistently enough) to the plan of trying to make it of no authority. "This was man's musing," he says, "not divine revelation of the state of the dead at all, nor given at such. Had you asked this man what he knew of that, he would have said as he did say, who knows? Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward?" This is one of Mr. Grant's (we will not say deliberate, but) staring perversions of fact. Solomon did not say "who knows?" in reference to the state of the dead, but in reference to the spirit of man in its living operation. It was the essence, constitution, or *modus operandi* of the living human spirit that was the problem covered in his question, "Who knoweth?" as in case of "the spirit of the beast," which he includes equally in the question. Then, Solomon did not own to ignorance as to the state of the dead. He expressly says, "as the one (the beast) dieth, so dieth the other (man); yea, they have all one breath, so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast" (Eccles. iii. 19), and with irresistible force: "The dead know not anything." These declarations are inconsistent with Mr. Grant's theory, so he assigns them a place among "man's musings,

"conjecture, and nothing more," &c. But he remembers Ecc. xii. 8 ("the spirit shall return to God who gave it"), and regarding this as a sanction of his view, he gets rid, in reference to this, of the suggestion about "man's musings," &c., and paves the way for the favourite passages by a hint that a higher light came in upon Solomon before he finished Ecclesiastes. This is simply an invention, pure and simple. Mr. Grant founds it on xi. 5, which he calls "a lowly confession: "As thou knowest not the way of the Spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child, even so thou knowest not the work of God, who maketh all." Mr. Grant lays stress on the words "thou knowest not the way of the Spirit." He puts this forward as the feature of the verse: as a confession that after all the wisdom of the first part of the book, Solomon now confesses that he knew nothing of the subject. This is an unjust or incompetent exegesis. The point of the verse is the ignorance of man as to the *quomodo* of the divine operations. Ignorance of "the way of the Spirit" is the point of comparison: it is assumed as a thing notorious and unacknowledged, and there is nothing else in the early part of Ecclesiastes than confessed ignorance on this point. What does the question, "who knoweth the spirit of man" in chap. iii. amount to but an acknowledgment of ignorance? To represent Solomon as acknowledging for the first time in xi. 5 that which is freely confessed throughout, and at the same time to represent that he pretended to a knowledge in the first part which he relinquishes in the second, indicates either a want of acumen or a capacity to gloss when the exigencies of argument require it. Mr. Grant's object in this gloss is to make Solomon himself discredit the early part of Ecclesiastes; and to help Mr. Grant to give an orthodox colour to Ecc. xii. 8. But the gloss is transparent. The Solomon of the first part of Ecc. is the Solomon of the last part, and the teaching throughout is the same. Ecc. xii. 8 discredits not, but confirms Ecc. iii. 19. "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return to God which gave it." This is death. The dust is not the man: the spirit is not the man. The combination of the two is the man; and when death comes, the combination is undone: the dust goes where it came from, and the spirit goes where it came from, and there is an end of the man for the time, which makes resurrection a necessity.

Then Mr. Grant similarly strains the closing words of Ecclesiastes. Solomon says, "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter." "Fear God and keep His commandments, for this is the whole duty of man. For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil." Upon this Mr. Grant asks whether such can be the conclusion of a matter that

"ends with the blank and silence of the grave?" This assumes that the theory he is opposing teaches such an end. In such a case, his question would be a weighty question. If the contention of "the poor annihilationists" were that Solomon taught the dead would never live again, it would, doubtless, be difficult for them to explain Solomon's allusion to a judgment which, on their hypothesis, in that case, could not take place. But Mr. Grant cannot be ignorant that this is far from being the case. They believe the other teaching of Solomon that "the righteous shall be recompensed in the earth, much more the wicked and the sinner."—(Prov. xi, 31.) They are, therefore, well able to understand the "shall bring into judgment" of Eccles. xii. 14. So far from the verse being a difficulty with them, it is a help to them, and a difficulty to Mr. Grant; for whereas Mr. Grant's theory represents that the judgment of "every work" is going on every day as fast as people die, Solomon teaches that the judgment is a future thing: "God SHALL bring every work into judgment." When? The New Testament supplies the answer: "Jesus Christ shall judge the living and the dead *at his appearing*."—(2 Tim. iv. 1.) "God shall render to every man according to his work . . . in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Christ Jesus."—(Rom. ii. 6-16.) "The Son of Man shall come in his glory, and THEN shall he reward every man according to his works."—(Matt. xvi. 27.)

Mr. Grant explains "while I have any being" (Psalm cxlvi. 2), and "before I go hence and BE NO MORE" (Psalms xxxix. 13), by reference to the statement that Enoch "was not." The fallacy of this we have already pointed out and need not repeat the argument.

"In that very day his thoughts perish."—(Ps. cxliv. 4.) "In death there is no remembrance of Thee."—(Ps. vi. 5.) "The dead praise not the Lord."—(Ps. cxv. 17.) "The grave cannot praise Thee"—(Is. xxxviii. 18.) Mr. Grant's explanation of these statements amounts to this, they are the expressions of "pious Israelites." "Pious Israelites" were in the habit of looking forward to the millennial day as the day of praise, and training up their children to celebrate Jehovah's praise *now*. In neither of these could the dead take part: and to this the statements refer. As to the intermediate state of praise, their knowledge "was very dim."

The which is productive of the following results: Mr. Grant, treating the Psalms as the private breathings of a "pious Israelite," refuses David as a prophet, and denies David's testimony, confirmed by Jesus and the apostles, that the Spirit of God SPAKE BY HIM."—(2 Sam. xxiii. 3.) According to Mr. Grant's thesis, the knowledge of the Spirit of God is "very dim!" David and Hezekiah looked at things in the way "the poor annihilationists" do: Mr. Grant being

witness. In consequence of their "very dim" state of knowledge in relation to Mr. Grant's conception of heavenly things, he cannot claim them as witnesses.

Surely as an explanation, yielding such results, it is the strongest condemnation that could be recorded against the theory it put forward to sustain.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

ETERNAL LIFE.

THIS chapter requires little in the way of reply. It does nothing to prove the popular case. It is altogether devoted to the defensive, and as ineffectually so as the defence of a bad case must always be.

The "Annihilationists" are able to quote many statements to the effect that Christ came to give "life," "everlasting life," "eternal life," "immortality" to those believing on him. On this they argue that man is not naturally immortal, and that consequently, popular theology is wrong at the bottom. Mr. Grant in this chapter tries to answer this argument; but his effort is the feeblest in the book. There is more parade of critical analysis of the lexicographical sort, but less logical back-bone, which are probably related to each other as cause and effect.

His first point is that immortality and eternal life are not the same thing. Immortality, he admits, is deathlessness of body, but eternal life, is (he does not say exactly what, but) "a life, a nature, which we receive in new birth," "down here" in this present time. The wicked, he says, might have immortality, and not eternal life. He does not say the wicked will have immortality. He is evidently afraid to commit himself to such a proposition. Indeed he excludes it by saying that the declaration of 1 Cor. xv. ("this mortal shall put on immortality, &c.," *is not made of the wicked*, but "applicable alone to the bloom and beauty of the resurrection of life." If this be so, how can the wicked be ever living? Mr. Grant admits they have not "eternal life," and shows that they are not the recipients of "immortality" How come they then to live for ever? Mr. Grant has not well considered the issue of his own premises. Even if the distinction existed, between immortality and eternal life, which Mr. Grant tries to make out, his argument to prove all men immortal would be unhelped, since both the things so expressed are admitted to apply to the righteous exclusively.

But does the distinction exist? Only as a matter of words. Just as we speak of the present life under different words, such as life, existence, being, so the future life is variously designated according to the relation in which it is considered. It is either $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, *soul* (Matt. xvi. 25); $\xi\omega\eta$, *life* (Mark x. 30); or $\eta\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, *we* (1 Thess. iv. 17), as the line of thought demands; but the hope in all cases is absolutely one and the same. The saving of the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (Heb. x. 39), is the obtaining of eternal $\xi\omega\eta$ (Matt. xix. 29), by the "us" of Paul's discourse (2 Cor. iv. 14).

The unscripturalness of Mr. Grant's suggestion that "eternal life" is a something that the justified have now, is at once apparent in the following quotations:—

Mark x. 30: "He shall receive . . . IN THE WORLD TO COME eternal life."

Tit. i. 2: "In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began."

1 John ii. 25: "This is THE PROMISE that he hath promised us, even eternal life."

Matt. xix. 29: "SHALL INHERIT everlasting life (the same words in the original)."

Luke xviii. 30: "IN THE WORLD TO COME, life everlasting."

Rom. vi. 22: "Ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the END, everlasting life."

How comes it that Mr. Grant should contend for eternal life being a present actual attribute of the believer's nature? Because he reads: "He that believeth on the Son HATH everlasting life."—(1 John iii. 36.) This might excuse his view if our information were limited to such expressions, but our information is not thus limited. We have the matter presented in many forms, the one regulating the other in such a way, that combined, they bring all to a correct focus. Thus the sense of "hath" in relation to eternal life is thus expressed by John. "This life is in His Son. He that HATH THE SON OF GOD, hath life; he that hath not the Son of God hath not life."—(1 John v. 11.) The man who has a box has what is in it, though he have it not actually in his hand. The man who can truly say "Christ is mine," can say "Eternal life is mine," because eternal life is in Christ for all accepted believers. So the man, who in this sense, can say "I have Christ," can say "I have eternal life;" but not in Mr. Grant's sense of asserting that it has already come out of Christ into him. His expressions are bounded in their sense by the fact stated by Paul: "Your life is HID with Christ in God; and when Christ who is OUR LIFE, shall appear, then shall we appear with him in glory."—(1 Col. iii. 3.) His literal attitude is defined in the words of Jude 15: "Looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ UNTO

ETERNAL LIFE," with which all the "HATH" passages are in perfect harmony; for it is no new thing in divine language to "call those things that be not (but which are to be) AS THOUGH THEY WERE."—(Rom. iv. 17.)

The testimony therefore that Christ has come to give eternal life to all that obey him (Heb. v. 8), remains in all its force as a disproof of the popular theory of natural immortality, for what is this "eternal life?"

Mr. Grant, as already said, has not attempted a definition, or a telling of us what it is. He hints at it as a metaphysical condition, superinduced in the believer at what is called "the new birth," and appeals to the conflict in a believer's mind as evidence of its reality, that is, as a metaphysically or physically present something. But this is inconsistent with the testimony that the righteous are to enter it *in the world to come*, and are now "in hope of it" (see passages above). And as to the conflict referred to, that it is not confined to believers of Mr. Grant's stamp, but exists wherever the "word of the truth of the gospel," received in faith by hearing (Rom. x. 17), has set up a new law of moral action, and caused the contrariety which is ever developed where the natural desires incline one way, and the commands of God point another.

Eternal life is in the first place "life" in its primary sense of being. Those who attain not unto it, are said to "lose their lives."—(Matt. xvi. 25). They become subject to *death*, the END of unrighteousness (Rom. vi. 21), or the wages of sin.—(23.) Mr. Grant destroys this truth by teaching that the righteous and the wicked equally live for ever. "Eternal" indirectly expresses the quality of the life to be attained by the chosen of God. Literally, as the English of $\alpha\iota\omega\iota\omicron\varsigma$, it signifies the life of the age: that is, the life to be bestowed in the age to come: but when we ascertain the nature of this life, $\alpha\iota\omega\iota\omicron\varsigma$, or "eternal," becomes the symbol of all its qualities. It is here where the terms "immortality" and incorruption", are specially instructive. The first ($\alpha\theta\alpha\upsilon\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha$) tells us that the life of the age is deathless. In entering it, we are told that "this mortal shall put on immortality." By this we know the truth declared by Christ that "They who are accounted worthy of the age . . . CANNOT DIE ANY MORE."—(Luke xx. 36.) But how is it that life is thus made endless to these that were before but mortal? The second word ($\alpha\phi\theta\alpha\tau\omicron\iota\alpha$) answers it: "This corruptible must put on incorruption."—(1 Cor. xv. 53.) Men are mortal—liable to death—because their natures are *corruptible*; they decay. But make them incorruptible, and endlessness of life is the necessary consequence. Hence to seek for incorruption is equivalent to seeking for deathlessness or immortality. And hence it is that the words are interchangeable.

But Mr. Grant destroys this beautiful harmony by making the terms distinct, and expressive of different things, making the life of the age a thing now actually possessed, and deathlessness not an element thereof, but a condition in the fate of righteous and wicked alike. Yet in these he contradicts himself, as we have seen, and as he is bound to do in order to make a fair show of maintaining an unscriptural and unreasonable theory. Nowhere perhaps, is this more strikingly illustrated than where he says in this chapter: "Of course, mortality is our condition down here. Immortality is *not* our natural and present possession. Immortality is deathlessness; but who among the people Mr. Roberts is opposing, asserts that we do not die? It is a poor quibble, that. The soul does not die; nor the spirit; but man does surely!!!" When we remember that in the beginning of his book, Mr. Grant wrote "*That which lives in the body IS THE MAN.*" It sounds queer to be told that the man *dies*, but that the spirit and soul don't. If that which lives in the body IS THE MAN, and "the man dies surely," then the spirit and soul, whatever they are, die. No, no, says Mr. Grant on p. 113, "The soul does not die; nor the spirit," but only the man. Which are we to believe? Mr. Grant on p. 16, or Mr. Grant on p. 113? On which side "the poor quibble" lies is evident.

"The question is," continues Mr. Grant, "as to what death is, not whether men are subject to it. Of course, with Mr. R., it is 'cessation of existence,' but then that is not what we mean by death. *We* mean the dust returning to the earth as it was, while the spirit returns to God who gave it." And that is what "the poor annihilationists" mean. They do not mean the cessation of the dust; but they say the dust is not the man. They do not mean the cessation of the spirit, but they say the spirit is not the man. They mean the cessation of the man; the death of the man: and this is what Mr. Grant and all Christendom deny, in denying which, they deny the first element of gospel truth, which is that "by man came DEATH," and nullify the second, "by man came also the resurrection of the dead."

Paul's statement that "God only hath immortality," Mr. Grant wishes to get rid of by asking if the angels are not immortal? Yes, they are; but they are God to us; for they are of His nature and come only on His errands. Thus an angel's communication to Moses at the bush was to him the voice of God.—(Ex. iii. 2-6; Acts vii. 30.) Thus, too, Jacob's wrestling with an angel was seeing God face to face.—(Hos. xii. 4; Gen. xxxii.) Angels destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, yet the work was Jehovah's.—(Gen. xix., compare verse 1. 14, 22, 24.) They are of divine nature; they are "spirit."—(Heb. i. 7.) When mortal men become spiritual in nature and immortal, it is said "*they are equal to angels.*"—(Luke xx. 36.) In relation to man, the state-

ment has absolute force that "*God only hath immortality.*" This statement written at a time when the Platonic schools, with their theory of human immortality, were in full swing, has a direct significance which Mr. Grant unavailingly seeks to weaken.

CHAPTER II.

DEATH ETERNAL.

On this question Mr. Grant strikes the right key-note. God's "estimate of sin and its deserts," is the thing to be ascertained. The reasoning of the "poor proud human intellect" on such a subject, unaided by revelation, is but speculation at the best. God has spoken and we must listen to His words, however unfathomable or deep His judgments may prove to us. In this we are glad to agree with Mr. Grant. But when the work of listening begins, agreement is quickly at an end.

God's estimate of sin and its deserts, is expressed in the words of Paul: "They who commit such things are worthy of death" (Rom. i. 32); for "the wages of sin is death" (Rom. vi. 23). "The end of these things is death" (21). But Mr. Grant is not content as a simple listener to receive this which he hears. He says it is a "living death" that is meant, though we meet with no such paradoxical phrase in the word of God. He quotes from Hastings ("Annihilationist" writer), 1 John v. 12 and John vi. 53: "He that hath not the Son of God hath not life," and "except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, ye have no life in you;" upon which he remarks that if the Annihilationist reading of such passages be right, they prove that the wicked have no existence now. This would be so if it were existence merely that was in question, but considering the question is as to that everlasting "life which the Son of man shall give"—(John vi. 27)—Mr. Grant's remark falls to the ground. This everlasting life is to be given "in the world to come" (Luke xviii. 30); but none have a right to it except those who believe and obey Christ. (Heb. v. 8.) Hence, having it or not having it now, is a question of having or not having the title to what is coming, and not of having or not having a present existence. Christ is our life.—(Col. iii. 4.) When he appears we shall appear with him in his glory.—(Ibid.) As prospectively related to that event, we have the life in having him, and assuredly, if we have, him not, it will prove that we have even no existence (in the sense of abiding) in us, but a wasting mortality which shall perish for ever while the righteous shall be an everlasting remembrance.

"But," says Mr. Grant, "in Scripture language, one may be *dead*

while living," in proof whereof, he quotes the saying of Paul that "she that liveth in pleasure is *dead while she liveth*." In what sense dead, Mr. Grant? Actually dead, or in a state related to death as a consummation? Is it not the sense expressed in the words of Christ, "Let the dead bury their dead?"—(Luke ix. 60): the living said to be dead because destined to share the fate of the corpses in question? This cannot be gainsaid. Hence, how absurd the clever question of Mr. Grant, in its context apparently convincing: "If there be a *living death* even now, as we are assured there is, *why not for eternity*?" What is called a "living death" is a state deriving its name from its terminus, and he asks why it cannot always be terminating!

A man in business, luxuriating in his rich country seat, and hearing of the occurrence of a commercial panic and the stoppage of the leading banks, exclaims, "I am a ruined man!" No actual change has yet taken place in his surroundings. His wine is in his cellar; the servants attend his call; fine carpets await his feet; the magnificent furniture shines for his pleasure; the glittering plate is in the chest; the larder is well supplied; his horses occupy his stables; his shining brougham rests snugly in his coachhouse under "John's" vigilant care. Not an article is changed; yet he says "I am a ruined man." If Mr. Grant were his guest, with his undiscerning simplicity, he might say, "Well, here is prosperous ruin;" and observing no change take place in the course of the evening, he might soliloquise before retiring to rest in one of the luxuriantly furnished bedrooms, "this is a beautiful state of ruin, and if there be such a thing as prosperous ruin for one evening, why not for a man's life-time? Why is my host so concerned?" The arrival of the bailiffs would take the scales off his eyes; the sale of all the fine things; and the removal of the family with breaking hearts to obscure lodgings, would show him that what his host meant when he said he *was* ruined, was that circumstances had taken such a shape as would lead to his ruin, and that "prosperous ruin" was a meteoric affair. If Mr. Grant survive to see the end of the wicked, he will learn a similar lesson about "living death."

Mr. Grant next turns his attention to the passages quoted to prove the extinction of the wicked. He examines the words translated "destruction" and "perdition." He shows that it is used in the sense of "marring" as applied to bottles (Mark ii. 22); "losing" as applied to sheep, money, the prodigal son; and also "perishing" (Matt. xxvi. 52), and "dying" (John xviii. 14).

He affirms that in none of these cases does the word imply extinction. The truth of this depends upon the sense in which the word "extinction" is to be understood. If it is to be taken in the unnatural sense of "annihilation" constantly thrust by Mr. Grant's class upon those whom they oppose in this controversy, doubtless the remark is true;

but away from this, it is not true. In each case something is destroyed. Bottles burst are bottles destroyed as bottles. In the case of an article lost, possession is destroyed for the time being. "Them that are lost" (2 Cor. iv. 13), are those who walk in the broad way "*leading to destruction.*"—(Matt. vii. 13.) They are spoken of as lost or destroyed in the same way as those whose end is death are described as dead.

The same remarks apply to and dispose of Mr. Grant's criticisms on the other words translated "destroy" and "perish." They fence off his attempt to take the meaning out of these words, and preserve the words in their appointed harmony with the fundamental doctrine of the Bible, that "the end of these things (wicked acts) IS DEATH."—(Rom. vi. 21.)

We have entered more thoroughly and critically into this point in our reply to Dr. Angus (see pp. 28-32, *Everlasting Punishment not Eternal Torments*), taking up all the words translated "destroy" and "perish," and showing that they contain the sense objected to by those who contend for eternal torments. It is unnecessary to repeat what is there written. It will suffice to notice the four cases quoted by Mr. Grant, to show that "destroy," contrary to Mr. Grant's contention, does mean "to bring to an end."

"*Knowest thou not yet that Egypt is destroyed?*" The reflection upon this is obvious. That which constituted the "Egypt" of colloquial talk, was being brought to an end by the disasters coming upon it by the hand of Moses. A country spoken of in this way does not mean the territory merely, but the state of things existing upon it; society, cities, agriculture, &c. All these were being brought to an end or destroyed by the great plagues. Strange that Mr. Grant should quote such a case to prove that destroy does not mean destroy.

"*The land perished.*" This is similar. The state of prosperity among the inhabitants expressed by the phrase, "the land," was coming to an end, was perishing, was being destroyed. Land is frequently used for the people: *e.g.*, "My father hath troubled the land."—(1 Sam. xiv. 29.) "The whole land trembled."—(Jer. viii. 16.)

"*The valley also shall perish.*" "The valley," on the same principle, is put for the people inhabiting it, and the state of things growing up under their hand.

"*O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself.*" And is it not so? Was not the Kingdom of Israel brought to an end by the sins of her people? Not only so, but the self-destruction of Israel involved the slaughter of the vast bulk of the nation. Strange that Mr. Grant should cite such a case to prove that destroy does not mean destroy.

The remainder of the chapter is devoted to an endeavour to show that the destruction of the wicked is not taught by such statements

as They shall be cut off (Psalms xxxvii. 9-10,) "consumed" (Psalm civ. 35), Rooted out of the earth (Prov. ii. 22.) Mr. Grant makes short work of his task by simply asserting that these expressions have nothing to do with the final destiny of the wicked. We need simply say that if this be so, it is impossible to find statements that have to do with it. Mr. Grant cannot produce them.

CHAPTER III.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE LIVING AND THE DEAD.

THERE is little in this chapter calling for Christadelphian comment, so far as the main topic of the book is concerned. It seeks to bring "The Lord's coming and the resurrection" into the foreground, from which Mr. Grant says they have been displaced by the "long prevalent idea of a spiritual millennium, to be brought about by missionary efforts, and closed by the coming of the Lord in judgment." This long-prevalent idea Mr. Grant calls "an error." So that again it appears Mr. Grant is not orthodox. Neither is he scriptural. It could be shewn that his sketch of the divine programme of events connected with the second coming of Christ and the history of the thousand years' reign, is as far off the mark as the "long-prevalent idea" which he condemns as an error. But this would be foreign to the main subject of the book. Dr. Thomas has made Scripture teaching on these things abundantly clear. We can, therefore, afford to pass on, noting merely Mr. Grant's denial that the saints are judged at the coming of the Lord, as to acceptance or rejection. This is a natural outgrowth of the theory that the saints ascend to the presence of the Lord when they die. If they enter His presence accepted at that time, obviously the revival of the question of acceptance, when they arrive together on the earth, is out of the question. Thus, as Mr. Grant says in the opening of the chapter, "error paves the way for error." The absurd idea that dead men are alive brings with it a denial of the apostolic testimony, that "the Lord Jesus Christ shall judge the living and the dead at his appearing and his kingdom;" and results in the affirmation of the unscriptural propositions which appear in the course of this chapter, that rejected servants come not forth to meet the Lord at his coming; that all who rise then are immortal and independent of the judgment, and that the resurrection, at the close of the thousand years, is confined to the wicked of former generations.

CHAPTER IV.

"THE GEHENNA OF FIRE."

IN this chapter, Mr. Grant "considers more particularly some of the plain statements of Scripture with regard to the sinner's final doom," his object being to establish the doctrine of eternal torments. As in former parts of his argument, so here; the weak arguments of some "annihilationist" writers give him a frequent advantage which he would not have if he were confronting the truth only. Mr. Morris he easily puts aside many times, where the advocate of the truth would be invulnerable. The distinction is virtually recognised by Mr. Grant, on page 140, where, in a certain connection, he remarks that "Thomasism is, indeed, fearless as usual," which actually means that the position taken by those referred to under that name, is not assailable as the position of Mr. Morris is. Mr. Grant's argument must be followed without reference to the other writers he opposes.

He starts with the favourite passage in Matt. xxv.: "Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." To justify the orthodox construction of this passage, he introduces the Apocalyptic "lake of fire burning with fire and brimstone." (Rev. xix. 20; xx. 10), which he understands literally. The failure of this argument is apparent at once when Mr. Grant admits, on page 140, as he was bound to admit, that the Apocalypse is "a book of symbols." Doubtless, in this book of symbols, there is occasionally "literal plain speaking;" but the opposite element is so nearly all-prevailing that there is; to say the least, great danger in assuming a literal meaning when the doctrine sought to be supported is open to doubt, and in evident conflict with the plain parts of God's Word. The literality of the meaning in such a case would have to be beyond question before it could be trusted to for proof of a disputed doctrine. But is that the case in the present instance? far from it. The mention of the lake of fire is twice associated with an explanation: "This is the second death;" "Which is the second death?"—(Rev. xx. 14 xxi. 8.) If the lake were a literal ocean of fire, in which creatures were to live for ever in torment, this remark would be without a use. In fact, it would tend to mystify a plain subject.

There could be no connection between such a lake of living torment and a repetition (as expressed by the word "second") of the death with which men are familiar in the present state. The insertion of such an explanation shows the symbolic character of the picture with which it is associated. It is like some other explanations that occur in the Apocalypse: "the woman *is* (that is, represents) the great city" (xvii. 18); "the seven heads *are* (that is, represent) the seven mountains" (xvii. 9); "the seven candlesticks *are* (that is, represent) the seven churches."—(i. 20.) The statement that the lake of fire *is* the second death, is evidence that it is a symbol.

But even apart from this express indication, Mr. Grant ought to find reason in the nature of the subject itself for taking the lake of fire as a symbol; for consider the objects with which it is associated: a personage on horseback, with a sword in his mouth, and a garment wet with blood; a beast, a false prophet and an image. Surely Mr. Grant would never claim a literal meaning for these. They are hieroglyphs of highly interesting import, but not to be understood if looked at as literal objects. This is so obvious as not to require argumentation. If Mr. Grant has any doubt on the point, we will but ask him to realise the shape of the devil cast into the lake of fire (Rev. xx. 10)—a red dragon, with *seven heads and ten horns*, and a prodigious tail.—(Rev. xx. 2; xii. 3.) If he admit a political meaning to the object seen in this shape—as he is bound to do in view of the interpretation set forth in Rev. xvii. 3, 9-18, shewing kings, governments and people to be signified—how can he claim a literal meaning for the fiery fluid into which the seven-headed symbolic monster was judicially projected? Consistency, and propriety and truth altogether forbid such a treatment of the subject. The lake of fire stood for the symbol of the judgments of God, by which the kingdoms of men will be destroyed, and, therefore, for the second death, which, in those same judgments, the rejected at the judgment seat will experience, with the appointed accessories of shame, indignation, anguish and wrath, by which that second death will be preceded and attended.

Mr. Grant lays stress on the language of Rev. xx 10, as showing that for a thousand years at least, "two men remain in the lake unannihilated." The statement is, that at the end of the thousand years, the devil is "cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and false prophet *ARE*." Mr. Grant prints the word "are" in small capitals, showing that his argument hinges on that word. But Mr. Grant admits, in a foot note, "are" is not in the original. He contends that it is necessarily implied, but as this is a matter admitting of two opinions, it is a loose foundation for its conclusion, that "two men" exist in literal fire for a thousand

years. Every ellipsis must be understood in harmony with the facts of the case. The "beast and false prophet" were cast into the lake of fire at the beginning of the thousand years; and in referring to this in connection with the similar fate of "the devil" at the end of the thousand years, it is surely not unnatural to understand the allusion historically, and to insert "were cast" instead of "are," after "the beast and false prophet." In that case where is Mr. Grant's suggestion about two men" (1) remaining a thousand years in the lake of fire unannihilated?

But Mr. Grant cannot understand "the beast and false prophets" being "cast *alive*" into the lake of fire, if they are systems and not two men. Surely this ought not to be a difficulty. The symbolic involves the literal. Systems exist in living men, or have no existence at all. Living systems imply living men. To cast them alive into the lake of fire, carries with it a very different meaning from casting them dead therein. It is an intimation that the systems will not die of themselves, but be destroyed by the Lord at his coming; and that as regards the prominent living agents of them at the time of the Lord's advent, they will be taken prisoners, and not die in battle, like the thousands who fight for them, but be brought into the Lord's presence and sentenced to ignominious destruction, like the kings of the Amorities, who were brought to the typical Joshua.—(See Isa. xxiii. 21; Josh. x. 22-26.)

Mr. Grant's next difficulty is about the "torment." He cannot understand how "systems" are to be "tormented." Why should he seek to understand so impossible a thing? Who proposed to him the idea of "systems" being "tormented?" Is not this a little invention of his own? Either a little perversely or a little blunderingly, Mr. Grant mixes the symbolical and the literal, and of course manages to make the view he is opposing look grotesque, but with no real gain to his argument. Suppose the writers on the other side of the question were to imitate him on other points. The woman on the back of the beast had a golden cup in her hand. The woman is declared to represent a city: suppose they were to say, How can a city hold a cup? How can a city be drunk? How can a government have ten horns? Mr. Grant would doubtless make clean work of such blunders. His quiet incisive sarcasm would recommend them to Lord Dundreary, for a little schooling in the art of mixing things up. Mr. Grant is himself guilty of this. The dragon was tormented: the dragon represents a system. "Oh, then," shouts Mr. Grant, "the system must be tormented." The answer is obvious. The thing represented by the dragon will suffer the thing represented by the torment; and what torment is to a beast, the process symbolised by the torment will be to the system symbolised by the dragon. All this is plain enough,

with the very opposite effect of "making the Scriptures unintelligible to any simple minds." It is Mr. Grant's deft jumbling of things that differ, and clever caricature of the views he is opposing, that creates the unintelligibility.

All that Mr. Grant contends for as to the meaning of "torment," may be conceded without hurt to the truth. The *kolasis* or punishment which is to devour the adversary (Heb. x. 27) will be to those who are given over to it, an experience of "toiling," "tossing," " vexation," "pain," "torment," &c., as shown by the "weeping and gnashing of teeth," in which they give vent to their feelings on seeing Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the Kingdom of God, and they themselves thrust out.—(Luke xiii. 28.) But this is no evidence of the truth of the popular doctrine of eternal torments, even though the *kolasis* is qualified by the word *aionion* translated "everlasting." The immortality of the wicked must be shown before the endlessness of their sufferings can be deduced from the term *aionion*. Mr. Grant cannot be ignorant that *aionion* is indefinite in its significance, considered as an abstract term; that its scope is determinable by the subject with which it is associated; that it can never mean absolute endlessness when associated with a terminable matter; that it only means endlessness in relation to the matter that may be spoken of. It is like "always," which depends entirely on its association for the measure of its meaning. Thus, when Jesus, in allusion to known domestic practice, said "the servant abideth not in the house for ever, but the son abideth ever (*aion*)" (John viii. 25), he meant "ever" in relation to the house. He did not mean any house absolutely existed for ever, but that so long as it was a house, the custom was for the servants to leave after a term of service, while the son of course remained indefinitely. So when Jesus said to the fig tree, "Let no man eat fruit of the hereafter for ever" (*aion*) (Mark xi. 14), he did not mean to intimate that the fig tree would exist for ever, but that so long as it was a fig tree it should yield no fruit. So when Christ is said to be a priest for ever, we are not to understand that sin will always exist, but that so long as sin exists, Christ and no other one is the priest. There are many other illustrations of this limitation with which Mr. Grant must be acquainted; notably in connection with the Mosaic system which enacted "statutes for ever, throughout your generations," which in the absolute sense were destined to come to an end, but were not to be altered so long as they were in force.

In view of this, it is evidently futile to hope to establish the popular doctrine of eternal torments by the Greek word *aion* or its derivations. Even the apparently-absolute phrase, *eis tous aionas ton aionon*, for or to the ages of the ages, translated "for ever and ever," fails to prove endless existence for the thing with which it may be associated. This is conclusively shown by its occurrence in connection with the smoke

of Babylon's destruction (Rev. xix. 3): "Her smoke rose up for ever and ever"—*eis tous aionas ton aionon*. If the sense here were the popular notion of absolutely endless futurity, how absurd to describe it in the past tense—"rose up"—as a thing *having happened*! How can a thing have happened "for ever" in the English sense? Mr. Grant sees this, and admits that the expression "is not to be taken literally," but "figures the abiding remembrance of her (Babylon's) judgment;" upon which the obvious remark is this: if Mr. Grant understands "for ever and ever," as applied to Babylon's smoke, to mean *abiding remembrance* of Babylon's smoke, because in the nature of things Babylon's smoke cannot last for ever and ever, why may not "for ever and ever," as applied to the torment of the beast and false prophet, mean *abiding remembrance* of their torment, if in the nature of things, the beast and false prophet cannot last for ever? Is it not entirely a question of the nature of things? And ought not the issue to rest entirely on the broad questions of the nature of man and the wages of sin, unentangled by idiomatic phrases, which Mr. Grant admits to be at least open to a second or modified meaning.

The meaning of the phrase in question is not obscure when taken with all the qualifications that belong to it. It is an intimation that the divine judgments that overthrow the enemies of God, are final and irrevocable, and in relation to them, in their effects, everlasting in the ordinary sense. The cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed by fire. Absolutely the fire ceased after their destruction; but in relation to them, it was endless. Hence, "they are set forth as an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal (*aionion*) fire."—(Jude 7.) It is not an uncommon peculiarity of Scripture language to express hopeless destruction by alleging the perpetual action of the thing that effects the destruction. Thus the fire that was to destroy the palaces of Jerusalem was "not to be quenched" (Jer. xvii. 27); "the sword of destruction was not to return to its sheath any more" (Ezek. xxi. 5); "the worm of corruption is not to die."—(Isa. lxvi. 24.) There would be just as much reason in these passages to allege the absolute endlessness of the conflagration that destroyed Jerusalem, and the military judgments by which the countries were devastated, as Mr. Grant has to argue from similar forms of speech, the absolute endlessness of the sufferings of the wicked.

Mr. Grant may, like others, turn round and say that such a line of reasoning destroys the hope of endless glory for the righteous. But this common retort is not founded in truth. True it is that the same term is employed, in speaking of one as of the other; but the thing spoken of is different, and, therefore, the sense conveyed is practically different. The distinction may be illustrated by reverting to the word "always." If, with regard to the positive experience of the two classes, we say, "The wicked (who are mortal) will *always* be miser-

able, the righteous (who are immortal) will *always* be happy, we use the same word with the same meaning, and yet with a measure differing with the terms "mortal" and "immortal." The case would be the same if mortality in the one case and immortality in the other were only understood and not expressed. "Always" to a mortal is bounded by his mortality: "always" to an immortal is co-extensive with endlessness, because immortality is deathless. It is the question of immortality that governs the terms. Who are immortal? This is the real question. Or suppose we were to change the form of the proposition and say, "The punishment of the wicked (which will be painfully-inflicted death) will be everlasting; and the reward of the righteous (which will be incorruptible life) will be everlasting." The use of the term "everlasting," in both cases, would not teach endless existence in both cases, though the measure of the term, as a term, might be the same in both cases; because the thing measured in one case would be death, and in the other, life. And the effect would be the same if "death" and "life" were only understood and not expressed. The effect would be the reverse of teaching endless existence for the wicked.

The rest of Mr. Grant's chapter iv. (part 3) is occupied with the arguments of Mr. Morris. As these arguments do not belong to the truth, Mr. Grant's answer to them calls for no notice here. Two passages, however, are quoted and insisted upon in the course of his remarks, which may as well be looked at.

1.—Rev. xiv. 9-11: "And the third angel followed them, saying with a loud voice, If any man worship the beast and his image, and receive his mark in his forehead or in his hand, the same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation; and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb; and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever; and they have no rest, day nor night, who worship the beast or his image, and whosoever receiveth the mark of his name." Mr. Grant thinks this is "too strong and simple to be evaded," as a proof of orthodox "hell-fire." Isolated from its context and considered superficially, it doubtless appears to have the character alleged by Mr. Grant; but a close scrutiny will show the state of the case to be contrary to the appearance. 1.—Mr. Grant's "wrath of God" is a wrath always operating in hell, from generation to generation, whereas "the wrath" of the Apocalypse is a wrath that "comes" at a particular juncture of affairs on earth, where the dead are raised.—(See Rev. xi. 18; xvi. 19.) 2.—Mr. Grant's sufferers of hell-fire are immortal souls, while the Apocalyptic drinkers of the wine of the wrath of God are "men" with "foreheads" and "hands." 3.—Mr. Grant's hell-fire is endured in hell, in banishment from the

presence of Christ and the angels, while the Apocalyptic torment in fire and brimstone is inflicted "in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb." 4.—Mr. Grant's hell is away from the earth, in some distant transpatial region without solid standing ground, whereas the scene of Rev. xiv. is enacted in the presence of the Lamb, after the Lamb has come to Mount Zion; and taken up his position thereon with the 144,000 redeemed from among men. These points of difference are sufficient to show that Mr. Grant's use of this passage in favour of eternal torments is altogether unwarrantable—the passage referring to a time and events altogether outside Mr. Grant's scheme of interpretation.

The time, as shown in the first verse of the chapter, is when "the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, who shall be punished with everlasting DESTRUCTION FROM THE PRESENCE OF THE LORD"—(2 Thess. i. 8-9). The place is the earth, where alone men "worship the beast and his image." The beast and his image are symbols for the systems of civil and ecclesiastical impostures which now enslave the millions, and to which they will adhere after Christ comes, and fight for them.—(Rev. xix. 19). Receiving their mark is submission to the official token of subjection thereto, in the initiatory ceremonies connected therewith. The threatened drinking of the wine of the wrath of God is the warning that will be sounded through the world when Christ has come—that all who continue subject to these systems will share in the judgments by which they are to be destroyed, instead of being permitted to live to enjoy the blessedness of the reign of Christ. "Torment in fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb," betokens the fiery "tribulation and wrath and anguish" which will be the certain portion of the beast, false prophet, and their armies that fight against the Lamb—an experience unequalled in the history of the world: "for their flesh shall consume away while they stand upon their feet, and their eyes shall consume away in their holes, and their tongues shall consume away in their mouths" (Zech. xiv. 12), and all this in the very presence of the power against which they will have come to fight at Jerusalem.—(Joel iii. 12-16.) The "smoke of their torment ascending up for ever and ever" is parallel with the smoke of Babylon rising up for ever and ever (Rev. xix. 3), and as we have seen, Mr. Grant has no difficulty in understanding this as symbolising "the abiding remembrance" of judgment in Babylon, and, consequently, can have no difficulty in exercising a similar understanding concerning those who share in Babylon's torment. Here Mr. Grant enters objection. He says "The smoke of her torment" is not said of Babylon. But here Mr. Grant is wrong. The people of God are exhorted to treat Babylon as follows:

—"Reward her even as she rewarded you, and double unto her double, according unto her works. In the cup which she hath filled, fill to her double. How much she hath glorified herself and lived deliciously, so much TORMENT (the same word—*βαρβαρισμος*) and sorrow give her: for she saith in her heart, I sit a queen, and see no sorrow. Therefore shall her plagues come in one day, death and mourning and famine, and she shall be utterly burned with fire."—(Rev. xviii. 6-8). Now, here torment and sorrow and plague are declared to be the appointed visitation of Babylon by fire (leaving out of question the symbolic or literal character of these sayings). Consequently, the smoke that rises over her is representative of all these things, and, therefore, as much "the smoke of her torment" as "her smoke." There is, therefore, just as little or just as much difficulty in understanding the smoke of the torment of the beast-worshippers ascending, *εις τον αιωνος των αιωνων*, as in understanding the smoke of Babylon's torment ascending, *εις τον αιωνος των αιωνων*. They are in fact equivalent: for the torment of Babylon is the torment of all who go to make her up. Mr. Grant being witness, the smoke of Babylon's overthrow ascending up "for the ages of the ages," does not mean the absolute endlessness of the process of overthrowing, but is a form of speech intimating its irretrievableness, and that Babylon, cast down, will be *found no more at all*.—(Rev. xviii. 21.) Mr. Grant, therefore, cannot insist that the smoke of the beast-worshippers' torment "ascending up for the ages of the ages," means the absolute endlessness of the process of tormenting, but the complete, final, and irretrievable victory of the process over them. They have no rest day nor night while the process is in active operation; but when the process is complete, it will have involved them in Babylon's fate, which is to be "utterly burned with fire," and "found no more at all," as saith many Scriptures: e.g. "The day cometh that shall burn as an oven, and all the proud, yea, and all that do wickedly shall be stubble, and the day that cometh shall burn them up, saith the Lord, that it shall leave them neither root nor branch."—(Mal. iv. 1.)

So much for Rev. xiv. 9-11.

The other passage Mr. Grant quotes is Mark ix. 43-50: "And if thy hand offend thee, cut it off; it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than have two hands to go into hell (*gehenna*), into the fire that shall never be quenched; where their worm dieth not and their fire is not quenched. . . . For every one shall be salted with fire and every sacrifice shall be salted with salt."

Mr. Grant admits that *gehenna* in this passage (translated "hell") "refers to the valley of Hinnom where dead carcases were burnt," but saves the passage for his purpose, by asserting that the valley of Hinnom is used only as "a type of that *gehenna* of fire of

which the Lord speaks." Granting for argument's sake that it is a type, it would follow that the thing typified is destruction, for that is what befel everything cast into the valley of Hinnom. A state of perpetual torment could not be "typified" by a place where death reigned supreme. Hence, Mr. Grant gains nothing by the typical argument. Besides, destruction is the natural antithesis of what the Lord affirms concerning those who are not to "go into *gehenna*." He says they "enter into life," and "enter into the kingdom of God." Exclusion from these is clearly exclusion from life, a departing to death, a going away into "outer darkness," where hopeless death reigns, by fire and corruption. Mr. Grant makes both classes enter into life, only one into a happy life and the other into a tormented one. Christ's figures of speech must be interpreted in harmony with Christ's doctrines.

But Mr. Grant falls back on the *salting with fire*. He says this means "preserving its miserable victims," *i.e.*, in eternal torments. If so, the righteous are to be subject to eternal torments; for *everyone* is to be salted with fire, which is the reason for the exhortation Jesus gives to abandon dangerous pleasures. Mr. Grant tries to escape this. He says the salting of the saints with fire ("always the symbol," he says, "of divine judgment") disciplines them for preservation and salvation, but to the ungodly, it is a fire preserving without saving. The plain meaning of this is, that in the one case it is not fire and in the other case it is; or that it is a symbol of divine judgment in one case but literal fire in the other. That Mr. Grant should have to invent this distinction shows how completely the passage fails in his hands as a proof of eternal torments. The meaning of Christ's words is made perfectly plain by Paul when he says (1 Cor. iii. 13-15), "The fire shall try every man's work what sort it is, and if any man's work be burnt, he shall suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire." Through this fire of judgment every man and all his works will pass, and this fact gives the strongest point to Christ's exhortation; but the action of the judgment-fire is only preservative on certain kinds of men and work. The judgment justifies and makes such incorruptible; the others are destroyed. All are subjected to the salting process, but the salt is preservatively taken on by those things only that are in their nature adapted to receive it; its action on other substances is corrosive and destructive. Jesus goes on to say, "Every sacrifice shall be salted with salt," that is, every sacrifice to be accepted must have the salt of the covenant present as required.—(Lev. ii. 13; Col. iv. 6.) Every man must be seasoned with the Word. He immediately adds: "Salt is good . . . have salt in yourselves," showing that Jesus is using salt in a good sense and not in a bad sense, as Mr. Grant's argument requires.

CHAPTER V.

THE ABOLITION OF EVIL.

THIS is a brief chapter, and calls for briefer notice. It is an attempt to set aside an argument which can be dispensed with so far as the demonstration of so-called "annihilationism" is concerned. The demonstration is complete and unanswerable without it. Nevertheless, the argument in question is powerful, and untouched by Mr. Grant's remarks. It is, that since the mission of Christ is to put away sin and abolish death, to subdue all enemies and destroy all curse (Jno. i. 29; 2 Tim. i. 10; 1 Cor. xv. 25, 26; Rev. xxii. 3), a theory such as Mr. Grant advocates, which teaches the eternal triumph of evil in the existence of a crowded abode of tormented transgressors throughout the countless ages of eternity, must be contrary to truth. With this brief statement of the case, we can afford to dismiss Mr. Grant's chapter on the "abolition of evil"—an abolition he does not believe in, but contrariwise, rejects it as a believer in the eternal and victorious existence of evil.

CHAPTER VI.

TENDENCIES AND RESULTS.

THIS, the last chapter of Mr. Grant's on the whole able book (the ablest that has yet been written against the truth), like the last, calls for little remark at the hands of a Christadelphian, unless it be to disclaim some things that Mr. Grant must surely be inadvertent in imputing to him. The object of the chapter is to show that bad fruit springs from a reception of the doctrine that man is mortal.

He places first, "the undermining of the authority of Scripture." Surely he must be ignorant of the Christadelphians to believe this to be an effect visible in their midst. So far is this from one of their characteristics, that they are described as "Bibliolaters" by those who reject the Bible. That is true which was said of them by a popular Baptist minister just gone to his grave: "they believe the whole of the Scriptures from beginning to end." "Christadelphianism," Mr. Grant says, "Has a new translation specially to teach their views." This is absolutely untrue. A Mr. Wilson, some years ago, published an inter-linear translation of the New Testament; but this is no more "a new translation for Christadelphians to teach their views," than Conquest's Bible, which any of them may possess. Mr. Grant quotes one or two amended renderings from *Elpis Israel* in support of his statement, but surely this is a different affair from a "new translation." Does Mr. Grant abide by every rendering in King James's version? King James's version is a good one, and the one used by the Christadelphians in all their meetings; but they do not shrink when occasion calls for it, to take the liberty which Mr. Grant himself has so freely exercised in this very book, of discriminating as to the precise meaning of the original tongue.

The next evil fruit alleged is a *denial of the resurrection of the unjust*. This no more applies to the Christadelphians than the other. It is one of their most positive tenets that Christ will judge the living and the dead at his appearing, and that among the dead will figure the unjust as well as the just.

Next is the assertion of a tendency to deny that there is any Spirit of God, which he makes consequent on the denial of a spirit of man. Both denials are equally untrue of the Christadelphians. The Christa-

delphians believe "there is a spirit in man" (Job xxxii. 8), though they deny that this spirit is man, or that it is an immortal entity. They also believe, fervently and thankfully, in that Spirit of God from whose presence they cannot go (Ps. cxxxix. 7), and by which, when the Father wills it, all things are made and done. Mr. Grant's imputations are as unfounded on this as on the other heads.

So also with his statement that they "soften down sin," or experience a lessening of responsibility. If he were acquainted with them, he would see the great mistake he had made; also in his suggestion that they undervalue the atonement and deny the divinity of the Son of God. They believe in both clearly, cordially, and unreservedly, in a manner evidently beyond Mr. Grant's knowledge or apprehension. In all points, his remarks as to "tendencies and results" among the Christadelphians are absolutely without truth, notwithstanding that he singles them out as the express illustration of his remarks. We can only excuse Mr. Grant on the score of ignorance. "Thomasism," he says, "has gone *all these lengths*, and more. . . . To the Christian *that* at least bears upon its forefront undisguisedly its deadly character. The subtle forms clothed in more decent orthodoxy are the most to be dreaded here" (in America). The answer is that the system of truth he speaks of as Thomasism is uncharacterised by a single one of the "tendencies and results" he imputes to "annihilationism." That it is "undisguised," and "bears on its forefront" its real character, is a compliment. That that character is opposed to the utmost degree of "deadliness," to the religion of the orthodox Christian of the nineteenth century is to be admitted: but the meaning of that depends upon the question of with whom the truth rests. If it is with Mr. Grant, then indeed "Thomasism" cannot be too earnestly denounced as a destroyer of men; but if it be with "Thomasism," as we have sought to prove throughout this review of Mr. Grant's work, then is Mr. Grant's book only an addition to the hostile agencies which, often in the hands of sincere men, have in all ages sought to turn away the simple from hearing the words of instruction.